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To reach it, a ladder has to be set up. There is no stair.
What can we be looking for in the attic






Chapter 1 is a consideration of: (a) the neglect by researchers of the
cognitive abilities of laterborn (b) complementarities of thought. The
possibility that the thinking of firstborn and laterborn might reflect some
such complementarity links these two lines of interest.
Chapter 2 is a consideration of the abilities of laterborn. The hypothesis
that laterborn are more interested in perceptual and spatial phenomena is
examined from two points of view, (a) By studying self-rated ability at
video-games with the hypothesis that laterborn would rate themselves
more highly than would firstborn. The hypothesis was supported. This study,
though of interest in itself, did not lead on to the rest of the thesis. It is
therefore included as Appendix I. (b) By studying the birth order of eminent
architects. It was hypothesized that "great" architects would be more often
laterborn than would be architects simply eminent enough to be listed in a
biographical dictionary. This hypothesis was supported, lending credence to
the idea that laterborn are more interested in spatial phenomena. But a
similar effect is observed among literary figures. It is therefore suggested
that "creativity" or an avoidance of the received wisdom of the field in
question, leads to this effect. In Chapter 3, the idea that laterborn avoid
received wisdom is developed further. It is hypothesized that laterborn are
more represented in non-dominant cultural areas such as art, while
firstborn are more represented in dominant cultural areas such as science.
An analysis of the Dictionary of National Biography 1961-1970 supports this
hypothesis.
This result is of limited interest if one cannot say how art is related to
science, and hence what ways of thinking are being taken up by laterborn
and firstborn. In Chapter 4 the need for a model of the relationships
between art and science is discussed. In Chapter 5 such a model is
constructed. This comprehensive model is a three dimensional surface (a
cube or a sphere) which relates ways of thinking typified by social science,
biology, physical science, mathematics, design, plastic arts, music, games,
literature, history, myth and depiction. The surface is defined by three
complementarities of thought: analysis/ambiguity, development/space, and
form/resemblance.
In Chapter 6 the coherence of the model is demonstrated by further
discussion and demonstrating the effects of distortion, in Chapter 7 the
model is applied to the data from the Dictionary of National Biography used
in Chapter 3, and a family size difference with respect to the
development/space polarity is found. In Chapter 8 implications of this model
for biographical, cultural and educational research are discussed.
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis with a brief recapitulation of the main
points (a) empirical (b) theoretical (c) with reference to application. An
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CHAPTER 1
BIRTH ORDER AND COMPLEMENTARITES OF THOUGHT
1.1. INTRODUCTION
This work explores two approaches to the study of thinking. The first of
these, reflected in the study of birth order and thinking, draws attention to
differences in thinking. The second, exemplified by the development of a
model of ways of thinking, draws attention to links between different ways
of thinking.
The essential structure of the thesis is this: (1a) An initial question: do
firstborn and laterborn have different preferred ways of thinking? (1b)
Evidence for this with respect to eminence in art and science. (2a) The need
for a comprehensive model of the relations between arts and sciences is
discussed. (2b) Such a model is constructed. (3) The implications of this
model are investigated.
1.2. STARTING POINT
My interest in cognitive differences associated with birth order was
roused by two observations:
1.2.1. Laterbom as Ground not Figure
The first was that in many studies laterborn seem to be considered as a
convenient comparison group for firstborn and little more. Thus laterborn
only posses abilities by default, that is to say because firstborn don't have
these abilities. For example firstborn are considered more dependent
(Schachter 1959), rather than laterborn being considered more independent.
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This seems a trivial point, but it is trivial in the same sense as is the
default use of the male gender in writing or speech. The firstborn, like the
male, is the point of reference. In the case of birth order this is
understandable, both from a first things first point of view, from a historical
point of view (e.g. rights of royal and aristocratic succession), and also
because the firstborn is the most clear-cut birth order category. But it is a
potential source of bias since it leads the investigator to frame questions in
terms of the firstborn, i.e. "what might a firstborn do better or differently?"
For this reason alone, he or she may emphasize firstborn characteristics at
the expense of those of the laterborn.
This is a subtle bias: it doesn't mean that information is not forthcoming
about laterborn, but investigators tend to revert to the firstborn as a
reference point in each new study. The initial (implicit) question is "Does
the firstborn do such and such better or differently?": this is then answered
by the study; it is then concluded that firstborn do such and such laterborn
do such and such. In the light of this a new study is carried out, but the
initial question is still (in the light of this new evidence) "What does a
firstborn do better or differently?"
We are thus faced with a list of findings most commonly expressed in
terms of firstborn having more of quality "x". For example, firstborn are
thought of as more: affiliative when anxious (Schachter 1959, Zucker et al
1968), fearful (Schachter 1959), intelligent (Terman 1925, Scottish Council for
Research in Education 1949, Zajonc 1983), likely to attend college (Altus
1966, Schachter 1963), eminent (Galton 1874, etc: see chapter two),
dependent (Rothbart 1971), responsible (Harris and Howerd 1968, Hansson et
al 1978), and verbally able (Breland 1973).
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In contrast laterborn are considered to have more of very little, and this
only at the margins of the literature: perhaps ability in fighter combat,
sub-aqua and dangerous sports (Schachter 1959, Nisbett 1968, Casher 1977)
and some forms of creativity (Eisenman 1964). The former abilities, as
would be expected in the light of the above discussion, are construed in
terms of the firstborn being more socially evaluating or more fearful, the
latter has little research on it.
Thus the general picture is that firstborn have more, laterborn have (by
default, not consideration) less. The firstborn is thus considered the site of
psychological happenings (good or bad). The laterborn is considered a kind
of shadow or backdrop. The firstborn is the figure, the laterborn is the
ground.
These assumptions imply a model in which first and laterborn are
considered as qualitatively alike, differences between them being explicable
in strictly quantitative terms. The idea that first and laterborn might
approach their worlds in qualitatively different ways did not seem to be
getting through; not because it had not been considered, (as it has been by
for example Rosenberg and Sutton-Smith 1970) but simply because the
firstborn was always the point of reference. A single point of reference
does not enable one to make a qualitative distinction. This requires a
minimum of two reference points. It was this latter sort of distinction in
which I was interested. My belief that laterborn should be considered
"actively different" rather than "passively less" than firstborn led me to
consider the following point.
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1.2.2. Firstborn and Laterborn Abilities Complementary?
This second point was that if laterborn are regarded as having positive
abilities rather than simply the negative of firstborn abilities, these can be
thought of as complementary activities to those of the firstborn. For
example verbal and spatial ability. The greater ability of laterborn in fighter
combat, deep-sea diving and dangerous sports, might suggest something
like a spatial ability, complementary to the verbal ability of the firstborn, or
an orientation to the physical rather than the social world. Similarly
laterborn "creativity" might complement firstborn "responsibility". This
interest in complementarities is central to my thinking, so its worth
considering in more detail here.
1.3. COMPLEMENTARITIES OF THOUGHT
A dichotomizing approach is common in our thinking about thinking. A-
complementarity is a pair of ideas which go together, both of which are
positive (ie one is not the negative of the other) e.g. verbal and spatial, art
and science, linear processing and parallel processing. Thus a word and its
negative, or an attribute and its lack (e.g. neuroticism/stability) do not
constitute complementarities.
Since the 1960s attention has been focused on many of these in the
context of research into differences in processing between the two
hemispheres of the human brain. The overall dichotomy is between those
methods of processing which take place in the so called "dominant", usually
left, hemisphere, and those that take place in what Sperry (1983) has called
"the neglected minor hemisphere", usually the right hemisphere. The neglect
Sperry refers to is that of our educational system and modern society
generally which, he claims, discriminates against this half of the brain.
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Such research has been helpful in so far as it has provided a conceptual
framework within which to try to relate complementarities of thought,
however it has tended to reinforce the assumption that there is only one
major dichotomy in human thought, and that this is reflected fairly simply in
the physical division between the two hemispheres. This point of view,
under the heading BKmodality, has a seperate entry in the recently
published Encylopaedic Dictionary of Psychology (1983), and this is some
reflection of its current recognition as a way of approaching problems of
differentiating cognition. This may be too narrow a perspective but is
nevertheless a useful starting point.
To show how widely used these complementary ideas have been I
reproduce a list adapted from Bogen (1969).
Each author's name is followed by a pair of concepts, the first regarded
by that author as an attribute of the left hemisphere, the second as an
















Bogen introduces a further list, which does not specifically refer to
cerebral lateralization, under the appropriate heading of "A potpourri of
dichotomies". It's contributors include Freud, James, Bruner, Hobbes,
Spearman, Luria and Levi-Strauss. The dichotomies noted include:
atomistic/holistic, abstract/concrete, numerical/geometrical,
symbolic/perceptual, discursive/eidetic, digital/analogic,
differential/existential, relations/correlates, directed/free, postive/mythic, and
abstract/maplike.
To these one might add: self assertive/self transcendent (Koestler 1978),
convergent/divergent (Guilford 1959), mechanistic/holistic (Smuts 1926),
rational/empirical (many sources), metonomous/metaphorical (Jacobson and
Halle 1956), agency/communion (Bakan 1966), action/appearence (Berger
1972) and romantic/classical (many sources).
These lists have a semblance of order, but are far from organized in any
satisfactory theoretical way. However there does seem to be something like
a common difference between the terms on the left hand side and the
terms on the right hand side. But it is also clear that all the terms on the
right are not synonymous, and that the same is true for the left.
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We thus have: (1) two sets of terms which seem to differ in the same
sort of way. (2) no clear idea of how synonymous or otherwise the terms
within these sets are. One can add two speculations: (3) that any forced
synonymity would simply lead to a conflation of ideas. (4) that there may be
more than one dimension of difference between the two lists.
My thinking about birth order differences was strongly influenced by
these ideas of complementarity. It seemed worth exploring the possibility
that the sort of cognitive differences reflected in these lists might also be
reflected in birth order differences. If so one would have the beginnings of
an answer the question "do laterborn think in a qualitatively different way
from firstborn?" and be able to suggest what sort of thinking this is.
At the beginning of my research point (1) was most salient in my
thinking. In retrospect this seems much more a point of departure rather
than a properly thought out position, but despite its one dimensionality it
gave me access to the problem. As my research progressed (2), (3), and (4)
became more obvious, culminating in the development of a model of ways
of thinking. I don't mean to imply that this model was based on a
consideration of this sort of list, however my approach to concepts was as
complementary pairs, and thus has something in common with the
approach of the authors of the above dichotomies.
The first section of this thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) contains studies of the
relationship between birth order and ability in architecture and literature and
eminence in art and science. These studies are investigations of positive
laterborn abilities. The issue of complementarities of thought becomes
progressively more prominent.
The second section (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), which has the most general
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implications, contains a consideration of the relationships between
complementary ways of thinking such as art and science. This leads on
directly from the finding in chapter three that there is a birth order
difference in eminence in art and science. While I was satisfied that the
birth order difference existed, I was far from satified that I understood what
this difference meant, because there was no adequately differentiated model
of the relationships between art and science. I therefore developed a model
of these relationships.
The third and final section looks again at family structure in the light of
the model of the relationships between art and science (Chapter 7) and
discusses the implications of the model for educational, cultural and
biographical analysis (Chapter 8).
My starting principles were an interest (a) in bias (neglect of
consideration of laterborn per se) and (b) in complementary ways of
thinking (Bogen's dichotomies). The thesis as a whole can be regarded as a
commentary on bias and complementarity.
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CHAPTER 2
BIRTH ORDER AND EMINENCE IN ARCHITECTURE AND LITERATURE
2.1. INTRODUCTION
2.1.1. A Perspective on Birth Order as a Biographical Datum
Birth order means something to many people on an individual level. The
description "youngest" or "only" child seems an important piece of
biographical information. People often believe that psychologists are
interested in them on this individual level. A common assumption on
meeting a psychologist is "you know what sort of person I am", or more
reasonably "you're interested in what what sort of person I am", with the
emphasis on the "I" rather than the "sort". Psychologists dismiss such views
easily, explaining to them that modern mainstream academic psychology is
a discipline which attempts to elucidate general laws of human behaviour,
and consequently has little interest in the individual.
Many psychologists swallow this nomothetic position, this search for
general laws, whole. And yet, clearly, this is not what psychology means to
the ordinary person. That person expects the psychologist to be interested
in what goes on within his or her life. That person expects the psychologist
to be interested in biographical issues, that is to say to be interested from
an idiographic, or single case, standpoint. Psychologists do not talk the
psychology of common sense.
In itself this is neither here nor there, but clearly, if we can talk the
psychology of common sense without doing violence to our subject, we
should. Such an approach benefits both psychologists and others alike.
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Need we then be so divorced from this standpoint? Some psychologists,
for example Howe (1982), recognize the importance of such biographical
information, especially with respect to making psychological sense of the
achievements of outstanding individuals. Detailed biographical study is not
the intention of the present work, however the variable initially under
consideration, birth order, is peculiarly suited to bridging the gap between
idiographic and nomothetic points of view. This is because birth order
information, which can be examined from a nomothetic point of view, is
salient in idiographic studies.
Later in this chapter and Chapter 3 I make use of data derived from
dictionaries of biography. The fact that these idiographic studies en masse
yield enough of this data for a nomothetic treatment to be possible
indicates the importance with which birth order data is regarded by the
writers of these short biographies. However this importance is not explicitly
recognized, because when biographical material becomes highly
standardized (eg Who's Who), while marriage, children, etc are mentioned,
birth order is completely neglected.
2.1.1.1. Galton
Interest in the influence of birth order on life history has been shown by
Sulloway (1972,1979) who comments on its role in the cognitive flexibility of
laterborn scientists such as Darwin, and on what he calls Freud's 'hybrid'
birth order (he was his mother's firstborn, but his father's thirdborn).
Hudson (1975), discussing Sulloway's 1972 paper, suggests that it
establishes "a valuable bridge". The bridge he is refering to is that between
the idiographic and the nomothetic. Interest in the influence of birth order
on the course of life has also come from Fancher (1984) who suggests,
from an Adlerian perspective, that Galton felt inferiority due to his position
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in his family as a youngest born.
The theme of this last paper is the relationship between Galton's
theoretical perspective and his life circumstances. Fancher points out that
Galton regarded himself as an academic disaster, due to his failure to live
up to family expectations and get a first at Cambridge. He suggests that
this biographical fact led him to espouse eugenics as a way of explaining
this, in terms of his own genetic endowment. He had no obvious
environmental excuse, coming as he did from a well to do and highly gifted
family.
Intriguingly, although Fancher mentions Galton's position in his family,
he does not mention that in "English men of science" Galton espouses not
only a eugenic position but also points out for the first time the greater
tendency to eminence among firstborn. If we follow Fancher's argument
that Galton espoused eugenics in order to make sense of his own academic
failure, by the same line of reasoning, but this time applied to Galton's
environmental explanation for firstborn eminence (greater inheritance,
attention in infancy and parental emphasis on responsibility, see below), we
see that Galton, as a youngest born is again able to explain his own
academic failure. Whether this explanation is right or not, it is certainly
interesting, since by pursuing Fancher's line of thought, that biographical
fact leads to theoretical interest, another part of Galton's theoretical
interests, birth order, falls into place in the structure of his life and thought.
2.1.2. The Individual and the Type
I have used Fancher's interest in Galton to illustrate concern with birth
order among biographical researchers, but in the course of this I have
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referred to Galton's own interest in birth order differences. This work is the
first important contribution to the literature. Galton's approach was
nomothetic but this is somewhat misleading, since the origin of his interest
in these generalizations is in the biographies of individual people. He
applies numbers to people but people are not for him mere numbers. In a
radically nomothetic approach this is what people necessarily become. One
is reminded of a quotation from Scott Fitzgerald's short story The rich boy':
Begin with an individual, and before you know it you find
that you have created a type; begin with a type, and you find
that you have created nothing.
This would be a good motto for a psychology properly balanced between
idiographic and nomothetic approaches, that is to say a psychlogy rooted in
study of the individual, but concerned with generalizing from this. Perhaps
this can give us some clue about re-integrating an idiographic approach
into contemporary psychology. One way to try to generalize about groups
and yet not lose sight of the fact that they are individuals is to deal with
groups of highly eminent people. One need not name them or discuss them
individually but simply because they are drawn from a dictionary of
biography or whatever leaves one with the recognition that these are not
nameless cyphers, but real people who have lived real lives.
One can of course argue that such samples are by their very nature
unrepresentative. This is true with reference to a national population, but in
another sense they are highly representative, since at least they represent
one group accurately, and at least they are more obviously identifiable as
human beings. One can identify with someone in the Dictionary of National
Biography (even if that person is not specified). One cannot identify with a
number. An idiographic view enables such identification. A nomothetic view
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does not. However this latter view allows one to group people in a
coherent way. Ideally in psychology what one wants to be able to do is to
class people together, while still recognising that they are people.
2.1.3. Idiographic implies Nomothetic
There are no real barriers between idiographic and nomothetic
approaches however their relationship is directional. One can argue from
idiographic to nomothetic, but not vice-versa. An idiographic description is
implicitly nomothetic. It relies for its credibility on us accepting that the
description fits with norms of human behaviour, known and unknown.
In contrast, a nomothetic approach need never refer back to individual
experience. This is its prime methodological disadvantage. Once a regularity
of behaviour has been discovered, the regularity is the thing: individuals are
only of interest in so far as they exhibit the regularity. The individual is
subordinate to the Gaussian distribution (note how the use of the word
Gaussian, rather than 'normal', emphasises idiographic connotations, which
would otherwise be missed. This helps to embed a study in social reality,
rather than in the data base of a computer).
Thus in a psychology approached from a nomothetic point of view the
individual is valued only in so far as he or she is an example of a regularity
of behaviour. In contrast in a idiographicly based psychology the regularities
of behaviour are implicit in the individual. Studies of eminence enable us to
look for psychological regularities as parts of the lives of readily identifiable
people, rather than process anonymous subjects in order to derive them.
This latter approach has its value, however its present dominance, which
necessarily distances psychology from people, should be called into
question. The key point is that an idiographic starting point does not stop
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you deriving laws. But it does stop you forgetting that people are
individuals. In this sense Galton's "English men of science" is a successful
piece of psychology, since one is always keenly aware of the people it
refers to. It would be convenient to assume that it has this accessibility due
to insight on Galton's part, but it is probably an accident. Galton strikes one
as a Victorian interested in his eminent contemporaries (as many Victorians
were, witness the birth of the Dictionary of National Biography, founded in
1882, only seven years after publication of 'English men of science') who
also wanted to make psychological generalizations. Thus it was his position
as a Victorian scientist which gave his works the form that they have,
rather than any intuitive attempt to blend idiographic and nomothetic
approaches. His studies, linked with his seminal work in statistics, can in
fact be seen as steps on the road to the predominantly nomothetic
psychology we have today. Indeed Kelves (1984) has commented with
reference to this aspect of Galton:
To enumerate human characteristics required no
penetration beneath the phenomenological surface and
established a wall of numerical objectivity between the
observer and the forces of the heart.
thus indicating the anti-idiographic intentions in Galton's work. But for
whatever reason, Galton's idiographic/nomothetic balance is a good one,
and it was an interest in this balance that stimulated my own interest in
biographical data. Thus, where appropriate, I have kept to a position on the
borderland between individual human beings and numbers.
2.1.4. Galton and Birth Order
To turn to Galton's work on birth order: this has come in for both
support and criticism. His study is in no way methodologically watertight:
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he does not consider family size or social class as complicating variables,
or consider that a baby boom might inflate the number of firstborn in his
sample. But his study is at the very least highly suggestive. In a sample of
ninety-nine well known nineteenth century scientists, he found that:
.... (1) that eldest sons appear nearly twice as often as
younger sons; (2) that, as regards intermediate children, the
elder and younger halves of the family contribute equally; and
(3) that only sons are as common as eldest sons...
The figures for this are as follows: only sons, 22 cases; eldest sons, 26
cases; youngest sons 15 cases. Intermediates: elder half of family, 13 cases;
younger half of family, 12 cases. Galton explains these findings as follows:
... the elder sons have, on the whole, decided
advantages of nurture over the younger sons. They are more
likely to be possessed of independent means, and therefore
to follow the pursuits that have most attraction for their
tastes; they are treated more as companions by their parents,
and have earlier responsibility, both of which would develop
independence of character; probably, also, the firstborn child
of families not well-to-do in the world would generally have
more attention in his infancy, more breathing space, and
better nourishment, than his younger brothers and sisters in
their several turns.
In the wake of Galton's work came studies by Yoder (1894), Ellis (1904),
Gini (1915), Clarke (1916), Cattell (1917) and Roe (1953). Like Galton, Cattell
and Roe studied scientists, Ellis and Yoder studied the eminent in general,
Clarke studied literary figures and Gini studied academics. These studies all
support Galton's findings: firstborn are over-represented among the
outstanding. In the light of this Hudson (1975) has commented:
Subsequent research has supported (Galton)
handsomely, and although efforts have been made to explain
away the data in terms of social class, differential fertility and
statistical mudddles of various sorts, the effect remains.
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Further recent support comes from Albert (1980) and Falbo (1984). However
doubts are cast by Ernst and Angst (1983) whose criticisms are in the
tradition reflected in the quotation from Hudson above.
This dichotomy of views can be explained by the different perspectives
of Hudson on the one hand and of Ernst and Angst on the other. The
former is prepared to accept, and is interested in, data which refers to
individuals from highly selected groups and may not necessarily generalize
from those groups (There is, indeed, a suggestion from Altus (1966) that
birth order effects are more prominent the more highly selected the group).
That is to say Hudson is sympathetic to a relatively idiographic position.
The latter authors are radically nomothetic in their approach. This is in fact
the keynote of their book, and they seem primarily interested in variables
which can be used as predictors in education. Birth order is not such a
variable. Note 1.
This brings out the distinction between an approach which values the
idiographic and one which does not. Hudson is explicitly interested in
individual experience, for example he takes note of what Sulloway says
about Darwin and Freud, and is fascinated by Rilke's extraordinary
production of the "Sonnets to Orpheus".
Ernst and Angst have no such interests. What concerns them are the
method and the mean, not the person. Their book is an example of what
Hudson (1972) has called "the cult of the fact", and as such risks throwing
the baby out with the bath water. Their work is nevertheless useful because
of its comprehensive nature, but with reference to this it should be noted
that they mention neither Hudson nor Sulloway. Whether one finds birth
order an interesting variable or not thus seems depend largely on
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subjective criteria, that is to say, what one thinks psychology is about.
2.1.5. Early Parental Attention and the Firstborn
It seems that when we actually look at what happens in society,
firstborn are particularly adept at filling positions of eminence: why should
this be the case? It is easy to reject Gaiton's suggestion that the firstborn
is more likely to be in a position of eminence in science because of
independent means consequent on inheritance. This is simply because the
effect shows up again in Roe (1953). Thus it is constant across Gaiton's
independently financed British amateurs, and Roe's institutionally financed
American professionals. However the possibility remains that the firstborn is
economically favoured within a family whilst still a child. Gaiton's other line
of consideration, that firstborn children receive more parental attention, has
received considerable support in. the literature, although, oddly, Galton
himself has not been recognized as the originator of the suggestion.
2.1.5.1. Attention, intervention, intrusiveness and interaction
Results supporting such a view come from a variety of studies.
Lasko(1954) studied sibling pairs of first and secondborn at the same ages
(ranging from two to ten):
.... the first child, in the preschool years, is subjected to
a great deal of verbal stimulation and acceleration. Special
acceierative attempts seem to occur before the first child is
two and again when he is five; these ... possibly represent
parental emphasis on skill acquisition (language, toilet
training, etc) for the very young child, and school readiness
for the five year old. The second child is also subjected to
acceleratory pressures by the time he is school age but
escapes the earlier efforts to speed up development.
Similarly Sears et al (1957) found that parents were more interventionist
and also less consistent with firstborn and Rothbart (1971) found that
20
mothers exhibit a greater anxious intrusiveness into the performance of
firstborn. More recently, Lewis and Kreitzberg (1979) have reported that
parents have more interaction with firstborn. Maccoby (1980) has suggested
that many of these effects result from firstborns having inexperienced
parents, but she also makes the point that this very inexperience may be
instrumental in the subsequent higher achievement of firstborn. They get
used to paying attention to the demands of authority. One could say that
authority makes sense to them. It is their reality.
2.1.5.2. Firstborn are "onlies" early on
In addition to any active intervention by parents, a firstborn as the only
child present in the family for, normally, well over a year is likely to get
considerably more and indeed a different type of, parental attention than a
laterborn during the equivalent period of life, simply because no other child
is present to be attended to. This is a key time in the life of any person.
Lipsitt (1969) has argued that the newborn can learn better than he or she
will be able to at any later age. This emphasises the importance of this
early period of life. At this time the firstborn is thus likely to find parents a
more important source of information than will the laterborn. One can
extend this idea by suggesting that firstborn will in later life consider
parents a more important source of information.
The picture which emerges is this: the firstborn is used to his or her life
being mediated by people in a parent-like role, that is to say by people in
whom (at least from the point of view of the firstborn) the norms of a
wider society are vested.
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2.1.6. Differing Behaviour of Firstborn and Laterborn Adults
Turning now to the behaviour of adults: there is evidence that firstborn
adults actively seek social norms, rather than simply responding to them
when necessary. This need for social comparison on the part of firstborn
was demonstrated by Schachter (1959). He found that firstborn were more
dependent on others as sources of "approval, support, help and reference"
(1959, p82). He related this to the Sears et al study referred to above. In
several experiments concerned with the relationship between anxiety and
affiliation, firstborn were more anxious when faced with a stressful situation
than were laterborn. When both were equally anxious, firstborn chose to be
with other subjects more than did laterborn. He goes on to say:
An attempt is made to formulate these findings in terms
of a relationship between ordinal position and dependence. It
is assumed that dependent behaviour will be most strongly
manifested in conditions of disturbance and anxiety but that
there should be other non-anxiety related indicators of such a
relationship. Independent measures of dependence prove to
be systematically related to ordinal position, with first-born
individuals consistently more dependent than later-born
individuals. Influencibility, which is assumed to be in part a
function of dependence, is demonstrated to be related to
ordinal position.
Support for the relationship between affiliation, anxiety and birth order
comes from Zucker et al, who in a natural experiment carried out during the
New York blackout of 1968, a distinctly anxiety provoking situation, found
that in those waiting in situations congruent with Schachter's theory, that is
to say firstborn waiting with others, laterborn waiting alone, anxiety was
significantly lower than in those waiting in situations not congruent with
the theory. Schachter's correlative theory, that under stress, in isolation,
laterborn will perform better than firstborn, is supported by his own
reanalysis of data from Torrance (1954), in which he showed that laterborn
fighter pilots perform better than do firstborn. Following up this work,
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Helmreich (1968) found that among U.S. Navy divers, another set of people
who must perform under stress in isolation, laterborn performed better.
The finding that, regardless of stress, firstborn are more affiliative than
laterborn has been supported by Dember (1964), Koenig (1969) and Nowicki
(1971). Pulling these strands of social evaluation related behaviour together,
Adams (1972) concluded, in a review of the literature, that:
... affiliation, dependence, conformity, and responsibility
all appear to be greater among firstborns than laterborns...
These attributes reflect an awareness of what society expects of the
individual. Such an awareness is functional in the gaining of a position of
eminence.
2.1.6.1. Studies of social behaviour in children of differing birth order
Snow, Maccoby and Jacklin (1981) report a behavioural difference in
children of 33 months which may be an early indication of this awareness.
They found that firstborn showed more social behaviour of several types
than did laterborn. The types of social behaviour they observed included
both "social assertiveness - aggression" eg attempting to take a toy from
another child, and "positive social behaviour", eg offering a toy, or moving
close to another child. This firstborn behaviour seems to be concerned with
the initiation of social activity, which fits in with the idea of seeking social
comparison, rather than interaction with peers per se, because in the home
environment Davie et al (1984) found that firstborn actually spent less time
interacting with peers than did youngestborn. In contrast firstborn spent
much more time interacting with parents than did youngestborn. One might
suggest that for a firstborn parents are the prime comparators, but peers
will do if no parent is available.
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Thus the context within which a firstborn acts seems to be substantially
composed of the opinions, actual or potential, of other people. The context
within which the laterborn acts seems to be much less composed of other
peoples's opinions. What then might this context be?
2.1.7. Social versus Physical?
Initially I was interested in the possibility that while firstborn cope well
with the conventions of society, laterborn cope better with physical
phenomena. My interest in this possibility originated in Schachter's (1959)
reanalysis of data relating to Korean War fighter pilots, which indicated that
laterborn were more capable in fighter combat than were firstborn.
It seemed to me that Schachter's explanation might deal with only one
side of the phenomenon since it might also be the case that laterborn had
a positive ability that helped them in these situations, such as a greater
awareness of physical phenomena such as space, gravity and movement, in
addition to needing to socially evaluate less than firstborn.
Results which support this position come from Eisenman (1964), who
found that laterborn had better design ability than firstborn, Wiedl (1977)
who found that lastborns had a greater interest in visually complex stimuli
than did firstborns, and also that lastborns were superior in perceptual
speed to firstborn, a finding also reported by Koch (1954). A further result of
interest here comes from Bassett et al (1978) who found that laterborn
perform better on tasks of visual co-ordination and figure ground
discrimination.
I thus accepted Schachter's idea that firstborn need to socially evaluate
more, but suggested that in addition laterborn, rather than simply needing
24
to socially evaluate less, were also positively more able to deal with certain
situations, namely perceptual and spatial. This exemplifies the approach I
advocated in in Chapter one, that is to say to consider laterborn of interest
in their own right rather than simply as backdrops to firstborn.
One can make sense of such abilities on the part of laterborn by
considering that infants are active beings and in the absence of parental
attention laterborn won't just lie there doing nothing, but will investigate
alternative sources of information, kicking their cots or whatever, to enable
them to analyse the physical contingencies of the environment. Piaget
(1953) describes precisely such creation of information from inanimate
objects, and Watson (1972) has described the satisfaction infants derive
from gaining control over physical systems.
2.1.8. A Dual Approach to the Problem
I approached the problem in two ways. Both yielded results, but they led
in different directions, and attempts to synthesize them, though interesting,
in fact only led to a conflation between, on the one hand, creative, and on
the other, perceptual, thought. In one part of this dual approach I looked at
a situation analogous to Schachter's fighter pilot study, but without the
enforced isolation, namely interest in video-games. The other part of the
approach was to study a group which can reasonably be considered to be
highly aware of their spatial environments, namely eminent architects. I was
additionally interested in this latter study because it was based on the
relationship between idiographic and nomothetic principles which I
discussed above with reference to Galton. The video-games study yielded
results consonant with Schachter's work, that is to say laterborn rated
themselves more highly than did firstborn, however these are not followed
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up in the present work. For details of this study see Appendix I. The other
study forms the basis for the rest of the thesis and is discussed below.
2.2. BIRTH ORDER AND GREAT ARCHITECTS
One profession that is particularly suited to individuals who have an
orientation to spatial phenomena is architecture. I therefore searched for a
suitable way of obtaining data about both birth order and competence in
this profession.
2.2.1. Method
The source of data I decided to use was Colvin's "Biographical
Dictionary of British Architects up to 1840". A substantial number of these
entries give information about birth order. The comprehensiveness of the
book is such that the majority of the architects entered are relatively
unknown.
This comprehensiveness gave me the opportunity to compare the birth
order of great architects with those who were merely eminent enough to
appear in the book. This comparison had the advantage that it allowed the
capabilities of the laterborn to be considered, even if, as seemed likely in
the light of the birth order and eminence literature considered above,
firstborn were over-represented among eminent architects as a whole, as
they are in other professions.
Thus the question was not "are firstborn over-represented among
eminent architects?" but "given a specified sample of eminent architects, are
laterborn more represented among those considered great when compared
with those considered merely eminent?"
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This avoids the difficulty faced by most birth order/eminence studies,
namely the possibiity that an over-representation of any birth order
category is an artifact of demographic change. For example: if in any
sample there are more firstborn than one would expect by chance, this
could be the result of an unusually high rate of marriages immediately prior
to the period during which the sample members were born. This would
clearly lead to more firstborn births than in a normal period.
2.2.1.1. A Criterion for deciding "Greatness"
The criterion for greatness was taken as three columns devoted to
either life or works in the dictionary. This criterion drew the line
appropriately between the great and the eminent. To give some indication
of who is included in the greatness category: it stretches from major
figures such as Robert Adam to lesser but still important figures such as
William Henry Playfair, who is best known for his public buildings in
Edinburgh, which include the National Gallery, the Royal Scottish Academy,
and New College. The architects in the merely eminent category are
comparatively unknown. There is a notable exception to this, namely
Thomas Archer builder of St John's, Smith Square, London. However he is a
genuine exception, and as such lends support to, rather than challenges, the
chosen criterion.
In making my analysis I used only information available in the dictionary.
Thus although I knew that Sir Christopher Wren was a laterborn, since this
information was not present in the dictionary it was not used. This avoided
problems of differential selection of information on my part.
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2.2.1.2. The Approximate nature of the Data
A problem with the data was that architects were frequently described
as "the eldest son of" or "first of two sons of" or something similar. From
this sort of description it is of course impossible to know whether or not
the architect is firstborn. In contrast there is no such problem deciding
whether an architect described as "second son of" or "fifth son of" is
laterborn. Full family structure details were rarely given. For this reason my
comparisons are made between a possibly firstborn group (n = 90),
consisting of those described as first, only or elder son; elder brother, son
and heir, and son and succesor, and a definitely laterborn group (n = 98).
Total N = 188. For data see Appendix II.
2.2.1.3. Hypothesis
It was hypothesised that laterborn are significantly more represented
among great architects than among architects who are merely eminent.
2.2.2. Results
11 great architects were possibly firstborn; 23 great architects were
definitely laterborn; 79 of the remaining eminent architects were possibly









Chi squared = 3.2828, ldf, p<.05, 1 tailed. Note 2.
The hypothesis was thus supported.
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2.2.2.1. Family size
This result could be due to family size rather than to birth order, since
there are proportionally more laterborn to firstborn in large families than
there are in small families. Thus it may be that great architects tend to
come from larger families. There was insufficient data to test this
alternative hypothesis, however I will comment on this again when
discussing literary figures, below.
2.2.2.2. Social grouping
Cox (1966) has commented with respect to the definition of social
classes:
Probably the social classification hitherto adopted is too
simple to be of any great value, for the Registrar General has
recently shown a tendency to break down the five groups
into their component parts.
This caveat is particularly appropriate here because it is difficult to tell
from the data on what socio-economic level a father was, for example, an
"architect" or a "mason". In addition, in line with Cox's comment about the
growing tendency to group by similarity of activity, one may doubt the
relevance of grouping them separately. In some cases families described as
masons, such as the Mylnes of Edinburgh, whose surviving productions
include buildings such as St Cecilia's Hall, the Tron church and Milne's
Court, would certainly today be considered families of architects. Similarly,
Yarwood (1970,p37) points out that William Adam was "Master Mason of
Scotland". Yet this title signified his position as Scotland's premier architect
of the day, pupil and successor to Sir William Bruce. In the event I decided
to ignore accepted demographic frameworks (social class and
socio-economic group) and use three groups which seemed to be relevant
to the data. These groups were (1) Father occupation stated as architect; (2)
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Father occupation related to architecture: i.e. mason, stuccoist, painter,
drawing theorist, sculptor, bricklayer, joiner, carpenter, builder, artist; (3)
Father occupation something other than architecture or related.
This classification leads to the interesting finding that the major part of
the effect observed above is accounted for by those whose fathers were
engaged in architecture or related occupations.




Chi squared = 4.4564, 1 df, 2 tailed, p<.05




Chi squared = 0.0162, 1 df, 2 tailed, p<.45, not significant
Laterborn seem to respond better if brought up in an environment in
which the sort of thought which characterizes architects is present.
2.2.2.3. Firstborn over-represented as a whole?
It should also be noted that the proportion of possibly firstborn to
definitely laterborn is 90:98, approximately 1:1. Bearing in mind that the
number of 'firstborn' is raised by the necessity of including the possibles,
this ratio nevertheless strongly suggests that firstborn are over-represented
in the sample as a whole, as one would expect from the eminence
literature.
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Such a suggestion is in line with a finding by Craik (1961). This is
unpublished but it is reported by Datta (1968). Craik is said to have found:
"that highly creative architects tend to be firstborn rather than only children
or laterborns". This is consistent with my data in that (a) all the architects
in my sample could be rated highly creative, since what I have been looking
at is relative creativity within what is undeniably a group of highly creative
individuals, (b) even among great architects firstborn may be
over-represented, the proportion of possibly firstborn to definitely laterborn
is 11:33. Due to the approximate nature of the data I cannot comment on
this further.
2.2.2.4. An uncritical assumption
At the beginning of this study I somewhat uncritically assumed that I
knew what sort of thought characterized architects, and that was: thinking
orientated to spatial phenomena and that "greatness" would be evidence of
a greater capability in this type of thinking. This is not an unreasonable
assumption and indeed such a type of thinking is obviously of importance
to architects. It does not however follow that the difference between first
and laterborn picked up in this study reflects this variable. Rather than
concluding at this point that something like a greater interest in spatial
phenomena on the part of laterborn leads to their relative
over-representation among great architects, I considered another possibility.
2.2.3. Convention versus Creativity?
Some authors, for example Eisenman (1964), have suggested that
laterborn are more creative than firstborn. "Creativity" is not an easy
concept to define, but may usefully be thought of as a process working
independently of the received wisdom of any field, and more, a process
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which works best if for some reason the creating individual is isolated from
that received wisdom. Mcluhan(1967) has called such creativity 'amateur':
Faraday's ignorance of mathematics contributed to his
inspiration ... it compelled him to develop a simple, non
mathematical concept when he looked for an explanation of
electrical and magnetic phenomena ...
Professionalism is environmental, amateurism is
anti-environmental. Professionalism merges the individual into
the patterns of total environment. Amateurism seeks the
development of ... the critical awareness of the ground rules
of society. The amateur can afford to lose. The professional
tends to classify and to specialize, to accept uncritically the
ground rules of the environment. The ground rules provided
by the mass response of his colleagues serve as a pervasive
environment of which he is contentedly ... unaware. The
"expert" is the man who stays put.
One has only to think of Newton's isolation from Cambridge during the
plague of 1665, Einstein's lowly position in a Patents Office in the early
years of this century, Kohler's internment on Tenerife during World War I, or
Kekule dozing in front of the fire, events which correspond closely to the
development of important new theories and insights, specifically Newton's
theory of Universal Gravitation, Einstein's special relativity, Kohler's insight
into insight, one of the foundation stones of Gestalt Psychology, and
Kekule's recognition of the structure of the benzene ring, to realize the
creative usefulness of being isolated one way or another from the received
wisdom of the field, or "environment", in question, or as Kuhn (1963) would
call it "the normal paradigm".
It will be noted that the discussion of eminence in general, earlier in this
paper, suggests that it is precisely such normal paradigms, intricate
structures of convention, that firstborn are particularly adept at grasping
and using. If this is the case then laterborn are less likely to become
involved with received wisdom and thus though they may for this reason be
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less likely to become eminent, for the same reason, if they do become
eminent they are likely to be creative in that position of eminence, and thus
they may eventually be considered exceptional. Being laterborn could thus
be seen as another way of being isolated from the dominant paradigm.
More profound, but nevertheless similar in effect to being interned on an
island, dozing off, or thinking about fundamental problems in a patents
office or an orchard.
Certainly this interpretation could be applied to my findings with regard
to architects. It would also be in accord with the clinical insights of Adler
(1939):
I have always found that the first-born possesses a sort
of conservative tendency. He takes the element of power
always into consideration ...
and with respect to some last-born:
Restlessly pushing forward, they surpass everyone by
their initiative (Kunstadt) frequently transcending the normal
and becoming pathfinders.
2.3. BIRTH ORDER AND CLARKE'S 'AMERICAN MEN OF LETTERS"
In order to investigate this "creativity" hypothesis further, I carried out a
reanalysis of Clarke's 1916 data on American men of letters. This covers a
group of similar social standing to the architects, engaged in an activity
with a similar requirement for creativity, but demanding this in a verbal
rather than a spatial medium. I should point out that this sample, contrary




Clarke divided men and women of letters into 13 categories: patron,
librarian, actor, orator, publicist, narrator, erudite, popularizer, speculative,
prose writer, poet, and dramatist.
I made three comparisons defining "creative writer" in three
progressively more selective ways. First of all, I compared writers in four of
Clarke's categories: prose writers (by which Clarke means novelists), poets,
dramatists and actors (included here because even though they are not
writers they seem more appropriately placed in the so called "creative"
group) with all men and women of letters in the remaining categories (ie
patron, librarian, publicist, orator, narrator, erudite, popularizer and
speculative). It could be argued that "actor" should not be classed with
"creative writer" however in my judgement this classification was more
appropriate than the alternative, to class "actor" with "patron, librarian, etc".
This decision was easier to take because there were so few actors in the
sample that an inappropriate classification was unlikely to unduly influence
the results. Thus in practical terms at least the classification is satisfactory.
N = 251. For data see Appendix III.
2.3.1.2. Hypothesis
It was hypothesized that creative writers would be more often laterborn




33 "creative" men and women of letters are firstborn; 54 "creative" men
and women of letters are laterborn; 58 remaining men and women of letters




Chi squared = 0.1558, ldf, 1 tailed, p<.9, not significant.
No pattern is discernible in this data.
2.3.2.2. Second analysis
In the second comparison my definition of "creative writer" was more
demanding. The selection criteria were (a) that the individual in question
was a poet, novelist, dramatist or actor, as classified by Clarke, and (b) that
he or she had an entry in Chambers Biographical Dictionary (1975). I used
this second criterion since an entry in this dictionary of persons of
international historical importance indicates a greater eminence than does a
listing in Clarke's book. These "creative" writers (plus actors) can all be
thought of as historically important figures. This produced the following
list, which I insert in full because of it's relevence to the third comparison:
Freneau P, Barlow J, Paulding J K, Key F S, Irving W, Cooper J F, Payne J
H, Goodrich S G, Bryant W C, Percival J G, Halliburton T C, Child L M, Abbott
J, Emerson R W, Hawthorne N, Forrest E, Simms W G, Willis N P, Longfellow
H W, Whittier J G, Holmes 0 W, Poe E A, Ossoli M S F, Stowe H B, Very J,
Cushman C S, Thoreau H D, Lowell J R, Whitman W, Cary A, Curtis G W,
Taylor B, Foster S C, Jefferson J, Alcott L M, Booth E, Clemens S L, Daly A,
Roe E P, Allen J L, Field E.
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Note that this list only includes those in Chambers Biographical
Dictionary for whom Clarke had birth order data. For this reason several
figures, eg Herman Melville and Henry James, do not appear. This procedure
was adopted in line with that of the architects study (see comment above
concerning Christopher Wren), in order avoid bias on my part resulting from
differential remembering of biographical detail in line with my hypothesis.
Such a problem may seem unlikely, but when one has an interest in such
details it is very easy to, for example, skim through a biography in a shop,
remember the detail one agrees with, and forget, simply because one is
less primed for it, detail which does not support the hypothesis. Precisely
delimiting the source of information (eg to a Biographical Dictionary, or to
data already collected by Clarke) enabled such bias to be ruled out.
8 historically important "creative" writers were firstborn; 33 historically
important "creative" writers were laterborn; 73 of the remainder were




Chi squared = 2.9854, 1 df, 1 tailed, p<.05
It can be seen that the pattern is similar to the pattern for architects.
2.3.2.3. Third analysis
My third comparison was most comparable to that carried out in the
case of architects, since I compared "great" creative writers with all the
remaining men and women of letters. The criterion I used for greatness was
simply that the writer in question should have survived to the present day
as a source of continuing literary interest rather than just as a historically
interesting figure. The writers to whom this description seemed to apply,
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refering to the above list were: Samuel.LCIemens (Mark Twain), Walt
Whitman, Henry David Thoreau, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, John
Greenleaf Whittier, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Edgar Allan Poe, Nathaniel
Hawthorne, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Harriette Beecher Stowe, Louisa M Alcott,
Washington Irving, James Fenimore Cooper and John Russell Lowell. The
least famous of these is Whittier. I include him because of his continued
recognition as a hymn writer. However, were he to be excluded from the
"great" group the result (see below) is not substantially affected.
The pattern is similar to the above but more pronounced:
No great writers were firstborn; 14 great writers were laterborn; 81 of
the remaining men and women of letters were firstborn; 156 of the
remaining men and women of letters were laterborn.
Chi squared = 5.5875, 1 df, 1 tailed, p<.01
The hypothesis was thus supported in the two more selective comparisons.
It is most strongly supported in the most selective comparison. In fact
when the great writers are removed from the creative group used in
comparison two, the effect is no longer evident, thus one can conclude that














Chi squared = 0.0984, 1 df, 1 tailed, p<.4, not significant
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2.3.2.4. Family size
As I have pointed out above, such a pattern could be a consequence of
family size rather than of birth order per se, since if great writers tended to
come from larger than average families for the sample, proportionally more
laterborn would be great writers, regardless of other variables. However an
inspection of the family size for great writers and the whole sample






Chi squared = 0.0123, 1 df, 1 tailed, p<.95, not significant
2.3.2.5. Social class
Most members of the sample come from social class 1 or 2
backgrounds. When great writers are compared with the remainder with




other 103 93 10
Chi squared = 0.1526, ldf, 2 tailed, p<.9, not significant
2.4. CONCLUSION
One can thus conclude that there is a birth order effect in the above
data which is independent both of family size and of social class. This looks
interesting but where does it leave the initial idea that exceptional
architects are more often laterborn than are merely eminent architects,
because they are more orientated to spatial phenomena? Is the idea that
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laterborn are more creative than firstborn more satisfactory? In this context
the answer is yes: but the possibility that laterborn have a more direct
awareness of spatial phenomena should not be forgotten, although it does
not seem to be immediately relevant here.
The contrast between "creativity" and "convention" seems useful. I have
been using both these words in their colloquial senses. In this sense
"creativity" means working outside, or at odds with, a dominant set of ideas.
"Convention" means working within, or closely with, a dominant set of
ideas. The reality of the firstborn seems to be more conventional. The
reality of the laterborn seems to be more creative.
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CHAPTER 3
ART, SCIENCE AND REALITY
Olympus and Parnassus were as real to Geddes as the
primeval slime out of which the protozoa had emerged.
Mumford (1944)
I very much doubt if any of us has the faintest idea of
what is meant by the reality or existence of anything but our
own Egos. ... It is of course possible to obtain consistent use
of the word 'reality' by adopting a conventional definition. My
own practice would probably be covered by the definition that
anything may be said to be real if it is the goal of a type of
inquiry to which I personally attach importance. Eddington
(1928)
I read: "... philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of
'Reality' than Plato got ...". What a strange situation. How
extraordinary that Plato could have got even as far as he did!
Or that we could not get any further! Was it because Plato
was so extremely clever? Wittgenstein (1931)
3.1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT SORTS OF REALITY CAN WE CONSTRUCT?
I have suggested that firstborn and laterborn have different realities. In
the present chapter everyday social realities are contrasted with cultural
realities, and birth order differences are considered from the latter point of
view.
3.1.1. The Many Worlds: James
Is it meaningful to use the word "reality" in this way? William James can
be of help here. In his "Principles of Psychology" he devotes a chapter to
the perception of reality; by this he does not mean the perception of
physical reality but the perception of the many different "sub-universes"
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which can be thought of as real. He calls these different realities "the many
worlds". This thought of James' has been picked up recently by Moscovici
(1983) in his discussion of the "consensual universes" of social
representation theory. For James the most important of these
sub-universes are (1) the world of sense, or of physical "things"; (2) The
world of science; (3) The world of ideal relations (logic, maths, ethics,
aesthetics) (4) The world of "idols of the tribe" (common illusions or
prejudices); (5) The various supernatural worlds of myth and fable; (6) The
various worlds of individual opinion; (7) The worlds of madness.
He goes on to say:
For most ... the "things of sense" ... are the absolutely
real world's nucleus. Other things, to be sure, may be real for
this man or for that - things of science, abstract moral
relations, things of the Christian theology, or what not. But
even for the special man these things are usually real with a
less real reality than that of things of sense. They are taken
less seriously: and the very utmost that can be said for
anyone's belief in them is that it is as strong as his "belief in
his own senses".
Thus James distinguishes between the world of sense and other worlds
which are "real with a less real reality". These other realities can be thought
of as of two types, (a) to do with everyday social events, that is to say
common illusions and prejudices, individual opinion and madness; (b) to do
with exceptionally durable elements of culture, that is to say the world of
science, the world of ideal relations and the world of myth and fable.
3.1.2. Objective Contents of Thought: Popper
This latter classification is close to what Popper (1972) has held to be
constitutive of the "objective knowledge" of what he calls "world three" :
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... and thirdly, the world of objective contents of thought,
especially of scientific and poetic thoughts and of works of
art.
He contrasts this with "world two": the private states of mind, or
behavioural disposition of the individual, and world one: the physical world.
James is, however, concerned with subjective rather then objective
realities; all the worlds he discusses are parts of Popper's world two, that is
to say the world of states of consciousness or behavioural dispositions.
Thus, while James can be thought of as laying the foundations for Popper,
the three types of world which I have suggested can be derived from
James's list should not be thought of as Popper's three worlds. The three
types derived from James can be called (1) the world of the reality of the
senses; (2) the world of everyday social reality; (3) the world of cultural
reality. These worlds are objects of consciousness. This is what makes
them realities. They are accessible on this level. We are not of course
conscious of the inherent structure of these realities whether this is the
process of perception, the prejudices involved in our everyday social
activity/or, on a cultural level, the "spirit of the age".
Social reality can be thought of either in terms of Wittgensteinian
language games, or Moscovician social representations. Gellner (1964) has
linked these two areas by pointing out the similarity between Wittgenstein's
later philosophy, and Durkheim's theory of collective representations, upon
which Moscovici's work is based. It is interesting to note that Gellner
criticizes Wittgenstein's philosophy for the underlying assumption that it
constitutes a solution to the problems of philosophy. That is to say: stay
within your language game, or "form of life" and the problems cease to
exist:
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But plainly it does not constitute a solution at all. It may
be true that we cannot stand outside all conceptual systems,
all "forms of life", in order to scrutinize some one or all of
them: but equally, we cannot fall back into a cosy conceptual
cocoon, the language/culture of our "forms of life", with the
comfortable reflection that any attempt to transcend it is only
based on some kind of error concerning the working of
language ... we cannot do this, because there are no such
conceptual wombs to crawl back into: the modern world is a
Babel of "forms of life", undergoing change with bewildering
rapidity.
The particular interest in this passage here is precisely this rapid change in
"forms of life" which theorists of social representation recognize. This rate
of change helps to distinguish social from cultural realities. It is notable
that, earlier in his paper, Gellner explicitly excludes Durkheim from the
criticisms he makes of Wittgenstein, realizing that he (Durkheim) is well
aware of the importance of change in representation. Note 3.
One can thus distinguish social from cultural realities by the rates of
change of the constructs associated with them. Moscovici (1983) considers
the study of social representations to be the basis of "a science of
consensual universes in evolution" which "requires that we revert to
methods of observation". It is thus clear that, at least as a starting point, he
is concerned with relatively fast rates of change in representation.
However, cultural reality is related to library or gallery type knowledge
(Popper's world three). Due to this "objective" element, change in cultural
representations is slow.
3.1.3. Rates of Change
This analysis is useful because it distinguishes two rates of change.
One is the rate which enables us to talk of periods of time such as "the
sixties" and contrast them with "the fifties" or "seventies", one might call
this the rate of fashion in any activity. The other is the rate that enables us
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to meaningfully contrast, for example, pre- and post- renaissance Europe,
that is to say the rate that reflects our evaluation of objective contents of
thought. I've distinguished these two rates for my own convenience, but
there may well be a continuum between them, ranging from the potentialy
highly changable representations of for example an only slightly known
person or place, to the relative stability of our evaluation of science.
This reality is is that science is the "real" way of understanding the
world. Science as the dominant cultural reality remains, even if it is
frequently criticised on an everyday level. This dominance is the key to
understanding the concept of "scientism", by which other activities are
spuriously validated by association with science. Both art and mysticism
have suffered badly from this confusion in the last century or so. The
dominance of science is evident from the desire of practitioners in other
areas to associate their areas with it, however inappropriately.
3.1.4. A Non-scientific Cultural Reality
For comparison with another cultural reality we can look back to the
medieval period. This seems to have been strongly associated with ideas of
art and religion, rather than with scientific analysis (see for example Lewis
1964, Leclercq 1962). In such a society it would make sense to give highest
reality status to states of religious ecstasy and mythological ambiguity and
to consider the "reality of science" as something that had to be coped with,
but that was in fact an illusion of relatively little value. The cultural reality is
more or less the reverse of the present one. At that time to analyse in
today's scientific sense would have been unconventional. But the other side
of the coin, the investigation of what one might call "ambiguity" would have
been highly conventionalized. This ordered investigation of multiple
interpretation is evident in medieval painting, architecture and religion.
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One can draw an analogy between the stereotype of the medieval
scientist as heretic, and the modern artist as neurotic. Both these words,
heresy and neurosis, are applied to people who are choosing not to toe the
cultural line when it comes to thinking. Their activities are at best regarded
as of dubious value, and at worst as "sick". However the scientist of the
middle ages was pursuing what is now a conventional activity, while the
artist of today pursues what was once a conventional activity. Both heresy
and neurosis are descriptions of an outgroup, of similar social use is these
different periods, despite their completely different linguistic meanings.
3.2. BIRTH ORDER AND EMINENCE IN SCIENCES AND ARTS
The research on birth order discussed so far, both my own and that of
others, has concentrated on birth order differences with respect to the
world of everyday social reality. We have seen that firstborn seem to be
more aware of how to successfully fit in, and consequently become more
eminent in general, but that, at least with respect to architecture and
literature, given a situation in which novel solutions are required laterborn
become significantly more represented. On this everyday level, firstborn can
be described as more professional while laterborn are more amateur (both
words used in Mcluhan's sense).
But what of the world of cultural reality? Different aspects of this type
of thinking are differently valued in different societies. At present we live in
a culture considerably skewed by an overvaluation of science at the
expense of art. Since this is the context for all social comparison, one
would expect the firstborn to behave in a way that reflected this dominant
cultural view. That is to say, to be more interested in science than in art.
An examination of birth order differences in orientation to cultural rather
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than everyday social reality would involve a direct comparison of the birth
orders of eminent scientists, as representatives of the dominant cultural
reality, and eminent artists, as representatives of the non dominant cultural
reality.
3.2.1. Previous Relevant Work
A partial comparison of this type was made by Bliss (1970), who found,
as one would expect in the light of the above discussion, that laterborn
were more represented among writers than among scientists. More
suggestive evidence comes from Exner and Sutton-Smith (1970) who found
firstborn to be more effective teachers of science and laterborn of English.
However no clear overall picture emerged from a study by Altus (1967) of
choice of college major, although laterborn women were found to be more
likely to choose art and music.
The picture here is not entirely clear, and, as paradox will have it,
seemingly contradictory evidence comes from earlier work by the present
author. I found that firstborn students were more likely to be in the arts
than science faculties of a university. One might attempt to explain away
this result by pointing out that the sample was highly specific (males from
two male child families), however such "explaining" would be unsatifying. A
more interesting line of thought can be developed by considering the
distinction between "arts faculty", a highly traditional institution, and "arts
as practiced", which among their better practitioners tend to be anything
but traditional.
3.2.1.1. Snow and Waddington
This is an important, but usually ignored, distinction. For example, it is
easy to assume that Snow (1956,1959) in his discussion of the "two
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cultures" is referring to the same cultural divide that Waddington (1969)
refers to in his comparison of painting and physics but this is not the case.
Snow's arts faculties are the repositories of tradition, essentially
conservative. Waddington's artists are each and every one of them working
at the forefront of their discipline, breaking new ground. These two ideas
are thus almost antithetical. It is important to realize this. I began (1981) by
failing to make this distinction, but my major interest in "arts" here is in
arts as done, rather than arts as traditional culture.
3.2.2. Method
My present comparison, carried out from a perspective of both an
interest in qualitative distinction between first and laterborn and a
consideration of a possible theoretical context for such differences, made
use of persons listed in the latest supplement to the Dictionary of National
Biography (1981). The scientists (n = 86) were physicists, geologists,
engineers, mathematicians, biologists, chemists and doctors of medicine.
The artists (n = 54) were musicians, literary figures and visual artists. N =
140. For data see Appendix IV.
3.2.2.1. Hypothesis
It was hypothesized that there would be proportionately more laterborn
among eminent artists than among eminent scientists.
3.2.3. Results
52 scientists were firstborn; 34 scientists were laterborn; 19 artists were





Chi squared = 7.500, 1 df, 1 tailed, p<.005
The hypothesis was thus supported.
3.2.3.1. Family size
This effect is not due to artists tending to come from larger families






Chi squared = 0.2267, ldf, 1 tailed, p<.35, not significant
3.2.3.2. Social class
The majority of the sample come from social classes 1 and 2. There is
no significant difference in social class of the artists and scientists.
1 2 3&4
art 28 15 11
science 36 29 21
Chi squared = 1.353, df 2, 2 tailed, p<.7, not significant
It should be noted again that, in keeping with the birth order and
eminence literature, despite the greater number of laterborn among artists,
in absolute terms firstborn are still over-represented. (The actual ratio of
firstborn to laterborn in the artists group is about 1:2, while the expected
ratio based on average family size is about 1:4).
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3.2.3.3. First and youngest
Further analysis of the data yields more interesting information, namely
that the birth order difference observed is mostly accounted for by a
predominance of firstborn and onlies in science and a predominance of
youngest-born (excluding onlies) in arts. The intermediate born seem to be
much less important, a phenomenon first noted by Galton (1875). It should
be noted that onlies behave here as first rather than youngest born. There
are few onlies in the arts group.
Only First Inter Youngest
art 3 16 18 17
sciences 15 37 25 9
3.2.3.4. Early behaviour of first and youngest
Observations in a recent study by Davie et al (1984) provide an
important indication of precursors of this effect in child social behaviour,
the three groups referred to are Only, Eldest and Youngest children:
Family position ... had a more potent influence than
either social class or sex on social interaction between the
subjects and both adults and other children. Youngest
children received far less attention from adults and spent far
more time playing and talking to other children than the other
two groups. Only children received most adult attention but
Eldest children, despite the fact that they, like Youngest
children, had siblings, ten'ded to be closer to Only children in
terms of the amount of adult attention they received. Fathers,
in particularly, ignored their Youngest children, concentrating
their attention on older siblings, when they returned from
work in the evenings or at the weekends. While receiving less
adult attention, Youngest children spent far more time than
the other two groups playing and talking to other children.
Youngest children tended to 'tag' along with older children
and take part in activities which depended on the initiation of
the older child, such as involving them in taking turns and
following simple rules. This often led to irritation in the older
child and the Eldest children interacting in turn with their
younger siblings showed more physical and verbal aggression
than did the other two groups. Parents, in turn, told off Eldest
children most, partly attributable to these siblings' disputes
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but also because of their more 'laissez-faire' attitude to
youngest children, who showed a happy-go-lucky attitude to
life, laughing more and weeping less than the other two
groups.
3.2.4. Women and Men
Another interesting feature of the data derived from the Dictionary of
National Biography is that the pattern of activity of men versus women
mirrors that of first versus laterborn. That is to say women are much more
represented in arts than they are in science. The figures are as follows:
This fits in well with the suggestion that the arts are at present the
non-dominant cultural reality, clearly the dominant reality is both scientific
and male; white also of course: it seems no coincidence that one of the
few areas where black excellence is recognised is music.
3.3. SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
Since completing this study I have discovered useful support in a study
of Nobel Prize winners, carried out by Clarke and Rice (1982). The birth
order effects they report are very similar to my own study, arts winners
being more often laterborn than science winners.
3.4. WHERE SHOULD WE GO FROM HERE?
Instead of enabling us to come to an easy conclusion, these findings
leave us facing a fundamental epistemological question, namely: What is the
relationship between the ways of thinking typified by art and the ways of









non-dominant cultural reality related to the dominant cultural reality, on a
psychological level?
We know that there is a birth order difference between those eminent in
arts and sciences, but we don't know what this means because we have no
proper conception of the links between these activities which reflect
fundamental ways of thinking.
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CHAPTER 4
THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF WAYS OF THINKING
Both of them thought:
"How many areas of specialization there are in
the world, and how broad each specialization is!"




The problem which seems to be emerging is this: science is the
dominant "objective content of thought" to use Popper's (1972) phrase, the
dominant "ideal reality" to use James' (1890) phrase and the dominant
"cultural reality" in my own phrase. This has been emphasized by
Barzun(1964) who has pointed out that despite our ready recognition of art
and science as constituting together the intellectual leadership of our
civilization: "One power only, and that one science, dominates the culture".
But neither art nor science are objects of serious study in mainstream
pscyhology. Nevertheless, since science is the dominant cultural reality, it is
easy to assume that the best analogy for mental life is scientific life.
Science is uncritically adopted as the model for cognition. Problem solving,
hypothesis testing. This is an example not of science but of scientism. This
is quite distinct from a truly scientific view which tries to discover what
thought is like by scientific means, without the accompanying assumption
that what those means will reveal will be a process which mirrors the
scientific method.
The problem can be dealt with if we consider both science and art
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seriously within mainstream psychology, rather than assuming the former
and ignoring the latter. The resulting psychology will be the beginnings of a
consciously comprehensive "science of mental life". We need this.
The present chapter deals further with the problem, the next chapter
suggests a solution.
4.1.2. Models of Man
Some idea of the problem, the implicit acceptance of science as a
model for thought and the ignoring of art as a possible model, can be
inferred from a book of papers collected from a British Psychological
Society conference in Cardiff, entitled "Models of Man" (Chapman and
Jones, 1980). Publication information for this book said that it "... captures
the dilemmas and controversies confronting the student of behaviour" and
that it "... emphasizes the plurality of presentday psychology". The review
magazine 'Contemporary Psychology' called it "... an impressive assessment
of the current state of the art", while 'Social Biology' said of it "... a labour
of love and scholarship ... here laid before us in concise and lucid english is
the structure and substance of the psychology which has evolved since it
was founded by Wundt".
It is thus clear that the book is intended, and has been accepted, as a
proper reflection of contemporary psychology. It is, in fact, a good book and
it is in this light that its omissions must be seen. If a book is good, its
omissions are meaningful. In 372 pages of text from 33 authors, the "person
as artist" is, quite simply, not modelled. Note 4. The implicit assumption is
that a model of artistic activities has no important part to play in a broad
consideration of human behaviour. In contrast a strong current of "man the
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problem solver", i.e."man the everyday scientist" runs through the book. The
last thing I would want to imply here is that this current of thought is
inappropriate; the point is that in itself it does not provide an adequate
model, or set of models, of human behaviour.
Paradoxically this does not reflect a lack of interest in art among
psychologists, and indeed a later well attended conference in the same
location testifies to this interest, see, for example, Crozier and Chapman
(1983), but what is lacking (and was seen to be lacking at this conference)
is any unified school of thought which has some conception of what art is
and some idea of how to relate this to conceptions of other ways of
thinking.
This state of affairs is discussed by Granger (1979) who begins by
commenting that "the psychology of art receives scarcely any attention in
our university courses..." but it is "...of central importance to the study of
man". One can only agree with both statements, and perhaps reinforce the
latter by pointing out that this central importance has been recognized by
not only Barzun, quoted above, but among others by J Z Young (eg Young
1978), to whom Granger refers, and Freud (1930). In this review he points
out that there has been general failure by psychologists and philosophers
to define the work of art. Granger suggests that it is:
...little wonder ... that no one has yet come up with a
crisp answer to the question, what is a work of art
because of the "bewildering variety of objects" which can be referred to as
such. Quite so, but such definition remains the key point. While it is true
that bewildering variety makes definition difficult, it also draws attention to
the need for such definition. If we had an acceptable definition of art
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bewilderment would vanish but variety would remain.
At present we view art like a photograph which despite its clarity
confuses us because it has been taken in close-up. We must take a wider
view to make sense of the phenomena confronting us. The problems of
what art is, and what art objects are, will not be solved unless we think of
all arts together, and further, consider these artistic productions as
manifestations of ways of thinking, just as are scientific theories. Only such
a view will enable us to see the structure of the problem and only then will
we be able to give a useful definition.
What is needed is a general model of ways of thinking, which includes
both art and science. Hudson (1966,1968) has provided a background for any
such work in his discussion (a) of the different cognitive styles of school
pupils specializing in arts and sciences, and (b) of stereotypes of artists and
scientists. My own thinking owes much to Hudson for he created the
conditions for it within psychology. However it is not a direct elaboration of
Hudson's work.
4.2. A BIAS EXPLORED
4.2.1. Art Divorced from Cognition
Our assumptions are by no means easy to pin down. The primary, and
eminently reasonable one, is that the study of cognition is central to
psychology. Do we then consider that cognition is related to science but
not to art? Clearly we are not so simple minded about it. However what we
do assume is that the idea of art has little to contribute to a general model
of cognition. It is assumed that what goes on in painting or literature can
tell us nothing important about the mind.
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Naturally we would deny that we held any such assumptions:
nevertheless we do. The form of the assumption is this (a) we assume that
cognition is about gaining knowledge about reality, (b) we assume that the
most important method of gaining knowledge about reality is science (c) we
assume in the light of the above that science-like processes are the best
model for cognition. Note 5.
The upshot of this is that when we apply our models of cognition to art
they are by no means fully relevant. This is because ideas appropriate to
the study of art, particularly ideas which depend on multiple interpretation
of information such as ambiguity and metaphor, have been written out of
our models of cognition at an early stage. Thus art seems like something
floating on the edges of thinking. It is certainly on an edge, but the edge is
that of theory, not of thinking.
Reference to the contents page of the thick reference work,
"psychological abstracts" can help us to explore this further. There is a
section devoted to "literature and art", but this comes under the enigmatic
heading of communication systems. There is no question of it being
"cognitive". Things that do come under a "cognitive" heading are learning,
memory, hypothesis testing etc. That is to say the sorts of things which are
salient in scientific thought. But there are further problems for any serious
psychology of art. First of all in the section called "literature and art", the
contents are predominantly literary: there is little visual art, and no music
(which is classed with auditory perception), secondly, at least one major
journal which takes the psychology of art seriously (Leonardo) is excluded
from psychological abstracts. We thus seem to assume that art and
cognition should be classified in different places: this is where we reveal
our dominant cultural reality; we come unstuck before we've begun.
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4.2.2. The Study of Children's Drawings as an example of Scientism in
Psychology
One such area in which this scientism can be clearly seen is the study
of children's drawings. Rather than being considered as art, these are likely
to be considered as reflections of intelligence or problem solving. There is
much argument in psychology between the proponents of a specific
problem solving approach to the human mind, and the proponents of the
idea of a the validity of a general intelligence. The argument is obscured, or
perhaps created, by the different methodologies typical of the opposing
groups; however it itself obscures what is, from a general point of view, a
more important point, namely that both schools make broadly the same
assumptions about what constitutes human thought: it is to do with a
problem solving ability, whether this is reflected in a standardized IQ test
composed of many tasks or the investigation of a single task.
Since what is salient is either a "general intelligence" or "problem
solving" it is not surprising that children's drawings are commonly
conceived of as either useful indices of intelligence (Goodenough 1926,
Harris 1974), or as examples of problem solving (Goodnow 1977).
It is paradoxical that a task with such a strong component of what one
might call "artistic intelligence", should be seen only as a precursor to
"scientific intelligence", a step on the road to logic, and that as soon as this
can be tested in a problem solving way, the possibility of "artistic
intelligence" becomes background noise. Note 6.
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4.2.3. Taking Art Seriously: Kellogg
This failure to consider one whole side of human cognition (cf Sperry's
comment referred to in chapter one) has practical implications for such
tests, for example Kellogg (1970) makes the point, with reference to the
"Draw a man" test that in different drawings the child has different
intentions (odd that such an obvious point has to be made), and that
consequently the scorable properties of the drawing vary. While an artistic
view can cope with the idea that the same child will want to produce
different types of drawing of the same subject (an idea coped with even
better by a comprehensive model of ways of thinking, see below), the
scientistic assumption underlying the test is that all drawings will be
attempts to produce a verisimilitudinous rendering of a human being. Such
renderings are more appropriate to scientific depictions such as anatomy
photographs, than they are to art.
Kellogg also discusses the "Easel age test" which again makes use of
primarily artistic products to measure intellectual development. Its
developer, Lantz, points out that " special effort has been made to avoid
turning the Easel age scale into a measure of artistic ability". Why was this
special effort made? Why was the artistic ability of the child thought to
have nothing to do with its intellectual growth? As Kellogg (p 262) says:
'The child teaches himself art at the same time as important brain growth
occurs".
There are other interesting examples of this assumed division between
intelligence and art, which have historical importance (ie a part in forming
our contemporary assumptions), for instance Terman (1919) remarks with
reference to Binet's Aesthetic Comparison Test that:
58
One might suppose that aesthetic judgement would be
relatively independent of intelligence. Certainly no one could
have known in advance of experience that intellectual
retardation would reveal itself in weakness of the aesthetic
sense about as unmistakably as in memory, practical
judgement, or the comprehension of language. But such is the
case. The development of the aesthetic sense parallels
general mental growth rather closely.
This is interesting, first of all for what it says about the relationship of
aesthetic sense and intelligence, and secondly for its clear statement of the
assumption underlying most psychological thinking about artistic
phenomena, namely that "one might suppose that aesthetic judgement
would be relatively independent of intelligence". Had one ever really looked
at the works in any major gallery, one might tend not to suppose any such
thing, but nevertheless the implication that art is not really worth taking
seriously, not a central part of cognition, seems to be as pervasive today as
it was when Terman was writing.
Kellogg however does take the artistic aspects of children's drawings
seriously. For her the child's main concerns are with aesthetic questions
such as balance and symmetry. She is interested in what makes aesthetic
sense, not the so called conceptual sense of imitation or crude
representation.
4.2.4. The Inappropriate Separation of Science and the Aesthetic
But herein lies a problem. While essentially aesthetically good notions
like balance, symmetry and homeostasis teil one a great deal about what
constitutes good art (see, for example, Klee 1953), they tell one equally
what constitutes good science. A great problem solution such as Einstein's
general relativity is no less aestheticly pleasing than a Cezanne still life.
Indeed Kaufmann (1977) has even considered it to have aesthetic "validity"
over its competitors:
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It should, however, be pointed out that, mathematically,
Einstein's theory is extremely simple and beautiful. The
competing theories are not. If beauty and simplicity are in
some way a measure of validity, we may continue with
confidence in assuming Einstein was right.
A stimulating discussion of the importance of beauty in science,
specifically with reference to Einstein's general relativity, can be found in
Dirac (1981). In this extract, entitled The test of Einstein', Dirac goes further
than Kaufmann, holding that the primary test of a scientific theory is its
beauty, a point he also made strongly (Dirac 1963) with reference to
Schrodinger's wave equations. He says of Einstein:
He was guided only by the requirement that his theory
should have the beauty and the elegance which one would
expect to be provided by any fundamental description of
nature. He was working entirely from these ideas of what
nature ought to be like and not from the requirement to
account for certain experimental results.
and later:
... one has an overpowering belief that its foundations
must be correct quite independent of its agreement with
observation.
It would be difficult to state the central importance of beauty to scientific
thinking with greater commitment. If one needs any further evidence of this
importance, one need only cite the emphasis on the aesthetic nature of
mathematics by Poincare (1914) and Hardy (1940).
It is, however, unfortunately true that, culturally, we are not encouraged
to appreciate the beauty of science, but this is a function of our
contemporary cultural reality, not of beauty. Thus aesthetic criteria unite art
and science rather than uniquely specifying art. It might therefore be argued
that Kellogg is studying something more like visual thinking than "art" (cf
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Arnheim below). Kellogg's confusion of artistic and aesthetic is important
because it is a confusion we all take for granted. I am suggesting here that
science is an aesthetically based activity, just as art is. Any distinction
between the two must be made on other grounds.
4.2.5. The Confaltion of Art and Visual Thinking: Arnheim
Another researcher who has taken the artistic importance of children's
drawings seriously is Ruldolf Arnheim. However he seems most concerned
with visual versus verbal thinking in general, with visual art as a prime
example of the former. He is less concerned with how art differs from
non-art. For example he says (1969, p295):
Thinking calls for images, and images contain thought.
Therefore the visual arts are a homeground for visual
thinking.
While one can accept this conclusion, Arnheim, specifically interested in
painting as he is, like Kellogg, risks conflating "art" and "visual thinking", or
"visual form" when he advocates
... a psychological and educational approach that
recognizes art as visual form, and visual form as the principle
medium of productive thinking. Nothing less will serve to free
art from its unproductive isolation.
One can only respect Arnheim's intention here: namely to encourage us
to take visual thinking more seriously. But his assertion that all productive
thinking is visual and that art is a prime example of visual thinking,
suggests that he sees art as some sort of model of, or aid to, the
productive process in science. "Art, then, approaches the means and ends
of science very closely ..." He thus implicitly justifies the role of art by
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association with science. Art becomes a sub-process of science, rather than
both being subsumed by a model of human thought.
The point that Arnheim makes, that visual thinking can be of great value
to science, is a good one, but it is not the point which he claims to be
making, namely that art per se can be of great value to science. This
conflation does however draw attention to an important problem, touched
on above: not only do we neglect art, we also fail to take visual thinking
seriously. Since neither activity claims our full attention, and they have
points of contact, it is easy to conflate the two. But they are clearly not one
and the same thing. This reinforces the need for a general model of ways
of thinking.
4.2.6. Geometry and Algebra: Davie
A discussion of the development of the trend away from serious visual
thinking can be found in Davie (1961). Here he discusses the conflict
between the mathematical traditions of the universities of Scotland and
England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He encapsulates the
struggle by quoting Sir William Hamilton (the Scottish Philosopher, not the
Irish mathematician):
The mathematical process in the symbolical method (i.e.
the algebraic) is like running a rail-road through a tunnelled
mountain; that in the ostensive (i.e. the geometrical) like
crossing the mountain on foot. The former carries us, by a
short and easy transit, to our destined point, but in miasma,
darkness and torpidity, whereas the latter allows us to reach
it only after time and trouble, but feasting us at each turn
with glances of the earth and of the heavens, while we inhale
health in the pleasant breeze, and gather new strength at
every effort we put forth.
A recent contribution to this discussion is to be found in Paterson (1984).
The latter comments:
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... the physical position of the point on a page may for
formal purposes be equivalent to two cartesian coordinates,
but formalism is only one way of looking at mathematics and
the equivalence may not necessarily be sustained for the
purposes of teaching, or the application to science, or
investigating the philosophical basis of mathematical thought.
and later:
The writings of the Scottish geometers might benefit
modern mathematics in three areas: the psychology of
learning and doing mathematics, the application of
mathematics to science, and the elucidation of the nature of
mathematical knowledge.
The growing interest in a return to a more visual approach to mathematics
is clear in a number of places, including Pappert's work with the computer
controlled line-drawing 'turtle', and also a recent issue of New Scientist, in
which two articles, Dixon (1985) and Kavanau (1985), are devoted to a
consideration of this problem.
As evidence of our present underexposure to such visual thinking one
can cite the surprise and wonder with which many people greeted Jacob
Bronowski's (1973) visual demonstration of Pythagoras' theorem. We are no
longer used to such a visual approach to thought, but one suspects that the
Edinburgh mathematicians of the Enlightenment, and for that matter their
contemporary, Robert Adam, would have been less taken aback. That such
an approach can be successful has been recently demonstrated even in
groups whose previous experience of mathematics has been bad. An
interesting article on this topic is White (1985).
It doesn't matter for Arnheim's purposes that he tends to conflate art
and visual thinking, since his emphasis is on the visual in general rather
than the artistic in general. However it makes a great deal of difference to
anyone wanting to examine the idea of art more broadly.
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4.2.7. Goodnow: Art and Guilt
These criticisms should not obscure the fact that these authors at least
take children's drawings seriously. In contrast the consideration of children's
drawings as art is overlooked by most psychologists because we are
unused to taking art seriously. This point can be further clarified by
considering what Goodnow writes in the conclusion to her book. Although
like Arheim and Kellogg she takes the artistic importance of children's
drawings seriously, she feels compelled to justify this interest. She writes:
how can such sources of pleasure be part of 'science?
I have tried to convince you that you should feel no guilt.
Graphic work is truly 'visible thinking'. The features it displays
- thrift, conservatism, principles of organisation and sequence
- are features of all problem-solving whether by children or
adults.
The interest of this passage lies in the author's implicit awareness that
in order to have anything taken seriously within contemporary psychology it
is both necessary and sufficient to imply that it is a type of problem
solving. Art must be squeezed into a scientistic mould so that it can be
taken seriously. Goodnow is up against the dominant cultural reality and it
shows.
One can also draw attention to her use of the words "pleasure" and
"guilt", since these bear on this same problem of scientism. She implies
that as scientists we may feel guilty at working with subject matter as
pleasure-giving as are children's drawings. This guilt may lead us to
conclude that children's drawings are scientifically irrelevant.
There is clearly no logic here, but I think we know what she means: but
why do we know what she means? This question can draw attention to
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some of our uncritical assumptions about human thought. Goodnow feels
that she must justify pleasure by bolstering it with the "reality" of science.
One must conclude that scientists aren't "really" meant to enjoy themselves.
Pleasure is not part of the dominant cultural reality. Of interest here is
Einstein's description of his own "education" in science:
One had to cram all this stuff into one's mind, whether
one liked it or not. This coercion had such a deterring effect
that, after I had passed the final examination, I found the
consideration of scientific problems distasteful to me for an
entire year .... it is a very grave mistake to think that the
enjoyment of seeing and searching can be promoted by
means of coercion and a sense of duty.
One might question whether it was ever the intention the promote
enjoyment. It would be interesting to explore these ideas further in terms of
Freud's deliberate theoretical separation of "pleasure" and "reality". The
durability of Freudian theory despite its critics, may indicate that it is an
unwitting re-statement of our assumptions about cultural reality. It strikes a
cultural chord, and is thus felt to be of value even if we have rational
misgivings about it.
4.3. THE NEED FOR A MODEL OF WAYS OF WAYS OF THINKING
Until psychologists have something coherent to say about things like
literature and painting as well as things like logic, and can talk about both
in the same context, the notion that psychology is a science of mental life
in any complete sense rings somewhat hollow.
4.3.1. Towards a General Model
If this is taken seriously, it becomes possible to develop a new
perspective on ways of thinking such as art and science.
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This is, in Bateson's (1979) phrase, a "perspective on perspectives". Such
a perspective is essential for any coordinated study of ways of thinking. If
general enough it will also bear on the problems that Bateson refers to at
the end of his last book, namely the nature of the sacred and the beautiful.
It is a perspective on ways of thinking which are "equally simple" for human
beings as a species.
4.3.2. The Principle of Equal Simplicity
The "principle of equal simplicity" is a useful heuristic introduced by
Nicolas Bernstein (1967) to enable one to comment on the nature of a
system by observing what tasks it can do with equal ease, and what tasks
it finds equally difficult to perform.
To take one of his examples: if a drawing system can only draw circles
of one radius, that is to say circles of one radius are "equally simple" for it
to draw, then one can infer from these products that this system is
probably more like a template than it is like a set of compasses, since a
template is characterized by the production of circles of one radius, while a
set of compasses is characterized by the production of circles of any
radius.
Taking the idea further, another drawing system in addition to the
template is characterized by the production of circles of equal radius. This
is the ellipsograph. What can be produced with equal simplicity with this
system are ellipses of identical circumference. One can make a decision
between template and ellipsograph by noting whether or not it is equally
simple for the system to produce ellipses other than circles.
Bernstein uses this principle when he infers, for example, that the
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control for the circle describing ability of the human arm in any orientation
with equal simplicity must be based on a centrally held conception of space
not on a motor image in the muscles. Only such a conception could enable
all these movements to be made with equal simplicity.
The principle has general applicability. For example, since human beings
find it simple to add two numbers but not four thousand, a computer which
can add two numbers or four thousand numbers with equal competence is
not an adequate model of this human mental process. It doesn't make the
right mistakes. The tasks that it finds equally simple are quite different from
those which humans find equally simple. Or again, human beings find the
interpretation or production of a range of inexact diagrams equally simple.
Computers at present require metrical exactitude for interpretation and
production of diagrams. Again, what is equally simple for them is different
from what is equally simple for human beings.
Turning to ways of thinking, one can comment that just as it is equally
simple to describe circles in different orientations, it is equally simple at
least initially to think in a variety of different ways.
One would expect these different ways of thinking to be substantially
reflected in our institutions of further education. The point is that artistic
thought on the one hand and scientific thought on the other are equally
simple modes of human thinking.
4.3.3. Constructing the Viewpoint
How can we construct such a perspective on ways of thinking? The
honest answer is: by wondering about it. I use this phrase to de-emphasise
any idea of simple logical progression of thought.
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The development of the theory is from spatial model to precise
terminology rather than vice versa. The dictionary only became useful at an
advanced stage. In Bateson's words:
... (if we) could say how they are related, we could
perhaps say what the words mean
This is an attempt to say how words to do with art and science are related.
4.3.4. Polya's Paradox
The model to be proposed may seem unfamiliar due to its generality. If
any justification of this generality is needed, Polya (1957) has provided it:
The more ambitious plan may have more chances of
success. This sounds paradoxical. Yet, when passing from one
problem to another, we may often observe that the new,
more ambitious problem is easier to handle than the original
problem. More questions may be easier to answer than one
question. The more comprehensive theorem may be easier to
prove, the more general problem may be easier to solve.
This comment is particularly appropriate here: it is not possible to
understand art fully, without reference to science and vice versa.
In developing the model I found that I was dealing with what looked like
fundamental ways of thinking, or ways of giving meaning to phenomena,
which were substantially typified by arts and sciences.
I was no longer dealing directly with arts and sciences, it is important to
make this point. However the most convenient and potentially useful way of
imagining the model is as a model of arts and sciences.
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CHAPTER 5
A MODEL OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ART AND SCIENCE
For Truth, like Einstein's universe, looks different
according to where one is standing. This means that science
does not confute literature, or even clash with it. The two are
simply different ways of viewing the world. Martin (1975)
The order that our mind imagines is like a net, or like a
ladder, built to attain something. But afterward you must
throw the ladder away, because you discover that, even if it
was useful, it was meaningless. Eco (1983)
To be an atheist is to maintain God. His existence or his
non-existence it amounts to much the same on the plane of
proof. Thus 'proof' is a word not often used among the
Handdrata, who have chosen not to treat God as a fact,
subject to either proof or to belief: and they have broken the
circle and go free. LeGuin (1969)
5.1. INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND TO THE MODEL
At the end of chapter three I said that the finding of a difference in birth
order between those eminent in art and those eminent in science had left
me facing a fundamental question, namely "what is the relationship betwen
art and science?" But had I not been interested in answering this question I
would probably not have noticed it as a question. So: why was I interested
in answering it? What was my background to asking it? The following
paragraphs, introducing the model, give some clue.
5.1.1. Koestler and Hesse
Some years ago I studied painting at art school. During this time I
became increasingly interested in the nature of art. Painting seemed to be a
way of understanding one's position as a human being in and of the
universe, or just simply understanding the universe. In this respect it
seemed to be very like science.
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I was attracted to Koestler's (1959) discussion of the aesthetic aspects
of science in "The sleepwalkers" and for similar reasons I was interested in
the fictional game described by Hesse (1943). This involved all types of
intellectual activity. In its most advanced form each move in the game is a
cue for contemplation of the relationships between the different disciplines.
While tracing Hesse as an antecedent to my own thought I re-read his
description of the history of this game, which gives context to general
approaches to ways of thinking:
How far back the historian wishes to place the origins
and antecedents of the Glass Bead Game is, ultimately, a
matter of his personal choice. For like every great idea it has
no real beginning; rather it has always been, at least the idea
of it. We find it foreshadowed, as a dim anticipation and hope,
in a good many earlier ages. There are hints of it in
Pythagoras, for example, and then among Hellenistic Gnostic
circles in the late period of classical civilization. We find it
equally among the ancient Chinese, then again at the several
pinnacles of Arabic-Moorish culture; and the path of its
prehistory leads on through Scholasticism and Humanism to
the academies of mathematicians of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries and on to the Romantic philosophies and
the runes of Novalis's hallucinatory visions. This same eternal
idea, which for us has been embodied in the Glass Bead
Game, has underlain every movement of Mind towards the
ideal goal of a universitas litterarum, every Platonic academy,
every league of an intellectual elite, every rapprochement
between the exact and the more liberal disciplines, every
effort towards reconciliation between science and art or
science and religion. Men like Abelard, Leibniz, and Hegel
unquestionably were familiar with the dream of capturing the
universe of the intellect in concentric systems, and pairing
the living beauty of thought and art with the magical
expressiveness of the exact sciences.
Hesse is writing in the person of a cloistered academic at this point, and
indeed the whole book is very much the view from the ivory tower. But the
very popularity of the book is an indication of the everyday importance of
the ideas.
70
It was with this background and these interests that I started to study
psychology. I was not intentionally studying the relationships between ways
of thinking such as art and science however the possibility of such
relationships was always at the back of my mind. As I've mentioned, I was
interested in Hudson's work on convergent and divergent thought. But these
ideas have the disadvantage of offering a one dimensional solution to the
art/science distinction. Thus while one can distinguish art from science in
an interesting way, the problems of distinguishing maths from physics or
music from painting remain. Perhaps for this reason I was more attracted to
two dimensional solutions such as Piaget's "circle of the sciences".
5.1.2. Piaget's Circle of the Sciences
Piaget was keenly aware of the importance of a theory of knowledge to
psychology. He took the view that in order to understand the cognitive
structures of the mind we need a proper epistemology, however he
regarded only science as of interest from this point of view, and as I've
indicated this is dealing with only part of the problem.
Piaget (1972a) points out that sciences are normally thought of as
progressing from maths to physics to biology to psychology (or sociology
as in Comte's hierarchy of the sciences), but that the two extremes,
mathematics and psychology, seem to be drawing together to form "a kind
of circle". He sees psychology as an attempt to explain why the
development of intelligence ends in the highly logical activity of formal
operational thought. He answers this question by proposing that thought
somehow enables mathematical reality, in much the same way as biological
reality enables any form of psychological process, or physical reality
enables any form of biological organism, or mathematical reality enables
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physical reality. (Whatever that "way" may be). Note 7.
Precisely how one should think of the relationship between the
mathematics of the mind and the mathematics which seems to underpin
physical reality is problematic, but one should not let this obscure the
usefulness of the circle of the sciences as a heuristic for exploring thinking.
While Piaget's circle only refers to part of the epistemological problem,
his example, that of creating a conceptual unity from seemingly disparate
elements, was most helpful to me. In the light of the model to be discussed
here it becomes possible to suggest a related circle of the arts. See below.
5.1.3. Waddington's "Behind Appearance'
Another thinker I found helpful early on was C.H. Waddington. His
interest in the relationship between art and science emerges first in "The
scientific attitude" (1941), and receives proper consideration in "Behind
appearance" (1969). The latter is subtitled "a study of the relations between
natural science and painting in this century". In it he considers both natural
science and non-figurative painting to be complementary investigations of
what lies behind appearance. He regards these two areas as linked by
identifiable features and claims that there is a "dialogue between painting
and science about the nature of the external world". He concludes his book
with these words:
We have been led, by a consideration of one apparent
discontinuity in human experience, that between painting and
natural science, to recognize that there is a continuity
between them after all, and that this continuity extends out
into wider fields .... the conclusion we have come to is that
man is an Argus with innumerable eyes, all yielding their
overlapping insights to his one being, that struggles to accept
them in all their variety and richness.
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I wanted to see this variety and richness within one coherent framework.
5.2. THE MODEL OF WAYS OF THINKING
5.2.1. An Initial Insight
Things began to fall into place when I started trying to map the
activities in which I was interested onto a three dimensional shape, namely
a cube. There's nothing special about a cube here (indeed I have used a
sphere as a more ideal expression of the model), except that it's a good
tool for thought: it helps to keep one's thinking straight because it has
edges and corners. Why I started using this three dimensional structure I
don't know, however it may be related to the fact I had been thinking of
art/science differences with respect to hemispheric specialization, and had
just been using Bogen's (1969) propositonal/appositional distinction to try
and sort them out. It may be that my thinking of a three dimensional
structure like the brain carried over into my thinking on art and science in
general.
I mention all this to try and avoid the usual practice of pretending that
present work is the logically necessary outcome of all that has preceded it.
The pattern of autobiography in this case seems more helpful than the
pattern of logic.
5.2.2. Planning a Library
There are substantial difficulties in communicating an unfamiliar model,
but suppose you were faced with the task of designing a general library, so
that the inter-relationships of the areas of thought covered by that library
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were reflected in the structure of the building itself. The design would only
be satisfactory if it enabled people to progress from one subject area
directly to any other closely related subject area. It would not be
satisfactory if people could not go directly from, for example, social science
to, on the one hand, history, and to biology on the other. Similarly it would
not be satisfactory if people could not go easily from music to painting or
to literature.
The question is this: what shape would such a library be? The answer is:
the same shape as a coherent model of ways of thinking. It is interesting to
reflect that since the model to be proposed is three dimensional, such a
library could in fact be built. I hope it will be.
Schopenhauer helps to put such a library in perspective:
As the biggest library if it is in disorder is not as useful
as a small but well-arranged one, so you may accumulate a
vast amount of knowledge but it will be of far less value to
you than a much smaller amount if you have not thought it
over for yourself; because only through ordering what you
know by comparing every truth with every other truth can
you take complete possession of your knowledge ...
The proposed model or library is a way of comparing every truth with every
other truth.
In examining the diagrams and descriptions below keep this "coherently
related library" analogy in mind. Imagining a journey round such a library
may be of particular help. Bear in mind that the library will have a highly
efficient stair, escalator and lift system connecting nearby areas to each
other. Thus in your journey ignore gravity, which would otherwise bias the
structure of the library by making it more easy to travel horizontally than
vertically.
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5.2.3. The Development of the Model
I have said that the initial insight was that a three dimensional model
had an explanatory power in some way appropriate to the problem of
relating the arts and sciences. What are these "dimensions"?
I approached this problem by giving working labels to the surfaces of
the cube, note (7). I eventually became more aware of the precise nature of
the model. I was then able to give more precise labels to the surfaces. But
in a real sense these labels are provisional. They are to meet necessity.
The model does not originate in them. Note 8.
They represent a coherent group of approaches to meaning. One can
call them elements of thinking. They are characterized by the following
concepts: analysis, ambiguity, development, space, resemblance and form.
Analysis is closely involved in what we call sciences. Each work depends
on being interpreted in only one way. Typical analytical activities are
biology, social science, mathematics and physical science.
Ambiguity is very much involved in art; each work has many possible
appropriate interpretations. Typical activities concerned with ambiguity are
music, plastic arts, mythology and literature.
Development is to do with what one might call a timespace, or following
Waddington, a chreod, rather than a spacetime. The irreversible order of
events is of paramount importance. Novels, studies of development, chess,
and biographies do not make sense backwards. Activities typifying this
element of thought are social sciences, history, literature and games.
Space is to do with potential reversibility and the implications of of such
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multi-directionality. Even time is thought of in this radically spatial way in
physics, for example its treatment as a dimension, or the backward time of
Feynman diagrams. Typical activities are plastic art, physical science, design
and depiction.
Resemblance is to do with, not so much what something is, but what it
is like, that is to say it is to do with a relation external to the thing.
Activities which depend heavily on this concept are history, biology,
depiction and mythology.
In contrast, Form is do do with internal relations. The relations with such
a formal work count for more than what it is like. This element of thinking
is typified by the activities of design, music, games and mathematics.
These concepts can be seen as three sets of complementarities or
polarities. These are the dimensions of the model. They can be called
categories of meaning. These three categories are:
(1) Definitional: one or many interpretations (analysis vs ambiguity)
(2) Directional: irreversible or reversible (development vs space)
(3) Relational: internal or external (form vs resemblance)
The convention adopted here is that the development/space polarity is
represented vertically, the analysis/ambiguity polarity is represented from








This structure makes sense of a substantial body of ways of thinking.
These are most accurately described by the concepts which characterise
them (eg "thinking about development and ambiguity") however each way of
thinking is also typified by an identifiable approach to knowledge, an
identifiable activity. Thus thinking about development and ambiguity is
typified by the production of literature. Similarly, thinking about form and
analysis is typified by the production of mathematics.
5.2.4. Categories of Meaning
I shall now consider each category of meaning in turn. This will enable
the reader to appreciate the model part by part, so that the complete
model, in which all three categories of meaning are brought together, will
be more fully understood.
5.2.4.1. Definitional
The definitional category of meaning is reflected in the
analysis/ambiguity polarity. The concept of analysis is underpinned by the
idea that phenomena can only be interpreted in one way. Each has only one
true meaning. In contrast ambiguity is underpinned by the idea that every
phenomenon is interpretable in many different ways. Ambiguity thus implies
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multiplicity, not vagueness, of interpretation. One is thus offered a choice of
type of definition with respect to any phenomenon: does it have meaning
by virtue of singularity of definition? Or does it have meaning by virtue of
multiplicity of definition? Singularity of definition is typified by what we call
science. Multiplicity of definition is typified by what we call art. While in
science f=ma is an infinitely repeatable singular definition, in art there are
an infinite number of different definitive interpretations of each work, none
of which can be repeated.
It is only because the listener, reader or spectator is an interpreter that
one can talk about unrepeatable interpretation, otherwise one might argue
that a recording, or a reproduction was a repeat interpretation. But the
interpretation is a construction of the mind of the experiences and it will be
different every time the "same" record is put on, or every time the same
pictorial reproduction is looked at. This is useful to consider because it
shifts the idea of interpretation away from the work itself onto the
experiencer of the work of art, science or whatever, which is where it
belongs. Note that the creator of the work is also an experiencer.
This is not to say that the appreciation of such things are simply
matters of of individual taste: it is to say that they are matters of individual
interpretation. There's no point in listening to Stravinsky or reading Einstein
if you cannot follow (i.e interpret) at least some of the transformations
made. But while understanding Einstein you are aiming for one repeatable
interpretation, in understanding Stravinsky you are aiming for an infinite
number of related interpretations. These could be called individual
productions. In contrast the scientific interpretation is (potentially) a mass
production. Note that this is not a question of implications. Einstein's
theories have no doubt infinite implications, but these depend on
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understanding them in precisely defined ways.
This contrast between analysis and ambiguity also helps to sort out the
problem of change in art and science. In art these changes are called
stylistic, in science they are called paradigmatic. In art change comes about
when there is a failure of ambiguity, eg when a style becomes the expected
convention. In science they come about when there is a failure in analysis.
Thus paradigm change and style change are similar processes, but they
depend on completely different starting assumptions, style change on the
assumption that meaning is a property of ambiguity, paradigm change on
the assumption that meaning is a property of analysis. It is interesting to
note that it is just such failures (conflicts in) analysis which Piaget sees as
critical to cognitive development. Perhaps we should begin to look in
addition for failures of ambiguity as similarly critical to cognitive growth.
The two surfaces of the model linked by the definitional category of
meaning (analysis and ambiguity) appear below. Each surface should be
looked at as a whole: a group of four activities characterized by one
concept. To pursue the above analogy further, each surface can be
considered a floor, wall or ceiling of the library.
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ANALYSIS
The "concept of analysis" surface (meaning as a property of single
definition) unites physical science (analysis/space), mathematics






The diagram below shows how this group of activities can be placed as




The "concept of ambiguity" surface (meaning as a property of multiple
definition) unites plastic arts (ambiguity/space), music (ambiguity/form),







The following diagram shows how this surface is placed as the right
hand surface of model:
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5.2.4.2. Directional
The directional category of meaning is reflected by the
development/space polarity. Development is underpinned by the idea of a
single irreversible direction. It does not make sense to talk about reversing
the sequence of development (if you can reverse the sequence it isn't
development). In contrast space is underpinned by the idea of complete
reversibility. The contrast here is between activities in which time (or
something time-like) is salient and activities in which space (or something
space-like) is salient.
Where time-like order is salient any spatial arrangement can only be
understood if its temporal significance is clear. Meaning is a property of
irreversible sequence. Things that are appropriately viewed in this way
include melodies, literature, histories, games, social science, programs and
rhythms. They can all usefully be thought of as inherently to do with
development (giving something time-like, conceptual priority) rather than
space.
In activities in which space is salient for example physical science,
design, geometry or painting, temporal questions are best understood in
terms of space. This is most clear when one considers time from a
physicist's perspective: not only has it been considered just another
space-like dimension since Newton's day, it is now even considered to be
reversible, for example in Feynman diagrams, or bi-directional as in
Stannard (1966). Thus development can be considered as uni-directional,
while space is multi-directional. One is thus again offered a choice: either a
phenomenon can be considered meaningful by virtue of its
uni-directionality, or by virtue of its multi-directionality.
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Early on in the development of the model I used the distinction between
spatial and temporal, rather than between concept of space and concept of
development, however I found this to be unsatisfactory because the
separation of space from time did not seem to exist. What did seem to
exist were things in which temporal properties only made sense with
reference to space, for example Einstein's theory of relativity, and other
things in which spatial properties only made sense with reference to time,
for example a book, an embryo, or an algorithm. The latter occupy what
might be called a timespace rather than a spacetime, and I therefore
characterised them as developmental since this word implies a making
sense of the activity of a system with reference primarily to temporal rather
than spatial features.
If I reverted to the use of temporal versus spatial I would find it difficult
to cope with, for example, Waddington's (eg 1975) topological idea of the
chreod (necessary path of development) since there would be immediate
pressure to classify this as spatial rather than temporal. This would be
unsatisfactory, because the idea refers to development, not space. The
fundamental idea of a chreod is the journey. The geography is only relevant
with respect to this.
The two surfaces linked by the directional category of meaning (space
and development) appear below.
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SPACE
The "concept of space" surface (meaning as a property of reversible
direction) unites physical science (space/analysis), design (space/form),
plastic arts (space/ambiguity) and depiction (space/resemblance).




The "concept of development" surface (meaning as a property of
irreversible direction) unites social science (development/analysis), games
(development/form), literature (development/ambiguity) and history
(development/resemblance).
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The relational category of meaning is reflected by the
form/resemblance polarity. The concept of form is underpinned by the idea
of internal relations. It is a concentration on what is going on inside the
boundaries of the phenomenon. In contrast the concept of resemblance is
underpinned by the idea of external relations. What is internal to the
phenomenon is taken for granted. What is important is how the
phenomenon relates to something external to it. Again one is offered a
choice: is this phenomenon meaningful by virtue of its internal relations, or
is it meaningful by virtue of its external relations?
The two surfaces of the model characterized by the relational category
of meaning (form and resemblance) appear below.
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RESEMBLANCE
The "concept of resemblance" surface (meaning as a property of external
relations) unites history (resemblance/development), myth
(resemblance/ambiguity), depiction (resemblance/space) and biology
(resemblance/analysis).
This group of ways of thinking is positioned on the model, as the front
surface, as shown below:
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FORM
The "concept of form" surface (meaning as a property of internal
relations) unites Games (form/development). Music (form/ambiguity), Design










The 'form' surface is positioned on the model (back surface) as shown
below:
5.2.5. One and Many
For each category of meaning there seems to be a choice between two
possible approaches to meaning. In each case this choice seems to be
88
between something unique and something infinite; i.e. analysis implies a
unique interpretation, ambiguity implies infinite interpretations; development
implies a unique direction, space implies infinite directions; form implies a
unique set of relations, resemblance implies infinite sets of relations.
5.2.6. Summary of Areas Typifying Ways of Thinking
Biology is centred on ideas about single definition (analysis) and external
relations (resemblance).
Physical science is centred on ideas about single definition (analysis)
and multiple direction (space).
/
Mathematics is centred on ideas about single definition (analysis) and
internal relations (form).
Social science is centred on ideas about single definition (analysis) and
single direction (development).
History is centred on ideas about single direction (development) and
external relations (resemblance).
Mythology is centred on ideas about multiple definition (ambiguity) and
external relations (resemblance).
Depiction is centred on ideas about external relations (resemblance) and
multiple direction (space).
Plastic art is centred on ideas about multiple definition (ambiguity) and
multiple direction (space).
Design is centred on ideas about internal relations (form) and multiple
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direction (space).
Music is centred on ideas about mutliple definition (ambiguity) and
internal relations (form).
Literature is centred on ideas about multiple definition (ambiguity) and
single direction (development)
Games are centred on ideas about single direction (development) and
internal relations (form)
5.2.7. Objections
One might raise objections here. For example: surely there's a great deal
of external relation (resemblance) in much music, for example Mahler? True
enough: the point with respect to the model is that music can, with a high
degree of meaning, be concerned with internal relations (form) and multiple
definition (ambiguity), for example Bach's "Art of Fugue", while other
activities are less likely to be so concerned. Similarly, biology can, with a
high degree of meaning, be concerned with external relations (resemblance)
and single definition (anlaysis), eg taxonomy. Other activities are less likely
to be so concerned.
Ways of thinking are thus, one might say, epicentres for particular
subject areas. They are helpful in sorting out one from another, but they do
not bind the thinker. They provide an epistemological home.
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5.2.8. The Model
We can now bring these activities together in a diagram of the complete
model:
5.2.9. Making Sense of Controversies
Note that the model can contribute to making sense of controversies
about the nature of certain activities. For example history relates as strongly
to literature as it does to social science. It thus makes sense that there are
controversies between historians of literary and sociological orientations.
Marwick(1970) makes this controversy plain in his discussion of Trevelyan:
Returning again to the question of whether history is art
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or science, Trevelyan concluded, rather as Thierry had done
before him, and as contemporaries like Stuart Hughes have
agreed since, in this fashion: 'Let us call it both or call it
neither, for it has an element of both.'
Macaulay versus Marx, so to speak. This controversy is illustrated in an
entertaining way by Graves (1936) in an imaginary conversation between
the Roman historians Livy and Pollio. The former mythologizes history, the
latter scientizes it.
History also relates as strongly to biology as it does to myth. In these
terms one can make sense of the controversy between Darwinian claims
about the early history of the world and those of creationists such as for
example Tytler (1862), who refers to 4004 BC as the date of creation of the
world, as though this were the same type of event as the execution of
Charles the first.
The creationist view is mythological, with reference to the model, in the
same sense as the evolutionist view is biological. They both make sense of
questions which bear on history, but they do not attempt to answer the
same question, even though these questions can be stated in the same
words. A problem arises when proponents of one view think that it answers
questions posed by the other. As, for example, when a creation myth is
thought to answer a scientific question, or when a scientific theory is
thought to have shown that a myth is stuff and nonsense. These are simply
errors of classification. An interesting example is given by Kelves (1984):
To Galton's mind, the scientific doctrine of evolution
destroyed the religious doctrine of the fall from grace.
note 10.
Similarly it makes sense that social science should be concerned both
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with problems of formal logic and games, as in cognitive science, but also
be concerned with issues impinging directly on history, as in sociology, and
biology as for example in ethology or neuropsychology. The other activities
on the model can be considered in a similar way. For example design
relates as strongly to physical science as to plastic art, and literature
relates as strongly to myth as to music (c.f. Levi-Strauss 1978).
It is helpful to include here another diagram of the model on which have
been placed names of representative thinkers:
Turing Chopin
Linnaeus Gainsborough
I would not want to take this naming of the cube too far because it
encourages distortion. Most thinkers avoid neat positioning. For example the
corner named "Mondrian" only represents Mondrian at his most well known
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stage of development. In his earlier work he was much more concerned
with resemblance, closer to the point named "Gainsborough" above.
Nevertheless as an exercise in gaining familiarity with the model such
naming is worthwhile.
5.2.10. The Model as an Analytical Tool
In the light of the above comment about Mondrian, it is clear that one
can see the model as a tool for the analysis of the development and scope
of ways of thinking in a particular individual. For example, Leonardo was
engineer, plastic artist and anatomist, and these activities can be seen as
substantially covering the "space" (lower) surface of the model. On the
other hand Michelangelo was best known as poet and plastic artist: with
reference to these achievements the "ambiguity" (right-hand) surface is
more appropriate. Similarly the "form" (upper) surface, with its characteristic
activities of maths, games, music and design strikes one as a good starting
point for the consideration of Wittgenstein, who as well as being concerned
with logic and games, studied as an engineering student at Manchester
University and took a keen interest in later life in both architecture and
music.
These are clearly preliminary analyses, but they demonstrate the
potential use of the model with respect to biographical understanding. It's
use with reference to biases inherent within particuar societies is similar.
That is to say its use with respect to the analysis of dominant cultural
realities (see chapter eight for further discussion of this).
5.2.11. The Model, William James, and Popper's Three Worlds
I originally approached the model much as James (1890) approached his
"realities" or "many worlds". That is to say from the point of view of the
subjective states of consciousness of the individual, what Popper has
referred to as "world two", however it has become increasingly clear that
the model reflects properties of Popper's "world three" also. That is to say
it is, on the one hand, a model of ways of thinking or types of
consciousness, and on the other it is a typology of what Popper has called
"objective contents of thought". It is thus no accident that Popper thinks of
world three knowledge as potential library knowledge, and that I found
myself employing a library as a useful explanatory analogy for the model.
An interesting gloss on the objectivity of library knowledge in found in Eco
(1983):
Until then I had thought each book spoke of things,
human or divine, that lie outside books. Now I realized that
not infrequently books speak of books: it is as if they spoke
among themselves. In the light of this reflection, the library
seemed all the more disturbing to me. It was then the place
of a long, centuries-old mumuring, an imperceptible dialogue
between one parchment and another, a living thing, a
receptacle of powers not to be ruled by a human mind, a
treasure of secrets emanated by many minds, surviving the
death of those who had produced them or had been their
conveyors.
Specific bodies of objective knowledge would not come into being
without particular ways of thinking, but a way of thinking gives rise to a
typical activity: that's all. It does not give rise to a specific body of
knowledge, for example Newtonian mechanics or Beethovenian symphonic
development, it does not even imply that developments somewhat like
these will happen. These developments should only be considered in terms
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of the whole model. They can only be understood when the culturally
dominant ways of thinking are understood (ie how the ways of thinking on
the model are selectively valued). For example to understand Beethovenian
symphonic development, it is necessary to understand Romanticism, which
cannot be understood without reference to the Industrial Revolution and
Renaissance and the differential evaluation of ways of thinking during these
periods.
What one can say is that knowledge of this or that type is the product
of an activity centred on thinking in this or that particular way. Any
particular body of knowledge will have the values placed on the ways of
thinking in the whole model, both contemporary and historical, as its
context. Neither a purely individual nor a purely cultural analysis will do. A
body of knowledge will not be properly explicable without a consideration
of cultural context but since it will relate to a fundamental way of thinking
it will not be fully explicable simply as a function of this context. Thus the
ways of thinking typified by painting and literature exist despite the
inadequate support structures for them in our present profoundly scientistic
culture. The alienation evident in the work of painters and writers at present
is a function of these inadequate support structures. The alienation is not
intrinsic to the activities per se. It is however intrinsic to the activity as
performed in a society in which the dominant objective knowledge is
science.
5.2.12. Provinces of Meaning
A consideration of the value that a person assigns to ways of thinking
helps to make clear the relationships between those ways of thinking and
the activities which typify them. A person who values certain ways of
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thinking will consider activities which typify these as central to the meaning
of his or her world view.
Thus someone who gives high value to thinking about form and
ambiguity will find that an activity typifying this way of thinking, music,
yields information central to the meaning of his or her world view. For
another person physical science may provide the template for "reality" or
"the world". For others it may be history, or literature or mathematics or
biology or myth or depiction or design or social science or games. There is
of course no reason to limit the basis of one's world view to one activity;
indeed it was a dissatisfaction with such an approach which led me to the
model in the first place. Such a pluralistic view leads to
incommensurabilities between realities which one should simply accept.
This acceptance can be justified because it can be seen to have a context,
i.e. the model.
A system of such incommensurable realities based on the insights of
James has been suggested by Schutz (1945). He refers to these as finite
provinces of meaning upon each of which we may bestow the "accent of
reality":
... we call a certain set of our experiences a finite
province of meaning if all of them show a specific cognitive
style and are - with respect to this style - not only
consistent in themselves but also compatible with one
another.
Schutz's view is useful but implies a rigidity of boundaries between
cognitive styles, or finite provinces of meaning, which in the light of the
continuous relationships between ways of thinking on the model, I would
reject. Thus incommensurabilities of ways of thinking are a function of
distance of separation on the model, rather than a function of crossing
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some definite boundary between provinces of meaning.
One can also now see how the dominant cultural reality can be reflected
in the views of individuals within it. If the institutions of a society provide a
selective evaluation of ways of thinking such that some are given high
levels of support, others little, this filtered view will be the world view with
which any individual within that society will have to cope. However it will
not be the only possible view. I have suggested in chapter three that
firstborn are more responsive to such dominant world views. These can
now be interpreted as selective evaluations of the set of possibilities
inherent in the model. The particular world view we have at present is
centred on "concept of analysis". Science is taken as the most real content
of thought.
5.2.13. A Further Consideration of each Typical Activity
5.2.13.1. Physical Science
On the model the way of thinking typified by physical science is most
closely related to those typified by mathematics, design, depiction and
biology. Bear in mind what this means in terms of the library analogy: from
physical science one can move with equal ease to mathematics, design,
depiction or biology. It is, cognitively speaking, equally simple to go from
physical science to any of these other ways of thinking.
Physical science is given position on the model by "concept of analysis"
and "concept of space". The distinctive meaning of physical science is a
function of these two concepts. It is bounded, on the "concept of form"
side, by mathematics and design, and on the "concept of resemblance" side,
by biology and depiction. Physical science thus bridges the gap between
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form and resemblance. The area of activity is both in possible formal worlds
and in observation. Events of significance include on the one hand
suggestions that the universe evolved from "literally nothing" but a set of
axioms as speculated by Guth and Steinhardt (1984), and, on the other,
observational feats such as those of Babylonian astronomy or Tycho. On the
one hand these activities are form driven, on the other hand they are
resemblance driven. Physical science necessarily unites the rationalist and
the empiricist, and this dichotomy will manifest itself in any discussion of
the "true nature" or "true role" of the activity. (This is equally true of social
science, see below).
5.2.13.2. Mathematics
The way of thinking typified by mathematics is most closely related to
those typified by physical science, design, games and social science.
Mathematics is given position on the model by "concept of analysis" and
"concept of form". The distinctive meaning of mathematics is a function of
these two concepts. It is bounded on the "concept of space" side by
physical science and design, and on the "concept of development" side by
social science and games. Mathematics bridges the gap between space and
development. This seems to be the distinction between cardinal and ordinal
number, or between geometry and topology on the one hand and the
irreversible sequences of the algorithm on the other. There is also perhaps
a link between this edge of the model and the three Bourbaki mathematical
"parent structures": algebraic structures, order structures and topological
structures, discussed by Piaget (1972b). Certainly something like order is
associated with development, something like topology is associated with
space, and something like algebra seems to be the central discipline of
mathematics. My understanding of this is limited, but it might be a starting
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point for a consideration of Piaget's contribution to cognitive theory, and
also a starting point for a consideration of the model from this well
established point of view.
5.2.13.3. Games
The way of thinking typified by games is most closely related to those
typified by mathematics, social science, literature and music.
Games are given position on the model by "concept of development"
and "concept of form". The distinctive meaning of games is a function of
these two concepts. They are bounded on the "concept of analysis" side by
social science and mathematics and on the "concept of ambiguity" side by
literature and music. Games bridge the gap between analysis and ambiguity.
Both the most purely analytical chess problem and the most ambiguous,
multi-definable spectacle (for example cricket or American football) are
games in this sense. It is interesting to note that chess is both
multi-definable like a work of art, that is to say capable of an infinite
number of correct games, but especially as it progresses it becomes
mono-definable like science, that is to say there comes a point at which
there is only one right move, one right answer to the problem. In contrast
games such as football, or a sport such as skiing never become
mono-definable. A different move is always possible at any point.
5.2.13.4. Music
The way of thinking typified by music is most closely related to those
typified by literature, games, design and plastic arts.
Music is given position on the model by "concept of form" and "concept
of ambiguity". The distinctive meaning of music is a function of these two
concepts. It is bounded on the "concept of development" side by literature
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and games and on the "concept of space" side by design and plastic arts.
Music bridges the gap between development and space. Its essentially
developmental characteristic is irreversible sequence: for example rhythm or
improvisation. It also has an essentially space-like characteristic. This is at
its minimum in rhythm, and at its maximum in a complex harmonic
structure. To take an analogy from an activity on the opposite side of the
"form" surface, mathematics: rhythm is to music as ordinal number is to
mathematics, while harmony is to music as geometry is to mathematics.
A work of music which well reflects the music label on the model is
Bach's "Art of Fugue". Perhaps Beethoven's late quartets also. But what
about the works of Mozart, Brahms, Monteverdi, Wagner etc? My purpose in
labelling part of the surface of the model "music" is to indicate a way of
thinking which reflects an essential property of music which is not an
essential property of the other typical activities on the model. But most of
what we refer to as music has many non-musical elements. For example
the combination with literature in opera, or the intended evocation of
relatively specific imagery in programme music such as Beethoven's sixth
symphony, or Vivaldi's "Four Seasons". The idea of essential music which I
am putting forward here is close to Pater's (1873) emphasis of music's
purely formal properties, and to Schopenhauer's rejection of "imitative
music". It is interesting to note that Schopenhauer had little admiration for
Wagner despite the latter's admiration for him (see Gardner 1963, p234).
The point is that something typifying thinking about of form and ambiguity
which involves both "concept of development" and "concept of space", is
more likely to be a piece of music than any thing else, note 11.
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5.2.13.5. Design
The way of thinking typified by design is most closely related to those
typified by mathematics, music, plastic arts and physical science.
Design is given position on the model by "concept of form" and
"concept of space". The distinctive meaning of design is a function of these
two concepts. It is bounded on the "concept of analysis" side by
mathematics and physical science, and on the "concept of ambiguity" side
by music and plastic arts. Design bridges the gap between analysis and
ambiguity. On the one hand design is analysis driven, form follows function
in its most radically "rational" sense; on the other hand it is ambiguity
driven and architecture is appropriately described as frozen music. This is
again a necessary unity, but this dichotomy will always emerge in debates
about the true role of design. One can exemplify this by comparing chair
designs from the Bauhaus and by Charles Rennie Mackintosh. Both these
chairs are beautiful, but the Bauhaus chair is a carefully analysed scientific
construction completely without ambiguity. It is, to paraphrase le Corbusier,
a machine for sitting on. In contrast the Mackintosh is almost wholly a work
of art. It is capable of an infite number of interpretations. It's fuction (in the
broad sense) is imprecise. It is considered a good chair, even if it's
uncomfortable. It's multiplicity of interpretations encourages the free range
of ambiguous thought, while the Bauhaus chair answers a design brief with
precision.
5.2.13.6. Plastic Arts
The way of thinking typified by plastic arts (here defined as painting
and sculpture) is most closely related to those typified by music, design,
depiction and myth. Plastic arts are given position on the model by
"concept of ambiguity" and "concept of space". The distinctive meaning of
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plastic arts is a function of these two concepts. The activity is bounded on
the "concept of form" side by music and design, and on the "concept of
resemblance" side by myth and depiction. Plastic arts bridge the gap
between form and resemblance. The appropriate area of activity is on the
one hand the investigation of formal properties as in non-figurative art, but
on the other hand the use of resemblance as in figurative or
representational art. The gap is thus bridged between a Mondrian and a
portrait by Gainsborough. Arguments within the activity will often be about
the relative merits of form and resemblance.
5.2.13.7. Myth
The way of thinking typified by myth is most closely related to those
typified by literature, history, depiction and plastic arts.
Myth is given position on the model by "concept of resemblance" and
"concept of ambiguity". The distinctive meaning of myth is a function of
these two concepts. It is bounded on the "concept of development" side by
history and literature, and on the "concept of space" side by plastic arts and
depiction. Myth bridges the gap between development and space. It's area
of activity is both the production of the developmental phenomenon of the
epic, or historical novel, and the spatial phenomenon of the icon. The
balance between icon and epic will play an important part part in disputes
about myth. For example, Christianity experienced a period of iconoclasm,
and there are still strong tensions between those who make use of the
iconography of myth and those who favour its narrative aspect.
5.2.13.8. Literature
The way of thinking typified by literature is most closely related to
those typified by myth, history, music and games.
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Literature is given position on the model by "concept of ambiguity" and
"concept of development". The distinctive meaning of literature is a function
of these two concepts. It is bounded on the "concept of form" side by
music and games, and on the "concept of resemblance" side by history and
myth. Literature bridges the gap between form and resemblance. This could
be taken as the distinction between on the one hand the deep response
possible to a poem in a language one does not understand, and on the
other hand the historical novel or epic. One would expect many discussions
between schools of form-orientated writers and schools of
resemblance-orientated writers.
5.2.13.9. History
The way of thinking typified by history is most closely related to those
typified by literature, myth, social science and biology.
History is given position on the model by "concept of development" and
"concept of resemblance". The distinctive meaning of history is a function
of these two concepts. It is bounded on the "concept of analysis" side by
social science and biology. It is bounded on the "concept of ambiguity" side
by myth and literature. History bridges the gap between analysis and
ambiguity. It's area of activity includes both ambiguous epic and analytical
census. Debates about the true role of the activity will often reflect this
dichotomy, literary and mythological on the one hand, and scientific on the
other. This can be characterised as the Macaulay/Marx debate. Also see
above "Making sense of controversies".
5.2.13.10. Social Science
The way of thinking typified by social science is most closely related to
those typified by history, biology, mathematics and games.
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Social science is given position on the model by "concept of analysis"
and "concept of development". The distinctive meaning of social science is
a function of these two concepts. It is bounded on the "concept of
resemblance" side by biology and history, and on the "concept of form" side
by mathematics and games. Social science bridges the gap between
resemblance and form, just as does physical science, however the subject
matter which enables this bridging is development rather than, as in the
case of physical science, space. On the one hand social science deals with
the empirical constraints of creating a structure to resemble a particular
situation, for example a census or a case study, on the other hand it deals
with the possible worlds of algorithms. Marx vs Turing. Also see above
"Making sense of controversies".
5.2.13.11. Biology
The way of thinking typified by biology is most closely related to those
typified by history, social science, physical science and depiction.
Biology is given position on the model by "concept of resemblance" and
"concept of analysis". The distinctive meaning of biology is a function of
these two concepts. It is bounded on the "concept of space" side by
depiction and physical science. It is bounded on the "concept of
development side" by history and social science. Its area of activity is
concerned both with space and with development. Both with on the one
hand taxonomy and anatomical description, and on the other with
embryology and evolution. Linnaeus vs Darwin.
5.2.13.12. Depiction
The way of thinking typified by depiction is most closely related to
those typified by myth, plastic arts, biology and physical science.
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Depiction is given position on the model by "concept of space" and
"concept of resemblance". The distinctive meaning of depiction is a function
of these two concepts. It is bounded on the "concept of analysis" side by
physical science and biology, and on the "concept of ambiguity" side by
myth and plastic arts. Depiction bridges the gap between between analysis
and ambiguity. Both an identity photograph and a portrait by Imogen
Cunningham are depictions. Both an anatomy drawing and a religious icon
are depictions. A depiction, despite our present tendency to conflate the
visual with the artistic, is not necessarily art. Beloff (1984) makes this point
concisely:
In one sense a photograph promises reality and truth
and scientific precision. And in another it is in the domain of
art.
5.3. LOOSE ENDS
5.3.1. The Thinker not the Thing
I mentioned above the primary importance of the interpreter. This can
be considered with reference to Beloff's remark. The same photograph can
have both scientific and artistic aspects. This is an important point to
consider with reference to the model. What you get out of an artifact such
as a photograph depends on the way you think about it. A portrait by can
be thought of as a work of art. It can also be thought of as a way of
identifying the sitter. It is not that the portrait is both an artwork and a
means of identification; rather what the portrait is depends on how you use
it, on how you think about it. However certain artifacts are tailored to
certain ways of thinking, that is to say they are produced by a certain way
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of thinking and are best understood by that way of thinking. For example a
simple linear composition by Mondrian is best considered in an ambiguous,
formal, spatial way. But clearly it could be thought of as a stylized
resemblance of scaffolding. The things which are not tailored to any way of
thinking are those of the natural world. As Blake said: "Nature has no
Outline, but Imagination has". This is perhaps, a key to understanding the
model. It is a model of what we can imagine.
5.3.2. Unimaginables
But what happens when we can't imagine something, yet still feel that
it's there? How can we feel its there if we can't imagine it? We can only do
this if we regard it as a context. That is to say something which gives
sense to our thought but by virtue of this cannot be made sense of by our
thought.
Such ideas seem odd (although they have superficial analogies with
Russell's theory of logical types and Godel's theorem) however they reflect
the meaning we give to similarly odd words such as God, Om, Tao and Zen.
"God in whom we live and breathe and have our being", sums the idea up
quite well. What is God if not a way of identifying context for thought?
Wittgenstein in his "Notebooks, 1914-1916" takes this view when he says:
"The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God" (p73).
The totality, and hence mystical. The unimaginable context: what you
understand when you have thrown away the ladder of theory. To quote
from the Tractatus:
6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the
following way: anyone who understands me eventually
recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them as
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steps to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw
away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will
see the world aright.
This notion of God is mystical not mythical. These notions are distinct,
although a myth may lead to God just as may a work of theoretical physics;
see in this connection Capra (1975). A mythical god is a type of thought,
not a context for thought. A mythical god can be the figure of fun or
tragedy. A mystical God is not a figure. "I am that I am" is a way of
indicating this, as is "In the beginning was the word, and the word was with
God and the word was god", as is the imaginary book of the Sufis which
they call "In it what is in it" (see Shah 1968). A context, not a jovial
personage. To return to Wittgenstein: "How things stand, is God."
(Notebooks, p79).
5.3.3. Library, School and Encyclopaedia
To return to the library analogy: in the light of the model one can now
imagine moving round the library and finding each area coherently
connected to its neighbours. For example one can go from music to
literature to history to psychology to biology to physics to maths to design.
Each area leads into its neighbours. Since most activities have an
accompanying literature, the library is a good analogy for the model,
however one could expand the analogy by extending the notion of the
library into that of a general resource centre. Extending the notion of library
is useful because it begins to make clear the possibilities inherent in the
model with respect to the development of a properly integrated theory of
education. One can regard this resource centre as a model for a school or
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university.
This organizational system reflects closely the meaning of
"encyclopaedia" given by Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary as "The
circle of human knowledge" from the greek en=in, kyklos=circle,
paidia=education. No doubt Piaget was aware of this connotation when he
talked about the circle of the sciences, especially since his fellow French
speaker Diderot in his definition of "encyclopaedia" translates "paidia" as
"connaissances" that is to say knowledge or learning. In this context of
general learning it is interesting to reflect that the Encyclopaedia Brittanica
has its origins in an intentionally generalist tradition of education, that of
Scotland. The model can be regarded as a series of circles of knowledge; a
programme for a complete encyclopaedia.
5.3.4. Circles of Science and of Art
Taking Piaget's work as an example its interesting to rethink the model
in this radically encyclopaedic way.
Piaget's circle of the sciences corresponds to the "concept of analysis"
surface of the model. Similar circles can be made from the other surfaces.
There are three pairs of these, which are iso-conceptual with reference to
four of the concepts but differ on the other two. For example the circle of
the sciences is iso-conceptual to the circle of the arts with respect to form,
resemblance, development and space, but differs in that its context is
"concept of analysis", while that of the circle of the arts is "concept of
ambiguity". It should be noted that music, often held to be that condition of
art to which all arts aspire, not only by Schopenhauer and Pater, but also by
Andrei Bely in his essay "The Forms of Art":
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If we place the fine arts in their order of perfection we
arrive at the following five principle forms: architecture,
sculpture, painting, poetry, music.
is iso-conceptual with mathematics, popularly conceived of as "the queen
of the sciences", e.g. Levy (1947).
Taken together these two circles are as follows
The terms on the left of each pair make up Piaget's circle of the
sciences. The terms on the right make up another circle, dominated by
concept of ambiguity, which is iso-conceptual with reference to
development, space, form and resemblance.
Similar iso-conceptual circles can be put together for the two other
pairs of surfaces. The resemblance and form surfaces are iso-conceptual
with reference to analysis, ambiguity, space and developement. An






The terms on the left of each pair compose the resemblance surface,
the terms on the right the form surface.
The same can be done for the development and space surfaces. These
are iso-conceptual with reference to resemblance, form, ambiguity and
analyisis.
The terms on the left of each pair compose the development surface,
the terms on the right the space surface.
5.3.5. Meditation and Patrick Geddes
There is, however, one element missing from the library. This is the area
devoted to the consideration of unimaginables. These could be







what he is not talking about. As Wittgenstein (1922) says: "It is not how
things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists." A "how" problem
can be interpreted. A "that" problem cannot be so treated. It is neither
interpretable nor uninterpretable. To approach it on the level of
interpretation is not appropriate. In the centre of the library one could set
aside an area for the contemplation of these things which indicate context.
A place where, to quote Neil Gunn, "the last metaphysical button fades on
the viewless air". The appropriate activity here would be meditation or
prayer. It is interesting to note that Patrick Geddes had just such an area in
his Edinburgh teaching institution, the Outlook Tower. Boardman (1978)
reports that Geddes often said that it should be an Inlook Tower as well,
and that the "meditation cell" was the beginning of this.
5.3.6. Burnet: the Most Important Side of Knowledge
The significance of the model is reflected in a statement by John
Burnet, the early twentieth century classical scholar and educationalist,
quoted by Davie (1972):
The most important side of any department of
knowledge is the side on which it comes into touch with
every other department. To insist on this is the true function
of humanism.
The model can be of use to those who, with Burnet, see an awareness of
connections between activities as essential to an education true to the
potential of the mind.
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CHAPTER 6
DEMONSTRATION OF THE COHERENCE OF THE MODEL
Break the pattern which connects the items of learning
and you necessarily destroy all quality. Bateson (1979)
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to methodically demonstrate the
coherence of the model. In part one it is considered that certain activities
involve certain concepts more than they do others. This is obvious; but the
point of this section is to show that this obviousness holds throughout the
model. That is to say that the model still makes sense when examined
closely. Part two demonstrates that if the organization of the model is
changed, it no longer makes sense. Part one is thus a positive
demonstration of the coherence of the model, part two demonstrates the
same by negative means.
6.1. PART ONE
Each way of thinking can be thought of as a viewpoint which makes
sense of phenomena with reference to certain concepts only. It has been
pointed out above that each way of thinking, or rather, each activity
typifying that way of thinking, is closely related to some other ways of
thinking, and more distantly related to others. This does not mean that a
user of a particular way of thinking will not think it appropriate to explain all
phenomena with reference to that way of thinking. "All phenomena" will
necessarily include the productions of other ways of thinking. But the
methods of one way of thinking will have at best limited applicability to the
products of other ways of thinking. Such explanations must inevitably lose
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credibiltiy as their methods become inappropriate.
For example a geometrical analysis of the composition of a painting (eg
Thomas 1969, Macdonald 1977) tells you about geometry and tells you that
it is possible to find rules of composition within the work. However it tells
you nothing about the meaning of the work to either the artist or the
viewer. Even if, let us suppose, it were possible to produce a set of
scientific criteria which would reliably identify paintings likely to produce
this meaningful experience, these criteria cannot give us any indication of
this meaning. The meaning of an artwork cannot be reduced to scientific
criteria. One can however describe the type of meaning appropriate to an
artwork by scientific criteria: while this tells one how it means, this very
information (eg that art is multi-definable) will indicate that this meaning
cannot be reduced to a scientific meaning.
Similarly the meaning of a scientific work cannot be reduced to any
artistic criterion we might use to approach it. For example a lifting gear
may satisfy a criterion of artistic worth: it might be appropriately thought of
as a high-tech Brancusi, but this ambiguous meaning, cannot be thought
adequate to explain its scientific purpose. The scientific laws relating to its
construction and use cannot be thought of as appropriately reducible to any
artistic criteria used to judge it.
However, this analysis also draws attention to the similarities between
the gear assembly and a sculpture. How can these similarities be coped
with? Referring back to the model, both the gear assembly, a product of
physcial science, and the sculpture, a product of plastic art, are related to
"concept of space". It thus makes sense that they have this evident
similarity. They share "concept of space" with design and depiction. Design
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is distinguished from depiction in being characteristed by concept of form,
rather than concept of resemblance. Thus any attempt to explain design in
terms of criteria of resemblance will not constitute an adequate explanation,
while any attempt to explain depiction in terms of purely formal criteria will
fail similarly.
These considerations answer objections that every activity has
something to do with all the concepts. This is true, but only to a certain
extent. The point is that each activity is more to do with some concepts
than others. To repeat the phrase used in chapter five, each activity has an
"epistemological home". These epistemological homes are best considered
as obvious, and it is worth considering this obviousness further. The
following systematic consideration has value as a demonstration but is
somewhat repetitive. The reader should bear this in mind and approach it
accordingly. Some readers may prefer to use it as a resource that can be
referred back to should questions arise.
6.1.1. Space
To consider again the surface of the model defined by concept of space.
This surface involves the ways of thinking typified by design, plastic arts,
depiction and physical sciences.
M»3i-IM?1
space
Depiction is opposed to design on the dimension of resemblance versus
form, and physical sciences are opposed to plastic arts on the dimension of
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analysis versus ambiguity. It is obvious that criteria of resemblance are
more central to the understanding of depiction than they are to the
understanding of design. Similarly it is obvious that formal criteria are more
central to the understanding of design than they are to the understanding
of depiction. Turning now to physical sciences and plastic arts: it is obvious
that analytical criteria are more central to the understanding of physical
sciences than they are to the understanding of plastic arts. Similarly it is
obvious that criteria of ambiguity are more central to the understanding of
plastic arts than they are to the understanding of physical sciences.
6.1.2. Development
Consider now the surface of the model defined by concept of
development. This involves the ways of thinking typified by history,
literature, games and social sciences.
History is opposed to games on the dimension of resemblance versus
form. Social sciences are opposed to literature on the dimension of analysis
versus ambiguity. It is obvious that criteria of resemblance are more central
to the understanding of history than they are to the understanding of
games. Similarly, it is obvious that formal criteria are more central to the
understanding of games than they are to the understanding of history.
Turning now to social sciences and literature: it is obvious that analytical
criteria are more central to the understanding of social sciences than they




ambiguity are more central to the understanding of literature than they are
to the understanding of social sciences.
6.1.3. Analysis
Now consider the surface of the model defined by concept of analysis.
This involves the ways of thinking typified by physical sciences, biology,











Social sciences are opposed to physical sciences on the dimension of
development versus space, biology is opposed to mathematics on the
dimension of resemblance versus form. It is obvious that developmental
criteria are more central to the understanding of social sciences than they
are to the understanding of physical sciences. Similarly, it is obvious that
criteria of space are more central to the understanding of physical sciences
than they are to the understanding of social sciences. Turning now to
biology and mathematics: it is obvious that criteria of resemblance are
more central to the understanding of biology than they are to the
understanding of mathematics. Similarly, it is obvious that formal criteria
are more central to the understanding of mathematics than they are to the
understanding of biology.
6.1.4. Ambiguity
Next consider the surface defined by concept of ambiguity. This surface











Literature is opposed to plastic arts on the dimension of development
versus space, mythology is opposed to music on the dimension of
resemblance versus form. It is obvious that developmental criteria are more
central to the understanding of literature than they are to the understanding
of plastic arts. Similarly, it is obvious that criteria of space are more central
to the understanding of plastic arts than they are to the understanding of
literature. Turning to mythology and music: it is obvious that criteria of
resemblance are more central to the understanding of mythology than they
are to the understanding of music. Similarly, it is obvious that formal
criteria are more central to the understanding of music than they are to the
understanding of mythology.
6.1.5. Resemblance
Consider now the surface of the model defined by concept of
resemblance. This involves the ways of thinking typified by history,
mythology, depiction and biology.
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History and depiction are opposed on the dimension of development
versus space, biology and mythology are opposed on the dimension of
analysis versus ambiguity. It is obvious that developmental criteria are more
central to the understanding of history than they are to the understanding
of depiction. Similarly, it is obvious that criteria of space are more central
to the understanding of depiction than they are to the understanding of
history. Turning to biology and mythology: it is obvious that analytical
criteria are more central to the understanding of biology than they are to
the understanding of mythology. Similarly it is obvious that critiera of
ambiguity are more central to the understanding of mythology than they are
to the understanding of biology.
6.1.6. Form
Lastly consider the surface of the model defined









Mathematics is opposed to music on the dimension of analysis versus
by concept of form,
mathematics, design,
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ambiguity, games are opposed to design on the dimension of development
versus space. It is obvious that analytical criteria are more central to the
understanding of mathematics than they are to the understanding of music.
Similarly, it is obvious that criteria of ambiguity are more central to the
understanding of music than they are to the understanding of mathematics.
Turning to games and design: it is obvious that developmental criteria are
more central to the understanding of games than they are to the
understanding of design. Similarly, it is obvious that criteria of space are
more central to the understanding of design than they are to the
understanding of games.
6.2. PART TWO: COHERENCE OF THE MODEL DEMONSTRATED BY SHOWING
THE EFFECTS OF DISTORTION
In the course of explaining the model in conversation, it has on occasion
been suggested that it is possible to make any set of ideas look consistent
in a three dimensional structure, regardless of how they are positioned with
respect to one another. This is not true, but in the light of this criticism it
seems necessary to demonstrate this. I introduced this chapter with
Bateson's comment: "Break the pattern which connects the items of
learning and you necessarily destroy all quality". This demonstration is
precisely such a breaking of the pattern, with its consequent loss of quality.
One can do this by distorting the model by placing ways of thinking
inappropriately within it.
This can be done most easily by substituting ways of thinking for their
direct opposites on the surfaces of the model. Thus mathematics can be
transposed with either music (across the "form" surface), or biology (across
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the "analysis" surface). To take another example, literature can be
transposed with either plastic arts or social sciences.
Each possible cross surface transposition appears below. In each case I
will present a diagram of the original coherent surface of the model, and
beside it a diagram of the conceptually incoherent surface resulting from
the transposition of ways of thinking. This constitutes a demonstration of
the coherence of the model. If already convinced of the coherence of the
model, the reader may prefer to go straight to chapter seven.
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Mathematics transposed with Music
If mathematics is transposed with music, on the "concept of analysis"





























Mathematics transposed with Biology
























Music transposed with Mythology

















On the "concept of resemblance" surface:
coherent incoherent









Biology transposed with Mythology






































History transposed with Depiction
If history is transposed with depiction, on the "concept of development"
surface:
coherent incoherent
development I development I



















History transposed with Games
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Depiction transposed with Design


























Design transposed with Games

















Literature transposed with Social Science
If literature is transposed with social sciences, on the "concept
analysis" surface:
coherent incoherent










Literature transposed with Plastic Arts
If literature is transposed with plastic arts, on the "concept of
development" surface:
coherent incoherent
development I development I




Social Science transposed with Physical Science
If social science is transposed with physical science, on the "concept of
development" surface:
coherent incoherent



















Physical Science transposed with Plastic Arts
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The above comparisons, each of a coherent surface with an incoherent





7.1. THE MODEL AS INTERPRETATIVE AND PREDICTIVE TOOL
I have shown that the model has structural coherence. Each activity is
uniquely defined by its neighbours. One cannot swop them around and still
have a sensible model.
But what can one do with the model? It's importance is as a general
interpretative tool, that is to say a way of ordering information, much, or all,
of which may already be to hand should one care to look for it. The model
is an intitial attempt to order an area. Most models are not of this type.
They deal with, and comment upon, areas which have already been ordered.
A useful analogy for my own work is the Ptolemaic view of the cosmos. An
initial ordering of the data which sets up useful limits (not necessarily the
only limits) for subsequent discussion. It is usual to date modern
cosmology from Copernicus but the Ptolemaic theory set the limits for the
Copernican discussion and this is the point. Ptolemaic theory is the intitial
cognitive tool in the area of scientific cosmology. The model can be used in
a similar way with respect to ways of thinking.
I will consider in the next chapter the use of the model with respect to
biographical, educational and cultural analysis, but it is appropriate here to
demonstrate its use on a smaller scale, with reference to data already
referred to.
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7.2. FAMILY STRUCTURE RELATED TO THE MODEL
At the end of chapter two I pointed out the need for a model of art and
science to make sense of the birth order differences found among those in
the Dictionary of National Biography. We now have such a model and it
suggests that the best description of this difference is in terms of firstborn
favouring meaning as a function of analysis, while laterborn, particularly
youngestborn, favour meaning as a function of ambiguity. This is a
difference in evaluation of definition. Firstborn value single definition,
youngestborn value multiple definition.
However we can go further than this and begin to use the model as a
tool to make sense of another major family structure variable, family size.
The model takes us away from a one dimensional view of the relationships
between ways of thinking. As well as having analysis/ambiguity, we also
have resemblance/form and space/development.
In dealing with the data from the Dictionary of National Biography, I
noticed that the family sizes of literary figures seemed larger than those of
some of the other groups. On its own this piece of information might have
gone relatively unremarked. However in the context of the model, it began
to make sense, since it seemed likely that one would have much more
opportunity to think about "development" (e.g. the irreversible social
consequences of actions) in a large family than in a small one. By the same
token, and getting back to one of my original interests, space, in a small
family, "space" might well be more salient simply because there is less
opportunity for thinking about these developmental systems. It thus seemed
plausible to suggest that those eminent in disciplines represented on the
"concept of development" surface of the model would tend to come from
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larger families than those eminent in disciplines represented on the
"concept of space" surface of the model.
There is a problem in the data here, namely that very few social
scientists (identified as such) appear in the Dictionary of National Biography
(1981), in fact I could only get full data on four of them. Thus the "concept
of development surface" would be lacking one of its main components in
any comparison. I resolved this somewhat by comparing "concept of space"
with disciplines "tending towards concept of development": i.e. biology,
music and mathematics as well as social science and literature. History was
excluded from this group, because it was not used in the original
comparisons between arts and sciences in chapter three, and I wanted to
use precisely the same set of data for the present comparison. For the
same reason architecture was excluded from the "space" group. Both these
categories have few members, so whether or not they are included in the
comparison makes little practical difference.
7.2.1. Hypothesis
It was hypothesised that members of the "concept of space" group
would have, in general, smaller family sizes than members of the "tending
towards concept of development" group.
7.2.2. Results
To test this hypothesis a median test was carried out:
t to d = "tending to development"
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t to d 42 42
space 38 18
Chi squared = 3.6762, 1 df, 1 tailed, p<.05
The hypothesis is thus supported. Further analysis suggests that the effect
is mainly evident in laterborn rather than firstborn. Whether or not onlies
are included in the firstborn group there is no interesting looking pattern. In
contrast, in the laterborn group and in its two sub-divisions, intermediate,
and youngest, those "tending to development" are represented














t to d 16 32
space 11 11
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Intermediate (laterborn but not youngest)
family size
2,3,4 4+





to to d 5 12
space 4 4
This family size effect is not an artifact of differing social class between the
two groups as the table below shows:
Social class
1 2 3,4
t to d 39 27 18
space 25 19 12
Chi squared = 0.0560, 2df, 2 tailed, not significant
I have implied that the effect is present in both arts and sciences, and it
can be seen from the table below that this is indeed the case, although the













The interesting finding here is that while the hypothesis is supported by
a comparison of all in the concept of space category versus all in the
tending to concept of development category, further analysis suggests that
this effect is mainly due to laterborn. However, unlike the case above
(Chapter 3) with respect to eminence in art and science, youngestborn
seem to behave very much as do intermediates.
Thus the two family structure variables of family size and birth order
seem to be differentially important to the development of ways of thinking.
Family size is important to later born, large families facilitating thinking
about development, small families facilitating thinking about space. Birth
order is important to first and youngestborn, firstborn tending to develop
ideas of analysis, youngest born tending to develop ideas of ambiguity.
Thus first and youngest seem to be distinguishable on the basis of the
model's definitional pair of concepts, but laterborn as a whole seem to be
distinguishable on the basis of the directional pair.
As has been noted, firstborn seem to become supporters of the
dominant cultural reality. Youngest seem to become supporters of the
non-dominant view. Does this mean that the youngest is some sort of
natural rebel? Perhaps a permitted or even encouraged rebel. The youngest
may be the focus of encouragement for those activities which are known to
be important but cannot be admitted as such in the context of the
dominant reality. The firstborn is the focus of all that can be overtly valued.
What is emerging about intermediates is that they do not seem to be
focuses for the encouragment of a particular world view. Firstborn seem to
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have a cultural identity thrust upon them. Youngest seem to be encouraged
to pick up the (highly important) cultural left-overs. Intermediates do not
seem to be encouraged to do anything to the same extent. Salient
information for them is influenced by the size of group (family) they are in.
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CHAPTER 8
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The solution which I am urging, is to eradicate the fatal
disconnection of subjects which kills the vitality of our
modern curriculum. There is only one subject matter for
education, and that is Life in all its manifestations. Whitehead
(1932)
8.1. IMPLICATIONS: BIOGRAPHICAL AND CULTURAL
The model can be used as a tool for biographical and cultural analysis,
both in the study of an individual or culture at any one time and also in the
study of the development of individuals and cultures.
An individual or culture can be represented as a biased version of the
model. A good way of doing this is to imagine the model as expanded in
some directions and attenuated in others. In addition to this expression of
cultural or individual emphasis, some parts of the model may also be more
or less differentiated than others.
8.1.1. Cultures
For example the present western cultural model is strongly expanded in
the "analysis" direction, but is attenuated with respect to "ambiguity". In
addition it is only within the last two centuries that social sciences have
become properly differentiated from other sciences on the one hand, and
literature on the other. And despite the fact that arts are at present
attenuated, they are nevertheless highly differentiated. That is to say we
have many carefully distinguished arts ail of which are inadequately
supported. In contrast to the modern view, the culture of classical Greece
seems to exhibit both a high level of differentiation of activities but also
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relatively little bias. However there does seem to be a neglect of the area
where "space", "analysis" and "resemblance" come together on the model.
This point is bounded by physical science, depiction and biology. It is thus
of interest that the philosopher who opens the Hellenistic age, Artistotle,
made a unique contribution in biology, and the culture of ancient Rome was
noted both for its physical science and for it's accuracy of portraiture. At
the same time, although the arts remain differentiated as they were in
Greece, there is a substantial attenuation. Rome made a significant
contribution in civil engineering. It's art is significant only as a development
of that of Greece.
One can thus envisage cultural development as a kind of pulsation of
the model. Different parts are differentiated and/or emphasized at different
times. Greece: most activities both differentiated and emphasized. Rome:
taking up this differentiated position, but emphasizing the least emphasised
in that position. In terms of the model one can see the Romanesque and
Gothic periods as times of re-emphasis of ambiguity; science is in
abeyance, but myth and plastic arts are of high importance.
The Renaissance is a time of expansion of both the arts and sciences.
But this expansion is driven by a cultural re-appraisal of analysis. We can
characterize one of the contributions of the Renaissance in one phrase:
accurate depiction. This is normally thought of as intrinsicly to do with art,
but clearly it is not (c.f. comments in Chapter 5 about the conflation of art
and visual thinking). A work of art can certainly be a depiction, but so also
can a work of science such as an anatomy drawing. The great invention of
the Renaissance, perspective, is an aid to depiction, not an aid to art. The
paradox of perspective is that we think of it as enabling the Renaissance
flowering of art, but it is as relevant, if not more relevant to science. It
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allows one to take precise, different, points of view. It allows you to
analyse, select with respect to specific criteria. Perspective does not make
art any better, it simply makes it different; a change in style. But
perspective does make science better since it is a tool for analysis, and
implies other similar tools. The Renaissance can thus be considered, in
terms of the model, as a movement away from the concern with ambiguity
in the Medieval period, towards the present situation in which the highest
cutural value is accorded to analysis. In these terms it is easy to consider
the modern era as starting with the Enlightenment.
8.1.2. Biographies
I have little to add here to the comments I made above with respect to
the use of the model as a tool for biographical analysis, but it important to
note this potential use. A brief further discussion of Leonardo is, however,
of interest. He was very much the painter/scientist, and explicitly rejected
the notion of himself as a man of letters (i.e. he did not see his contribution
as having much to do with a substantial part of the developmental surface
of the model).
I am fully aware that the fact of my not being a man of
letters may cause certain arrogant persons to think that they
may with reason censure me ...
Leonardo's "Notebooks" quoted by Bronowski(1961)
Thus to return to the point made in Chapter 5, one can get good initial
access to the works of this painter, engineer and anatomist by considering
the concept of space surface of the model.
This consideration of culture and biography is only a starting point
based on my own limited knowledge, a suggestive, rather than a definitive.
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analysis. The important thing is that the model is being used to order
information in an interesting way. Given a deeper knowledge of history and
biography, the resulting fuller analyses will be at the very least stimulating.
8.2. TOWARDS APPLICATION: USE IN EDUCATION
The model seems to imply a view which accepts a set of linked ways
of thinking, irreducible to one another, which can be differently valued by
different cultures, (or subcultures, or individuals). This differential evaluation
might be called the representation of knowledge or truth or reality of that
particular group or person. One can thus, perhaps, begin to understand
other cultures (or individuals), because the possibilities of that culture (or
individual) are inherent in one's own culture (or self), although the value
system (or reality) may be quite different. Berlin (1981) has called such an
approach "pluralistic".
One would expect that a model of relevance to cultural and individual
differences in thinking would be of relevance to education: this it is. It can
be used in curriculum design.
Such a view is in accord with Hirst's (1969) comment that "there is,
atleast to some extent, a map of knowledge", however it is stronger in that
qualification seems unnecessary. Again one could agree with Hirst that:
the logical demarcations that (the map of knowledge) ...
shows cannot but be helpful in providing our pupils with an
idea of the range of human understanding and therefore
some perspective on human pursuits.
At the very least the model provides such a perspective.
The model is the basis for a coherent theory of education. It will be a
theory of education with which one will be able to make sense of, not only
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a "map of knowledge", but also contemporary educational practice because
it is also a model of different evaluations of knowledge truth or reality.
It can be used to suggest courses of action. For example, if we want to
expand the perspective of "the narrow minded boffin reared on a restricted
diet of science and mathematics" or "the arts man, blank in his
incomprehension of the scientific outlook" (both quotes from Hirst's 1969
article), we can contextualize arts for the scientist and science for the artist
by using the model. For example, art can be made meaningful to the
physicist by leading him or her to it via a consideration of design or
depiction, holding what I've called "concept of space" constant. One can
move easily from Newton to Telford to Adam to Michelangelo.
Giving a physicist a lecture on painting or literature without providing
this context may be interesting to the physicist, but it is unlikely to seem
relevant since "the pattern which connects the items of learning", to use
again Bateson's memorable phrase, will not be discernible.
Similarly the student of literature can be introduced to a social science
such as sociology or psychology or economics, via history or games,
keeping concept of development constant. For example: Tolstoy to
Trevelyan to Marx. Or taking the "games" route: start with a writer
concerned with form and ambiguity such as Mallarmee, then consider a
formal game (eg chess) then the nature of an algorithm then cognitive
psychology.
One might also begin to create an awareness of the distinction between,
on the one hand, literary and mythological approaches to history, and on
the other, social scientific approaches, by comparing "Apocalypse Now",
"Rambo" and 'The Deerhunter" with documentary treatments of the same
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war. The more analytical view is clearly no alternative to the ambiguities of
the literary/mythological approach of the cinema, yet both are related by
the idea of history. In addition distinctions can be drawn between the
relative mythological and literary value of the different films.
Educationally speaking the important point is not that these
transformations can be made, since intuitively that has always been the
case, but that they can be explained in terms of varying some concepts
while keeping others stable. One is no longer following a track in darkness.
Contextualizing subjects for specialists in other disciplines is thus both
easier to carry out and easier to make sense of, if one makes use of the
model. The critical point is that such methods will enable the student to
see that he or she could participate as a thinker in at first sight unfamiliar
areas of knowledge, and could begin to make some preliminary sense of
what specialists in those fields are doing. This enables a respect for other
areas of thought based on an understanding of them as parts of a unified
field of knowledge, rather than a respect for them based, at best, on a
mystified implicit relativism and, at worst, an ignorance based on the
assumption that they are irrelevant, or not "thought" atall.
The model can also be used to help cope with biases about the nature
of knowledge encountered during teaching. To give an example from my
own experience: during a seminar, an industrial design student seemed
sceptical of the worth of social science. On discussion it emerged that he
did not regard anything as "real" unless it was a physical object, a more or
less exact depiction of one, or a report about its properties. Clearly the
topics with which psychology deals did not satisfy his criteria of reality. But
by his own admission nor did the paintings of Van Gogh, which distorted
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exact depiction too much.
By using the model it was possible to see that his idea of "the real"
made perfectly coherent, though limited, sense. On the evidence of this
conversation, his idea of reality was strongly concerned with "resemblance",
"analysis" and "space". The sort of science he found convincing was
physics, the sort of art tended towards depiction. Instead of being confused
in the face of his scepticism about social science, it was possible see his
position in context. This made the difference between having a discussion
and having an argument.
Peters (1983) states the need for an alternative to or a revision of Hirst's
"forms of knowledge" as a basis for the curriculum as a whole, and goes on
to say that "without such a theory modern discussion of the core
curriculum ... seems very ad hoc ... ". The model can contribute to a




(He) let his mind drift about in time, encompassing past,
present and future and forming it into a whole - a pattern. He
was suspicious of pattern, disliking shape, for he did not trust
it. To him, life was chaotic, chance-dominated, unpredictable.
It was a trick, an illusion, of the mind, to be able to see a
pattern to it. Moorcock (1965)
9.1. CONCLUSION
Three points of importance emerge from this thesis; the first is
empirical, the second theoretical and the third practical.
(1) The empirical point is this: There is evidence that eminent laterborn,
in particular youngestborn, have a different world view from eminent
firstborn. One characteristic of this view is an orientation to the
non-dominant cultural reality of the arts as practiced; in contrast the view
of the firstborn is orientated to the dominant cultural reality of the sciences.
This finding satisfies one of my intial aims, that is to say to demonstrate
that laterborn can be thought of as actively different from firstborn, rather
than passively less. I am not claiming to understand how birth order
differences in ways of thinking arise, although I have made certain
suggestions with respect to early experience. I do, however, claim that
important birth order differences exist, and that laterborn manifest positive
abilities if you care to look for them. Birth order is, therefore, a good
variable to use in the understanding of plurality of thinking (c.f.
cross-cultural research).
(2) The theoretical point is this: The ways of thinking that are typified by
the arts and sciences are coherently related and a model of this plurality is
presented. I am not claiming that the model of art and science corresponds
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to any other organization, whether anatomical, physiological, linguistic or
social. Such links or the lack of them remain to be explored. But there are
two obvious routes of such exploration: (a) anatomical/physiological: Is the
model reflected in, for example, hemisphere differences? (b) linguistic/social:
Is the model a description of a language game in the broadest sense? I
remain without commitment on these points. We need such a model as a
prerequisite for an adequate consideration of high level cognition and
cultural realities. The model provides only a beginning but as such is highly
important.
(3) The practical point is this: The model has considerable implications
for what we should be learning and how we should be learning. Essentially:
the model provides a starting point for a coherent curriculum.
9.2. EPILOGUE
Let aa tochts be lichthooses
Jamieson (1985)
The final sentence of the above section is the end of this thesis as a
considered work. But thought does not stand still simply because one has
defined the extent of a particular document. I therefore include here some
recent thinking about the model which might turn out to be fruitful.
9.2.1. Perception, Language and Consciousness
If one considers space and development as essentially to do with
coordinate systems, one begins to wonder whether they might have
something to do with what seems to be "given" in perception. We seem to
understand both space and development a quasi-perceptual way. We can
imagine perceiving examples: whether the space of a field, or the
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development of a flower. Less immediate spaces and developments such as
the space of physics or the development of a novel nevertheless seem
linked to these examples. One might thus characterise this polarity as
quasi-perceptual.
Similarly consider form and resemblance. On the one hand gestalts, on
the other, similarities. Organizing by whole and by analogy. This polarity
seems to be quasi-lingusitic in the same sense that the preceding one is
quasi perceptual. It may reflect puzzling distinctions such as that between
syntax and semantic.
*
The final polarity, analysis/ambiguity might to be of a higher order than
the other two. One might suggest that perception and language are
manipulative systems. Several writers have noted the connection between
what we call objects and what we call symbols. Bronowski (1972) refers to
the hand as "the cutting edge of the mind", strongly implying a connection
between the manipulation of objects and symbols. The significance of the
etymology of the word "manipulation" is clear. Fischer (1963) notes that
"language came into being together with tools". This third polarity enables
one to interpret these manipulations (or constructions) of symbol and
object or event. But perhaps these manipulations would have no point
without the possibility of different interpretations. This polarity might be
considered the polarity of meaning, use or practice. Perhaps it should be
called consciousness.
I think this is on the right lines. Consciousness is perhaps usefully
considered in two ways: firstly as a level on which language and perception
are interpreted (considered for their non-immediate significance). Secondly
as an awareness of self and other. These two ideas exist together in the
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context of the model, since (a) the third polarity is the way of interpreting
the other two but (b) the interpretation depends on the distinction between
analysis and ambiguity, which can be considered in terms of the distinction
between self and other. Ambiguity enables one to blur the distinction
between self and other. In such a view, the self has conceptual priority over
the other. This is perhaps what "empathy" means. Analysis enables one to
precisely distinguish self from other, and by virtue of this fact to consider
self as an other. In such an view, the other has conceptual priority over the
self. One might call such a view "objective". Thus both analysis and
ambiguity depend on the relationship between self and other.
9.2.2. The Materials of Childhood
Two points emerge from this: (1) The analysis/ambiguity dichotomy may
be of the highest order on the model. (2) The four neutral subjects -
between the analysis and ambiguity polarity seem to provide the materials
of childhood: history (stories both factual and mythological), design
(building blocks), depiction (crayons), games (games). This looks very
interesting. The implication is that space/development and
form/resemblance give us access to (let us create) the world, while
analysis/ambiguity can give that construction meaning in terms of what one
might call, on the one hand, self-consciousness and on the other hand,
objective-consciousness.
9.2.3. Empiricism, Rationalism, Classicism and Romanticism
It seems possible to make sense of words like empirical, rational,
classical and romantic all at once (two by two it would be of little import
since they are contrasted pairwise already). Essentially then: The edge
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labelled biology can be called empirical: (analysis/resemblance). That
labelled maths can be called rational: (analysis/form). That labelled music
can be called classical: (ambiguity/form). That labelled mythology can be
labelled romantic: (ambiguity/resemblance). This seems to be getting nearer
to a satisfactory way of labelling the model. The arts and sciences are good
labels in the meantime, but the model should be able to cast light on them
without having to use them as labels as well.
9.2.4. A Closing Note
Finally, and with reference to the thesis as a whole, a seventeenth
century motto quoted by Jung (1954) seems appropriate:
I inquire, I do not assert; I do not here determine





I. BIRTH ORDER AND VIDEO GAMES
INTRODUCTION
There is evidence in the literature compatible with the view that there
exist birth order differences in something like a spatial or perceptual ability.
One of the earliest and most striking reports consistent with this view is
that of Schachter (1959) who reported that laterborn fighter pilots were
more successful in combat than were their firstborn colleagues. He explains
this finding in terms of his affiliation/anxiety hypothesis, suggesting that the
firstborn performs less well than the laterborn when isolated in an anxiety
provoking situation because of a need to affiliate to reduce his anxiety,
resulting from early experience , while the laterborn, with no such need, is
able to reduce his anxiety in isolation and is thus able to function more
effectively in this situation.
But one can also interpret Schachter's findings by proposing that
laterborn have higher spatial or perceptual ability , and that it is this which
enables them to perform better the complex spatial manipulations required
of the fighter pilot in combat. Wiedl (1978) and Koch (1954) have noted a
perseptual speed advantage in youngestborn, and Stewart (1967) found
them to be more field independent, an ability which Vernon (1979) identifies
with his "spatial and visualization" factor. Bassett et al (1978) found that
laterborn children performed significantly better on tasks of visuo-motor
coordination and figure/ground discrimination. Similarly Wiedl (1978) found
that lastborn were more interested in visually complex stimuli than were
firstborn.
A coda to these studies is my own honours dissertation (1981). On the
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Embedded Figures Test the result was in the hypothesised direction,
laterborn having a lower mean EFT score indicating that they were more
field independent, but the difference between firstborn and laterborn means
was not significant. However an interesting trend was evident within the
firstborn group: those of more than three years spacing from their sibling
seemed to be more field independent than those of less than three years
spacing from their s ibling. I suggested an explanation of this based on the
hypothesis that large spacing firstborn have more opportunity to play with
their fathers having gained some initial spatial competence, than do small
spacing firstborn. This idea was suggested by Carlsmith's(1964) finding that
father absence led to decreased mathematical ability (which demands a high
level of spatial ability).
The advent of video games as a common recreational activity has
provided an opportunity to study groups of people engaged in an activity,
similar in spatial manipulation terms to that of a fighter pilot, but with
neither the danger nor the isolation. I designed a questionnaire asking for
detailes of birth order, family size, father's occupation, and self rated ability
at video-games and pinball. Pinball was asked about because of it's
similarities and differences with video-games, and because it was readily
available to the video-games players questionned.
METHOD
Subjects
These were male undergraduate students at Edinburgh University. N =
130. For data see Appendix V.
The composition of the sample was: 22 firstborn of more than three
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years spacing,38 firstborn of less than three years spacing, and 71 laterborn.
Of this last group, 6 were last born with a spacing of more than 7 years
from their closest sibling: these were not used due to the difficulty in
classifying them.
Procedure
About 190 copies of the questionnaire, were handed out by the author
in the games room of Teviot Row Union, on five occasions during the lunch
hour (when the room is crowded and the available games are in continuous
use),two of these occasions were during the autumn term of 1981 and three
were during the spring term of 1982. An effort was made to get a
questionnaire to every person in the room at this time: this was of course
not po ssible, but this effort ensured that self selection of subjects either
by experimenter or subject, was kept to a minimum. Each person was asked
to complete the questionnaire on the spot and return it to the author: since
each questionnaire was short, this was a reasonable request in spite of the
location. 159 copies were returned (all but three on the spot), of which 137
were made use of. Of the remaining 22, 10 were incomplete in essential
birth order details, 8 were twins, and 4 were completed by women (there
was no intention by the author to limit the study to men, but for whatever
reason, the venue was an almost exclusively male domain.
Hypotheses
(1) That laterborn would rate themselves more highly on video games
ability than would firstborn.
(2) That firstborn with greater than three years spacing from their next
sibling (if any) would rate themselves more highly on video games ability
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than would other firstborn.
(3)That firstborn and laterborn would differ in their self-rated ability at
pinball.
(4) That firstborn with greater than three years spacing from their next
sibling (if any) would differ from other firstborn in self rated ability at
pinball.
RESULTS
Hypothesis (1) was supported. A Mann-Whitney U test yielded a z score
of 2.3241, p=.01, 1 tailed.
Hypothesis (2) was supported. A Mann-Whitney U test yielded a z score
of 1.81, p<.05, 1 tailed.
Hypothesis (3) was supported. A Mann-Whitney U test yielded a z score
of 2.18, p<.05, 2 tailed.
Hypothesis (4) was not supported. A Mann-Whitney U test yielded a z
score of 0.66, p<.6, 2 tailed, not significant.
The support for hypothesis (1) could be an artifact of family size
(laterborn coming from larger families than firstborn. However a Mann
Whitney U test comparing the rated video-games ability of those with
median family size or less (1 to 3) with those of greater than median family
size, indicates that this is not the case. U = 1406.5, z = 0.69, p = .24, 1
tailed, not significant. Similarly with hypothesis (2). A Mann-Whitney U test
comparing the rated pinabll ability of those with family size of median or
less with those of greater than median family size, yielded a z score of .13,
p = .09, 1 tailed, not significant.
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DISCUSSION
The support for the hypothesis that laterborn consider themselves better
at video games than do firstborn, lends weight to Schachter's finding that
laterborn fighter pilots perform better in combat. However it suggests that
this is a reflection of a greater spatio-perceptual ability on the part of
laterborn, rather than, as Schachter suggested, better performance when
anxious and isolated.
However it should be pointed out that the suggestion that firstborn
perform less well as fighter pilots because they have less good
spatio-perceptual ability than laterborn, does not exclude the possibility that
firstborn also perform less well because they are more in need of affiliation
to reduce their anxiety.
On the face of it there seems no reason to suppose that both these
variables are important, however it is interesting to note Bing's(1963) finding
that both "anxiety arousal in cautiousness training" and "less permissiveness
with object experimentation" were found to be related to high verbal ability
in children. Several studies have shown that firstborn have higher verbal
ability than laterborn (eg Koch 1954, Altus 1962, Breland 1974, Macdonald
1981), we can thus speculate that this verbal pre-eminence of the firstborn
may be related to early experience with the mother which involves both
anxiety arousal and less object experimentation . It is reasonable to assume
that object experimentation has a fundamental role to play in the
development of spatial abilities: one could thus expect the firstborn to be
more anxious and less spatially able, making him a less successful fighter
pilot from two points of view.
Similar discussion is relevant to the findings of Nisbett(1968) and
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Helmreich(1968) with reference to laterborn preferential participation in in
dangerous sports and deep-sea diving respectively. Both of these activities
are clearly less dangerous if the individual involved in them has both high
spatial ability and low anxiety when required to act in isolation, of course,
deciding what isolation is, is far fronm straightforward. For example, Nisbett
is talking about dangerous team sports , and it may seem unreasonable to
regard the players as acting in isolation. This is a fair point, which would
tend to lead one to favour the the spatial ability hypothesis alone in this
case.
A further variable of interest here is the perception of pain.
Schachter(1959) showed that firstborn are less tolerant of pain than are
laterbom, both reporting electric shocks as more painful, and discontinuing
the experiment at lower levels of shock. As Nisbett has pointed out "...it is
possible that firstborns are more sensitive to pain...(but)... a more cautious
interpretation is to say that their reaction to the electric shock provides
behavioural evidence that firstborns are more fearful than laterborns It
seems safe to conclude that firstborns are more frightened by the prospect
of physical harm than are laterborns, and it is plausible to infer that they
avoid dangerous sports for this reason." Thus firstborn either feel pain
more, or are more fearful of its imagined consequences. Pain perception
does not seem to be a simple phenomenon, so it may well be the case that
feeling pain more and being more fearful of its imagined consequences are
the same thing. One might say that pain has more "meaning" for firstborn.
Whatever the case, this greater pain salience for firstborn could be the
result of what Bing calls "anxiety arousal in cautiousness training".
Hypothesis (2) yielded the tantalizing finding that there was a birth order
difference in self-rated ability at pinball, but opposite to that found for
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video games. Firstborn considered themselves to be very much better. The
result indicates that pinball and video-games are indeed quite distinct
activities. Chance plays a much larger part in pinbail. In video-games the
re-inforcement depends primarily on skill. In pinball it depends on both skill
and chance. Pinball has a variable schedule of re-inforcement. One can
speculate that firstborn are more responsive to such variable schedules. But
why? Rothbart (1971) has noted that mothers are more anxiously intrusive
into the performance of firstborn children. Such disruption might play a part
in convincing the firstborn that the world is full of chance disruptions, as is
pinball. Note that this is quite different from not having control over the
world. This suggestion may or may not be worth taking seriously. In
retrospect I very much regret not asking subjects about whether or not
they played fruit-machines, since this could throw some light on the
suggestion here.
The finding with respect to hypothesis (3) that firstborn with more than
three years spacing to their next sibling (if any) rate their video-games
ability higher than do other firstborn, supports the idea derived from
Carlsmith that early father interaction fosters spatio-perceptual ability. No
such effect is evident for pinball. This is interestingly consonant with the
idea expressed above that the higher self-rated ability of firstborn at pinball
may be related to the greater anxious intrusiveness by mothers into the
performance of firstborn. Both firstborn groups would be open to such
intrusion.
Conclusion
These results are interesting, as are the ideas they have given rise to,
but at present both ideas and results should be treated as a useful basis for
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further research rather than of substantial interest in themselves.
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II. DATA FROM COLVIN 1978
The following list refers only to those architects for whom Colvin gives
birth order data. The form of the data given in the dictionary is given in
brackets immediately following the birth order category of the architect.
These two categories are "PFB" (possibly firstborn) and "DLB" (definitely
laterborn). This bracketted information is of a very straightforward form, for
example "(1s)" means that the dictionary entry was "first son" or something
close to that wording. Similarly "(2s)" represents the wording "second son"
etc. "(Ys)" refers to the wording "youngest son", while "(ys)" refers to
"younger son", "(sh)" refers to "son and heir" while "(eb)" refers to "elder
brother". Both these last are considered as possibly firstborn. Similarly "(es)"
refers to "eldest son", "(os)" to "only son". Any inspection of the list reveals
Colvin's interest in sons rather than children. The rest of the key is as
follows: yob = year of birth; cols l,w = columns in the dictionary devoted to
life and work respectively: when life and work are not separate a composite
figure is given; b order = birth order; f occ = father occupation, followed in
brackets by whether that occupation is architect (A), or architect related
(AR).
N = 188
name yob cols l,w b order f occ
Adam J, 1732 - 1.5 - DLB ( 3s) architect (A)
Adam J, 1721 1.0, 2.0 PFB (Is) architect (A)
Adam R, 1728 6.5,11.5 DLB (2s) architect (A)
Aikin E, 1780 - 1.0 - DLB (Ys) doctor
Akroyd J, 1556 - 1.5 - PFB (Is) mastermason (AR)
Alexander A, dl637 - 0.3 - PFB (Is) earl
Archer T, 1668 1.3, 2.3 DLB (Ys) landed
Bacon C, 1734 - 0.8 - DLB (ys) sculptor (AR)
Barry C, 1795 3.0, 3.5 DLB (4s) stationer
Basnett C, 1784 - 0.3 - PFB (OS)
Bastard T, 1686 - 0.5 - PFB (Is) architect (A)
Bastard J, 1688 - 0.5 - DLB (ys) architect (A)
Bastard W, 1689 - 0.5 - DLB (ys) architect (A)
Benson W, 1682 - 1.8 - PFB (Is) iron merchant
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Billing R, 1785 1 0 LO 1 PFB (Is 7
Billing R, 1815 - 0.3 - PFB (Is architect (A)
Billing J, 1815 - 0.3 - DLB (ys architect (A)
Billing A, 1816 - 0.3 - DLB (ys architect (A)
Blore E, 1787 2.0, 8.0 PFB (Is lawyer
Bonomi I, 1787 0.8, 3.0 PFB ( Is architect (A)
Booth W, 1797 - 0.3 - DLB (ys architect (A)
Brerewood F, 1699 - 0.5 - DLB (ys draper
Brettingham M, 1699 3.0, 3.0 DLB (2s mason (AR)
Brettingham M, 1725 - 2.0 - PFB (Is architect (A)
Brettingham R, 1696 - 0.3 - PFB (Is mason (AR)
Brown J, dl876 0.3, 2.0 DLB (2s merchant
Bruce W, 1630 4.0, 2.5 DLB (ys landed
Bryce J, 1805 - 0.5 - DLB (ys builder (AR)
Burton D, 1800 1.5, 7.0 DLB (10s ) builder (AR)
Busby C, 1788 1.3, 1.0 PFB (Is musician
Buxton J, 1685 - 0.8 - PFB (sh squire
Burlington 1695 4.0, 4.0 PFB (sh earl
Byres J, 1734 - 3.0 - PFB (Is laird
Campbell C, 1676 3.5, 3.0 PFB (Is laird
Carter E, dl663 - 1.0 - DLB (ys K's wks (AR)
Chute J, 1701 - 1.5 - DLB (5s landed
Cockerell C, 1788 5.0, 5.0 DLB (2s architect (A)
Cubitt L, 1799 - 1.0 - DLB (Ys 7
Cubitt T, 1788 - 3.0 - PFB (Is 7
Cundy T, 1765 1.0, 1.5 PFB (Is landed
Cundy T, 1790 - 1.0 - PFB (Is architect (A)
Dance G, 1741 3.3, 3.0 DLB (5s architect (A)
Edwards W, 1719 - 1.3 " DLB (Ys farmer
Elger J, 1801 - 0.3 - DLB (ys 7
Elliot A, 1760 - 1.0 - PFB (Is carrier
Elliot J, 1770 - 1.0 - DLB (ys carrier
Elliot A, dl843 - 0.3 - PFB (ss architect (A)
Elmes H, 1814 1.5, 1.0 PFB (OS architect (A)
Emmett W, 1671 PFB ( Is master brklay (AR)
Erskine J, 1675 - 4.0 - PFB ( Is earl
Etty W, 1675 - 1.0 - DLB (3s architect (A)?
Finden T, 1785 - 1.0 - PFB (Is architect (A)
Foster J, 1787 1.0, 1.0 DLB (2s architect (A)
Frederick C, 1709 - 0.5 - DLB (2s landed?
Gandy J, 1773 2.0, 1.0 PFB (eb steward
Gandy J, 1787 1.0, 0.5 DLB (yb steward
Gibbs J, 1682 4.5,11.5 DLB (ys merchant
Gibson G, (cl9 - 1.0 - PFB (Is architect (A)
Gill W, 1679 - 0.5 - PFB (Is colonel
Good J, 1778 - 1.0 - PFB ( Is clergyman
Graham H, 1795 - 0.3 - DLB (3s clergyman
Gray G, dl778 - 0.5 - DLB (ys colonel
Greenway F, 1777 - 1.0 - DLB (Ys mason (AR)
Grey T, 1781 - 0.2 - PFB (Is earl
Gutch G, 1790 - 0.8 - DLB (5s clergyman
Gwilt G, 1775 - 1.0 - PFB (Is surveyor (AR)
Gwilt J, 1784 1.5, 1.0 DLB (ys surveyor (AR)
Hakewill H, 1771 0.5, 2.0 PFB (Is painter (AR)
Hakewill G, • • • • - 0.3 - DLB (ys painter (AR)
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Hakewill J, 1778 - 1.0 - DLB (2 s) painter (AR)
Hall J, 1769 - 0.25 " DLB (3s) surveyor (AR)
Hardwick P, 1792 1.0, 2.0 DLB (ys) 7
Haycock E, 1790 0.5, 3.0 DLB (2s) architect (A)
Haycock J, 1759 0.5, 1.0 DLB (2s) builder (AR)
Henderson J, 1813 - 0.25 - PFB (Is) builder (AR)
Herbert H, 1689 1.5, 2.0 PFB (Is) earl
Hiorne F, 1744 1.0, 1.0 PFB (Is) architect (A)
Holland H, 1745 2.0, 3.5 PFB (Is) masterbuilder (AR
Hope T, 1769 - 2.0 - PFB (Is) merchant
Humphrey C, 1772 - 2.0 - PFB (Is) joiner (AR)
Hutchinson H, 1800 - 0.5 - DLB (ys) architect (A)
Inwood C, 1799 - 0.3 - DLB (2s) architect (A)
Inwood E, 1803 - 0.3 - DLB (3s) architect (A)
Inwood H, 1794 0.5, 0.5 PFB (Is) architect (A)
James J, 1692 4.0, 3.0 PFB (Is) clergyman
Jenkins J, (cl9 - 0.3 - DLB (ys) clergyman
Jenkins W, dl86 - 0.5 - PFB (Is) 7
Jerman E, 1668 2.0, 1.0 PFB (Is) surveyor (AR)
Jerningham E, 1774 - 0.5 - DLB (Ys) landed
Jupp R, 1728 - 2.0 " DLB (Ys) master carp (AR)
Jupp W, dl78 - 0.5 - PFB (eb) master carp (AR)
Jupp W, dl839 - 0.3 - PFB (Is) master carp (AR)
Keene T, 1754 - 0.5 - PFB (Is) landed
Kirby J, 1716 - 1.3 - PFB (Is) literary
Lapidge E, 1779 1.0, 1.0 PFB (Is) gardener
Latrobe B, 1764 - 1.0 - DLB (2s) clergyman
Liddel T, 1800 - l.o - -DLB (2s) baron
Loudon J, 1783 - 3.0 - PFB (Is) farmer
Machell T, 1647 - 1.5 - DLB (2s) landed
Mackenzie D, 1800 - 0.5 - DLB (2s) architect (A)
Mackenzie W, 1856 0.3, 0.5 PFB (Is) architect (A)
MaddOx G, 1802 - 0.5 " PFB (OS ) 7
Malton J, dl803 - 0.75 - DLB (Is) dr thr (AR)
Malton T, 1748 - 0.75 - PFB (Is) dr thr (AR)
May H, 1621 3.0, 2.0 DLB (7s) landed
Monck C, 1779 - 1.0 - DLB (3s) landed
Montague J, 1690 - 1.0 - PFB (sh) duke
Mountague J, 1776 - 0.3 - DLB (yb) city official
Mountague W, 1773 - 0.8 - PFB (eb) city official
Mountain C, 1773 0.3, 1.0 PFB (OS) architect (A)
Mylne R, 1633 - 2.5 - PFB (Is) master mason (AR)
Mylne R, 1733 5.0, 6.0 PFB (Is) master mason (AR)
Mylne T, dl763 - 2.5 - PFB (ss) master mason (AR)
Mylne W, 1734 - 1.0 - DLB (2s) master mason (AR)
Mylne W, 1781 - l.o - DLB (2s) master mason (AR)
Nixon W, 1810 - 0.5 - PFB (Is) clerk of wks (AR)
Norris R, 1750 - 1.0 - PFB (Is) surveyor (AR)
North R, 1653 - 2.5 - DLB (6s) lord
Palmer J, 1785 0.5, 0.5 DLB (4s) humble
Papworth J, 1775 4.0, 5.0 DLB (2s) stuccoist (AR)
Parkyns T, 1662 - 0.8 - PFB (sh) baronet
Party W, 1758 - 1.0 - DLB (ys) mon mason (AR)
Playfair J, 1755 1.5, 2.5 DLB (4s) clergy
Playfair W, 1790 2.5, 3.5 DLB (ys) architect (A)
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Pilkington R, 1789 - 0 3 - DLB (ys) architect (A)
Pilkington W, 1758 0.5 1.0 PFB (es) p
Pitt T, 1737 - 2 o - PFB (OS ) landed
Piatt G, 1700 - 0 5 - DLB (3s) architect (A)
Piatt J, 1728 1.0 1.0 PFB (Is) architect (A)
Plowman T, 1805 - 0 25 - PFB (Is) architect (A)
Pocock W, 1779 1.0 1.5 PFB (Is) carpenter (AR)
Potter R, 1795 - 0 3 - PFB (Is) architect (A)
Pritchett J, 1789 1.0 2.5 DLB ( 4s) clergyman
Rennie J, 1761 2.0 1.0 DLB (ys) farmer
Repton G, 1786 0.5 2.0 DLB (4s) architect (A)
Revett N, 1720 - 2 8 - DLB (2s) landed
Rickman T, 1776 4.0 5.0 PFB (Is) apothecary
Robinson R, 1734 - 0 5 - DLB (yt>) p
Robinson T, 1702 - 3 o - PFB (Is) landed
Salmon R, 1763 - 1 0 - DLB (Yb) builder (AR)
Samwell W, 1628 1.0 0.5 PFB (Is) r ich
Sandby T, 1721 - 3 5 - PFB (Is) landed
Sharp R, 1793 0.5 0.8 PFB (Is) landed
Sharp S, 1808 - 0 3 - DLB (yb) landed
Shirley W, 1722 - o 5 - DLB (2s) earl
Smith J, 1734 - 0 5 - PFB (Is) p
Simpson A, 1790 2.0 3.0 DLB (3s) merchant
Smirke R, 1780 3.0 8.0 DLB (2s) artist (AR
Smith F, 1672 2.5 4.0 DLB (Ys) bricklayer (AR)
Smith W, 1661 2.5 4.0 DLB (2s) bricklayer (AR)
Smith W, 1705 0.3 1.0 PFB (Is) architect (A)
Stavely C, 1759 - 0 5 - PFB (Is) surveyor (AR)
Stirling W, 1772 0.5 1.5 PFB (Is) architect (A)
Stone J, 1620 - 1 o - DLB (3s) sculptor (AR)
Surplice W, 1771 - 0 25 - PFB (Is) builder (AR)
Talman J, 1677 2.0 2.0 PFB (Is) architect (A)
Talman W, 1650 5.0 3.0 DLB (2s) landed
Tatham C, 1772 3.0 2.3 DLB (5s) priv sec
Tattersall G, 1817 - 0 8 - DLB (ys) auctioneer
Thomas W, 1800 0.3 0.5 PFB (eb) p
Thornhill J, 1675 4.0 0.0 DLB (Ys) landed
Thorpe J, 1565 - 1 o - DLB (2s) master mason (AR)
Townesend W, 1668 2.0 3.0 DLB (2s) master mason (AR)
Tracy C H, 1778 - 1 o - DLB (3s) ironworks owner
Trevor R H, 1706 - 0 8 - DLB (3s) lord
Trubshaw C, 1715 - 1 o - PFB (Is) mason (AR)
Trubshaw J, 1777 2.0 1,0 PFB (Is) mason (AR)
Trubshaw T, 1802 0.3 1.0 PFB (Is) mason (AR)
Tyrrell C, 1775 - 0 5 - DLB (5s) solicitor
Vanburgh J, 1664 7.0 4.5 DLB (2s) merchant
Welch E, 1806 1.0 1.0 PFB (eb) p
Welch J, 1810 0.5 1.0 DLB (yb) p
Westmacott W, 1780 - 1 o - DLB (Ys) sculptor (AR)
Wightwick G, 1820 3.0 1.5 PFB (OS) landed
Wing J, 1728 - 1 5 - PFB (es) mason (AR)
Wing J, 1756 0.5 0.3 PFB (es) mason (AR)
Wilkins W, 1778 3.0 3.0 PFB (Is) architect (A)
Winde W, dl722 4.0 2.0 PFB (es) landed
Woods J, 1776 - 1 o - DLB (2s) educated
Wyatt J, 1746 6.5, 18 DLB (6s) builder (AR)
Wyatt s, 1737 2.0, 6.0 DLB (3s> builder (AR)
Wyatt B, 1745 - 0.8 - DLB (5 s) builder (AR)
Wyatt B, 1755 - 0.5 - DLB (2s) builder (AR)
Wyatt B, 1775 - 0.5 - PFB (is) builder (AR)
Wyatt H, 1789 - 0.5 - DLB (2s) builder (AR)
Wyatt J, 1739 - 0.3 - DLB (4s) builder (AR)
Wyatt M, 1805 - 0.3 - PFB (is) builder (AR)
Wyatt P, (31835 0.8, 0.8 DLB (4s) builder (AR)
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III. DATA FROM CLARKE 1916
The key to abbreviations is as above except that "type" refers to the
type of literary figure as coded by Clarke, and fam str = family structure
(e.g. "m6 of 6" means "the sixth child, a male, of six children"). The number
following father occupation is social class as coded by the Office of
Population Censuses and Surveys (1980). "C" following this number
indicates listing in Chambers Biographical Dictionary (1975). "G" following
the "C" indicates "greatness" as discussed in Chapter 2. My abbreviations
of Clarke's typology of literary figures are as follows: pp = popular; e =
erudite; s = specualtive; pb = publisher; o = orator; n = narrator; a = actor; p
= poet; pr = prose-writer; I = librarian; d = dramatist.
N = 251
name yob type fam str f occ
Mather I, 1639 PP m6 of 6 clergyman, 1
Mather C, 1663 s,e,pp ml of 10 clergyman, 1
Edwards J, 1703 s,pb,pp m5 of 11 clergyman, 1
Franklin B, 1706 pp,n,s ml4 of: 17 tallow-chandler,
Bellamy J, 1719 PP m5 of 11 mine owner, 1
Backus I, 1724 e m2 of 5 farmer, 2
Otis J, 1725 o ml of 13 lawyer, 1
Dickinson J, 1732 pb m2 of 4 judge, 1
Adams J, 1735 pb ml of 13 farmer, 2
Henry P, 1736 o m2 of 9 surveyor, 1
Bartram J, 1739 n ml of 4 botanist, 1
Jefferson T, 1743 pb,n,pp m3 of 10 planter, 2
Belknap J, 1744 e ml of 4 merchant, 2
Emmons N, 1745 PP m6 of 12 farmer, 2
Murray L, 1745 PP ml of 12 miller, 2
Filson J, 1747 e m2 of 4 farmer, 2
Thomas I, 1749 1 m5 of 5 ?
Buckminster J, 1751 PP m4 of 9 clergyman, 1
Madison J, 1751 pb ml of 12 planter, 2
Freneau P, 1752 P ml of 5 planter, 2, C
Graydon A, 1752 n ml of 4 merchant, 2
Barlow J, 1754 P mlCI of 10 farmer, 2, C
Adams H, 1755 e f 2 of 3 merchant, 2
Marshall J, 1755 e ml of 15 planter, 2
Ames F, 1758 o,pb m5 of 5 physician, 1
Weems M, 1759 PP ml5i of 19 farmer, 2
Alsop R, 1761 P ml of 8 merchant, 2
Morse J, 1761 PP m8 of 10 farmer, 2
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Ware H, 1764 pb, s m9 of 10 farmer, 2
Dunlap W, 1766 d ml only 7
Adams J, 1767 pb,o,n ml of 4 lawyer, 1
Harris T, 1768 PP ml of 3 teacher, 1
Miller S, 1769 e m8 of 9 clergyman, 1
Ballou H, 1771 pb mil of 11 clergyman, 1
Alexander A, 1772 PP m3 of 9 farmer, 2
Dowse T, 1772 1 m7 of 8 leather-dresser, 4
Porter E, 1772 PP m5 of 7 judge, 1
Quincy J, 1772 o ml only lawyer, 1
Wirt H, 1772 pr,o,e m6 of 6 7
Bowditch N, 1773 e m4 of 7 cooper, 3
Randolph J, 1773 o m2 of 2 planter, 2
Beecher L, 1775 pb ml of 3 blacksmith
Hobart J, 1775 PP m9 of 9 merchant, 2
Clay H, 1777 o m7 of 8 clergyman, 1
Allston W, 1779 P m2 of 3 planter, 2
Paulding J, 1779 Pr m8 of 9 ? ,, c
Story J, 1779 s,e ml of 11 surgeon, 1
Watson J, 1779 e m2 of 2 ship-owner, 1
Channing W, 1780 s,o,pb ,pp m3 of 10 lawyer, 1
Key F, 1780 P ml of 2 planter, 2, C
Benton T, 1782 n,o,e ml of 8 lawyer, 1
Calhoun J, 1782 s,o,pb m4 of 5 planter, 2
Webster D, 1782 o m9 of 10 farmer, 2
Irving W, 1783 pr,n,e mil of: 11 merchant, 2, CG
Savage J, 1784 e m9 of 11 judge, 1
Spring G, 1785 PP m3 of 11 clergyman, 1
Woodworth S, 1785 P m4 of 4 farmer, 2
Jarvis S F, 1786 e m3 of 3 clergyman, 1
Sargent L, 1786 pb m7 of 7 merchant, 2
Edwards J, 1787 pbf pp m3 of 7 farmer, 2
Hale S, 1787 PP m3 of 14 7
Leslie E, 1787 pr fl of 5 watchmaker, 2
Willard E, 1787 PP f 16 of: 17 farmer, 2
Cooper J, 1789 pr ,e mil of: 12 farmer, 2, CG
Farmer J, 1789 e ml of 3 farmer, 2
Jay W, 1789 pb m4 of 5 publicist, 1
Sedgwick C, 1789 pr, pp f 6 of 7 lawyer, 1
Turner S, 1790 e m8 of 8 clergyman, 1
Hayne R, 1791 o m5 of 14 7
Signourey L, 1791 pp,n,pr,p fl only 7
Ticknor G, 1791 e ml only educator, 1
Birney J, 1792 pb ml of 2 banker, 1
Payne J, 1792 p,d m6 of 9 teacher, 1, C
Bedell G, 1793 PP m4 of 4 business, 1
Goodrich S, 1793 PP'Pr m6 of 10 clergyman, 1, C
Bryant W, 1794 P m2 of 7 physician, 1, C
Everett E, 1794 o m2 of 2 clergyman, 1
Robinson E, 1794 e,n,pp m6 of 10 clergyman, 1
Ware H, 1794 PP m5 of 19 professor, 1
Harper J, 1795 1 ml of 6 farmer, 2
Kennedy J, 1795 pr ml of 5 merchant, 2
Percival J, 1795 P m3 of 4 physician, 1, C
Halliburton T, 1796 pr ml only judge, 1, C
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Prescott W, 1796 e m2 of 7 lawyer, 1
Wayland F, 1796 pp,s m6 of 6 clergyman, 1
Colton W, 1797 n m3 of 12 weaver, 3
Hodge C, 1797 pp,s m5 of 5 physician, 1
Lyon M, 1797 pa f 6 of 8 farmer, 2
Weed T, 1797 pb ml of 5 carter, 4
Baird R, 1798 e,pb ml2! of: 13 farmer, 2
Dix J, 1798 n m4 of 5 merchant, 2
Hawkes F, 1798 e'PP m2 of 9 7
Spencer I, 1798 Pr »PP mlO of: 11 farmer, 2
Alcott A, 1799 s ml only farmer, 2
Choate R, 1799 o m4 of 6 farmer, 2
Lowell J, 1799 pa ml of 4 merchant, 2
Placide H, 1799 a ml of 5 gymnast, 2
Bancroft G, 1800 e m8 of 13 clergyman, 1
Durbin J, 1800 n ml of 5 farmer, 2
Lenox J, 1800 pa ml only merchant, 2
Potter A, 1800 PP m6 of 7 farmer, 2
Todd J, 1800 PP m7 of 7 physician, 1
Clarke J, 1801 pp,n mil . of 11 7
Janney S, 1801 e ml of 3 miller, 2
Marsh G, 1801 e,pp m2 of 6 lawyer, 1
Seward W, 1801 o m4 of 6 physician, 1
Bushnell H, 1802 s,pp ml of 6 farmer, 2
Child L, 1802 pr ,pu,pp f 6 of 6 baker, 2, C
Dix D, 1802 PP fl of 3 7
Abott J, 1803 pr,pp,e m3 of 7 land dealer,
Brownson 0, 1803 s,pu m3 of 3 farmer, 2
Emerson R, 1803 p,pr,s,&c m2 of 6 clergyman, 1,
Hawthorne N, 1804 pr m2 of 3 shipmaster, 1
Abott J, 1805 PP<e m4 of 7 land dealer,
Garrison W, 1805 pu m4 of 5 shipmaster, 1
Gould A, 1805 PP m2 of 8 teacher, 1
Walker J, 1805 s,pp m2 of 2 farmer, 2
Forrest E, 1806 a m5 of 7 bank clerk, 2
Harper F, 1806 1 m6 of 6 farmer, 2
Simms W, 1806 Pr >P m2 of 2 merchant, 2, <
Willis N, 1806 n,pr,p m2 of 9 editor, 1, C
Adams C, 1807 e m3 of 3 lawyer, 1
Chandler E, 1807 P f 3 of 3 farmer, 2
Felton C, 1807 PP ml of 3 7
Longfellow H, 1807 P'Pr m2 of 8 lawyer, 1, CG
Whittier J, 1807 p,pu m2 of 4 farmer, 2, CG
Davidson L, 1808 P fl of 3 physician, 1
Gallagher W, 1808 P m3 of 4 7
Ripley G, 1808 PP m9 of 10 merchant, 2
Holmes 0, 1809 Pf Pr m3 of 5 clergyman, 1,
Lincoln A, 1809 o m2 of 3 carpenter, 3
Poe E, 1809 pr ,P m2 of 3 merchant, 2, <
Winthrop R, 1809 o ml4I of 14 merchant, 2
Burritt E, 1810 pp,pu mlCI of 10 farmer, 2
Clark J, 1810 pp,e,s m3 of 3 physician, 1
Gray A, 1810 PP ml of 8 farmer, 2
Ossoli M, 1810 n,pr fl of 7 lawyer, 1, C
Parker T, 1810 pu,o,pp,s mil. of 11 farmer, 2
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Ticknor W, 1810 1 ml of 6 farmer, 2
Toombs R, 1810 o m5 of 6 planter, 2
Greely H, 1811 pu,e m3 of 7 farmer, 2
Phillips W, 1811 o,pu m8 of 9 judge, 1
Porter N, 1811 pp,s m2 of 2 clergyman, 1
Stowe H, 1811 pu,pr f 6 of 8 clergyman, 1, CG
Sumner C, 1811 o,pu ml of 9 lawyer, 1
Stephens A, 1812 pu,o m3 of 8 farmer, 2
Warren W, 1812 a m5 of 5 actor, 2
Beecher H, 1813 o,pu,pp m9 of 13 clergyman, 1
Brooks C, 1818 P m2 of 5 7
Cooper S, 1813 n m2 of 7 author, 2
Douglas S, 1813 o m2 of 2 farmer, 2
Judd S, 1813 pu m2 of 6 merchant, 2
Very J, 1813 P ml of 6 shipmaster , 1, c
Chapin E, 1814 PP ml of 3 artist, 2
Gay S, 1814 e m2 of 3 lawyer, 1
Motley J, 1814 e m2 of 8 merchant, 2
Putnam G, 1814 1'PP m4 of 5 lawyer, 1
Yancey W, 1814 o ml of 2 lawyer, 1
Downing A, 1815 PP m5 of 5 nurseryman , 3
Cushman C, 1816 a fl of 5 . merchant, 2, C
Daly C, 1816 e ml of 2 carpenter, 3
Duyckink E, 1816 e ml of 2 publisher, 1
Howe H, 1816 e m7 of 7 publisher, 1
Judson E, 1817 Pr f 5 of 6 7
Thoreau H, 1817 n,pr m3 of 4 pencil maker, 2,
DeLeon E, 1818 n m2 of 6 physician, 1
Hill T, 1818 s m9 of 9 tanner, 4
Abott E, 1819 e ml of 2 7
Lowell J, 1819 p,pu,pr m5 of 5 clergyman, 1, CG
Stevens H, 1819 e m2 of 11 inn-keeper , 2
Whitman W, 1819 P m2 of 9 carpenter, 3, CG
Bristed C, 1820 n ml only clergyman, 1
Cary A, 1820 P'Pr f 4 of 9 farmer, 2, C
Dawson J, 1820 pu ml of 2 bookdealer , 1
Kane E, 1820 n ml of 7 lawyer, 1
Preston M, 1820 P fl of 8 clergyman, 1
Raymond H, 1820 pu ml of 6 farmer, 2
Wallack J, 1820 d, a ml of 4 7
de Peyser H, 1821 e ml only lawyer, 1
Poole W, 1821 PP m2 of 3 tanner, 4
Cuyler T, 1822 PP ml only lawyer, 1
Field H, 1822 n m7 of 7 clergyman, 1
Frothingham 0, 1822 pu,pp m3 of 3 clergyman, 1
Grant U, 1822 n ml of 6 farmer, 2
Johnson R, 1822 pr m5 of 6 planter, 2
Olmstead F, 1822 n ml of 8 merchant, 2
Angell G, 1823 pu ml only clergyman, 1
Coffin C, 1823 n,pp m3 of 3 farmer, 2
Davidson M, 1823 P f 3 of 3 physician, 1
Lippincott S, 1823 pr ,n flO of 11 physician, 1
Parkman F, 1823 e,n m2 of 6 clergyman, 1
Cary P, 1823 P f 6 of 9 farmer, 2
Curtis G, 1824 pr,n,pu m2 of 5 banker, 1, C
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Larcom L, 1824 P f 8 of 9 shipmaster, 1
Dorr J, 1825 P fl only quarry operator
Taylor B, 1825 p,pr,n m4 of 10 farmer, 2, C
Bowles S, 1826 pu,n m3 of 5 journalist, 2
Foster S, 1826 P m3 of 3 merchant, 2, C
Cooke J, 1827 PP ml of 2 lawyer, 1
Eddy M, 1827 s,pu,pp m6 of 6 farmer, 2
Norton C, 1827 e,pp m3 of 6 scholar, 1
Browne W, 1828 e ml only merchant, 2
Drake F, 1828 e, ml of 2 book-seller, 2
Haven A, 1828 PP f 3 of 4 clergyman, 1
Jefferson J, 1829 a ml of 2 actor, 2, C
Hayne P, 1830 P ml only naval officer, 1
Florence W, 1831 a ml of 7 v
Gilman D, 1831 pt,e m5 of 9 manufacturer, 1
Victor M, 1831 pr ,pu f 3 of 5 7
Winsor J, 1831 e m2 of 5 merchant, 2
Alcott L, 1832 pr f 2 of 5 teacher, 1, CG
Conway M, 1832 PP»e m2 of 3 judge, 1
Talmage T, 1832 PP ml2! of: 12 farmer, 2
Booth E, 1833 a m7 of 10 actor, 2, C
Dodge M, 1833 pr ,pu f 7 of 7 farmer, 2
Furness H, 1833 e m2 of 4 clergyman, 1
McCrady E, 1833 e m2 of 8 lawyer, 1
Stevens B, 1833 e mlC). of: 11 inn-keeper, 2
Ward G, 1833 a fl only planter, 2
Abott L, 1835 PP m3 of 5 clergyman, 1
Adams C, 1835 e m2 of 4 lawyer, 1
Brooks P, 1835 pr ,pp m2 of 6 merchant, 2
Clemens S, 1835 pr m5 of 6 merchant, 2, CG
Spofford H, 1835 Pr , P fl of 6 lawyer, 1
Delmar A, 1836 e,sp ml of 3 gov't official, 1
Piatt S, 1836 P fl of 2 7
Adams H, 1838 e m3 of 4 lawyer, 1
Daly A, 1838 d ml of 2 ?, ,, c
Roe E, 1838 pr m5 of 6 7
De Leon T, 1839 pr ,d m3 of 6 physician, 1
Denison G, 1839 e ml of 2 lawyer, 1
George H, 1839 pu,s m2 of 10 publisher, 1
Willard F, 1839 PP f 4 of 5 farmer, 2
Baldwin J, 1841 PP m6 of 6 farmer, 2
Briggs C, 1841 e ml of 2 7
Sill E, 1841 P m2 of 2 physician, 1
Dickinson A 1842 o m5 of 5 merchant, 2
Fiske J, 1842 s,e,pp ml only editor, 1
Abott C, 1843 pp,n m4 of 4 banker, 1
Holley M, 1844 pr m7 of 7 7
Ward E, 1844 pr fl of 7 clergyman, 1
Hawthorne J, 1846 pr ,n m2 of 3 author, 2
Lloyd H, 1847 pu ml of 5 clergyman, 1
Morris C, 1847 a fl only 7
Adams B, 1848 e m4 of 4 lawyer, 1
Holland E, 1848 a m3 of 6 actor, 2
Allen J, 1849 pr m7 of 7 ?, ,, c
Crozier J, 1849 s m5 of 5 farmer, 2
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Gillman N, 1849 pu ml of 3 lawyer, 1
Field E, 1850 P/pr m2 of 8 lawyer, 1,
Grady H, 1850 o ml of 3 business,
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IV. DATA FROM DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 1981
N = 140
name cols,, fam str , f occ
MUSICIANS
Barbirolli J, 2.5, m2 of 3, violinist, 2
Dyson G, 2.8, ml of 3, blacksmith, 3
Hess M, 2.8, f 4 of 4, merchant, 2
Ord B, 2.0, m5 of 5, linguist, 1
Scott C M, 2.5, m2 of 2, business, 1
PAINTERS: including film makers, typographers, designers
Asquith A, 3.0, m2 of 2, PM, 1
Bateman H M, 2.3, ml of 2, business, 1
Craig G, 3.0, m2 of 2, theatre design, 2
Edwards L D R, 2.0, m8 of 8, doctor, 1
John A E, 4.3, m3 of 4, solicitor, 1
Le Bas E, 2.3, m3 of 3, industry, 1
Morison S A, 3.3, m2 of 3, comm trav, 3
Redpath A, 2.0, f 2 of 4, design, 2
Sheridan C C, 3.3, f 2 of 3, landowner, 1
Wolmark A A, o(N ml of 5, , 2
Hutchinson W 0, 2.5, m5 of 6, business, 1
LITERARY: including journalists, publishers, actors
Aldington R, 4.5, ml of 4, solicitor's clerk, 2
Blyton E M, CJ 00 fl of 3, business, 1
Brittain V, 2.0, fl of 2, paper manuf, 1
Devine G, 1.8, ml only, bank clerk, 2
Eliot T S, -J CO m7 of 7, industrialist, 1
Farjeon E, 2.3, f 3 of 5, novelist, 2
Forbes J R, 2.0, fl of 6, landowner, 1
Forster E M, 4.8, ml only, architect, 1
Foyle W A, 2.0, m7 of 8, grocer, 3
Hodgson R E, 2.0, m6 of 10, coal merchant, 2
Karloff B, 2.0, m9 of 9, revenue officer, 2
Kennedy M M, 2.3, fl of 4, barrister, 1
Lamburn R C, 2.0, f 2 of 3, church, 1
Lane A, 4.0, ml of 4, architect, 1
Macniece L, 6.0, m3 of 3, church, 1
Maxwell G, 2.0, m4 of 4, colonel, 1
0'Casey S, 2.5, m5 of 5, clerk, 3
Orton J, 2.5, ml of 4, gardener, 4
Powys J C, 2.5, ml of 11, church, 1
Ransome A M, 2.5, ml of 4, prof of hist, 1
Sackville-West V, 3.5, fl only, baron, 1
Sitwell E, 3.0, fl of 3, baronet, 1
Sitwell 0, 3.0, m2 of 3, baronet, 1
Spring R H, 2.5, m5 of 9, gardener, 4
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Unwin S, 3.0, m9 of 9, printer's business
Wadell H, 2.3, mlO of: 10, church, 1
Wilson F P, 3.5, m9 of 9, wholesaler, 2
Wilson J D, 4.5, ml of 6, engraver, 2
Wilson J G, 1.8, m3 of 8, bookbinder, 3
Wolfit D, 3.3, m4 of 5, clerk, 3
Hayward J D, 2.0, m2 of 2, surgeon, 1
Angell R N, 2.8, m7 of 7, grocer, 3
Barry G, 2.3, m4 of 6, church, 1
Bone J, 2.8, m2 of 6, journalist, 2
Christiansen A, 2.0, m2 of 3, master shipwright,
Gibbs PAH, 2.8, m5 of 7, civil servant, 1
Robertson-Scott J W, 3.0, ml of 7, comm trav, 3
Swaffe H, to o ml of 8, draper, 2
ENGINEERS
Abe11 L S, 2.5, ml of 4, JP, 1
Camm S, 4.0, ml of 12, joiner, 3
de Havilland G, 3.0, m2 of 5, church, 1
Drysdale C V, 2.0, ml only, doctor, 1
Forbes Sempill W F, 2.3, ml of 4, soldier, 1
Griffith A A, 3.5, ml of 3, journalist, 2
Hacking J, 2.0, ml of 4, engineer, 1
Lanchester G H, 1.8, m8 of 8, architect, 1
Moullin E B, 2.3, ml only, engineer, 1
North J D, 2.5, ml only, solicitor, 1
Page F H, o•CN m2 of 5, master upholst, 3
Pelter W E W, 2.8, ml of 4, engine manuf, 1
Pippard A J S, 2.0, ml of 5, building constr, 1
Roscoe K H, 3.0, ml of 4, engineer, 1
Round H J, 2.5, ml of 4, registrar (b&d), 1
Southwell R V, 2.8, m2 of 3, company director, 1
PHYSICISTS
Astbury W T, 2.0, m4 of 7, potter, 3
Bowden F P, 3.0, m5 of 6, manager, 2
Darwin C G, 3.3, ml of 4, FRS, 1
Gray L H, U> o ml only, civil servant, 1
Ryde J W, 00 ml only, colourman, 3
Smith T, 1.5, ml of 5, teacher, 2
Stoner E C, 2.0, ml only, cricketer, 3
Tyndall A M, 3.3, m5 of 5, ironmonger, 2
Whiddington R, 2.0, ml of 3, teacher, 2
Wilson W, oCN ml of 11, farmer, 2
GEOLOGISTS
Fernsides W G, 2.5, ml of 3, grocer, 3
Hawkins H L, 2.0, ml only, master baker, 3
Hudson R G S, 4.0, ml of 6, joiner, 3
Read H H, 2.0, m3 of 4, farmer, 2
Taylor J H, 2.5, ml only, merchant, 2
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MATHEMATICIANS
Aitken A C, 2.3, ml of 7, grocer, 3
Bescovitch A S, 2.5, m4 of 6, jeweller, 1
Fisher R A, 3.0, m7 of 7, auctioneer, 2
Ingham A E, 1.8, m2 of 5, craftsman, 3
Tichmarsh E C, 3.0, m2 of 4 , church, 1
CHEMISTS
Gaddum J H, 3.3, ml of 6, importer, 2
Hilditch T P, 2.3, ml of 3, master mariner, 1
Hinshelwood C N, 6.0, ml only, accountant, 1
Hughes E D, 1.5, m9 of 9, farmer, 2
Ingold C K, 3.5, ml of 2, , 2
Kenyon J, 2.3, ml of 7, gardener, 4
Mapson L W, 2.3, ml only, steward, 3
Partington J R, 2.0, ml of 3, bookeeper, 2
Peat S, 1.8, ml of 3, mining engineer, 1
Read J, 2.5, ml of 2, farmer, 2
Robertson A, 2.5, ml of 3, farmer, 2
Turner E E, 2.0, m3 of 3, salesman, 3
Turner WES, 3.0, m2 of 7, working class, 4
Wormall A, 2.0, m2 of 4, printer&lith, 2
BIOLOGISTS
Blackman V H, 3.0, m6 of 6, Doctof, 1
Brown T G, 2.3, ml of 4, Doctor, 1
Cannon H G, 2.3, m3 of 4, compositor, 3
Cheesman R E, 2.0, m2 of 5, farmer, 2
Colebrook L, 2.8, m5 of 6, farmer, 2
Dale H H, 4.3, m3 of 7, manager, 2
Florey H W, 7.5, m3 of 3, shoemaker, 3
Fox C F, 2.0, ml of 2, army officer, 1
Glenny A T, 3.3, m3 of 5, stockbroker's clerl'
Gregory F G, 3.3, m4 of 8, jeweller, 1
Hammond J, 2.0, ml of 4, farmer, 2
Henderson D W W, 3.3, ml only, accountant, 1
Holden H S, 2.0, ml of 2, clerk, 3
Keilin D, 3.0, m3 of 7, business, 1
Leiper R T, 3.0, ml of 3, tailor, 2
Martin W K, 1.8, m6 of 9, church, 1
Pearsall W H, 3.5, m2 of 3, teacher, 2
Pumphrey R J, 2.8, ml only, salesman, 3
Richards F J, 2.5, m3 of 4, butcher, 3
Russell E J, 2.8, ml of 9, teacher, 2
Slater W K, 2.0, ml only, manager, 2
Stephenson T A, 2.0, ml of 3, church, 1
Thoday D, 2.0, ml of 6, teacher, 2
Tulloch W J, 2.0, m5 of 5, hatter, 2
Wallace T, 2.5, m8 of 9, blacksmith, 3
MEDICAL
Cawthorne T E, O•CN
Dain H G, 2.8
Fairley N H, 3.3
Gray A M H, 3.0
Isaacs A, 2.0
Jameson W W, 3.5
Lett H, 1.8
Souttar H S, 2.0
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
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ml only, customs official
ml of 6, draper, 2
m3 of 6, bank manager, 1
ml of 4, doctor, 1
ml of 4, shopkeeper, 2
m2 of 3, bank manager, 1
ml of 8, doctor, 1




2.0, m2 of 4, classical scholar
2.5, ml of 4, engineer, 1
3.0, m6 of 6, church, 1
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V. DATA FROM VIDEO-GAMES STUDY
Key to abbreviations: S = subject; pb = self-rated performance at pinball;
vg = self- rated performance at video-games; fs = family structure; sc =
social class.
S pb vg fs sc
Firstborn: small sibling spacing
(3 years or less)
1. 3 3 2 1
2. 3 5 3 1
3. 6 2 5 2
4. 3 4 3 1
5. 6 4 3 1
6. 1 2 4 3
7. 1 6 3 -
8. 4 3 6 3
9. 6 1 2 1
10. 3 3 3 -
11. 5 2 3 1
12. 2 3 3 2
13. 3 6 2 3
14. 4 2 2 1
15. 5 4 4 3
16. 6 5 3 1
17. 5 3 2 1
18. 5 3 2 2
19. 4 3 3 -
20. 4 6 2 1
21. 3 3 4 3
22. 6 6 3 3
23. 3 5 2 1
24. 4 3 2 1
25. 6 6 2 1
26. 6 5 3 1
27. 2 4 2 -
28. 2 6 4 3
29. 4 2 2 1
30. 3 4 2 1
31. 3 6 2 1
32. 6 6 2 2
33. 1 2 2 3
34. 6 6 2 2
35. 6 4 2 3
36. 5 2 3 1
37. 5 5 3 1
38. 3 5 2 1
Firstborn: large sibling spacing




41. 2 3 2 1
42. 3 4 2 1
43. 6 6 2 1
44. 5 3 2 1
45. 3 6 3
46. 4 2 3 1
47. 4 3 2 1
48. 2 4 2 1
49. 5 2 2 1
50. 4 4 3 3
51. 4 2 2 -
52. 6 2 1 3
53. 6 2 1 2
54. 4 2 1 2
55. 4 6 1 2
56. 3 1 1 2
57. 5 3 1 3
58. 6 2 1 1
59. 5 2 1 3
Youngest large spacing
60. 4 6 3 1
61. 6 3 5 2
62. 3 3 4 3
63. 4 2 3 1
64. 5 2 2 3
65. 6 2 3 1


























91. 4 2 2
92. 4 2 2
93. 6 3 2
94. 6 3 2
95. 5 2 2
96. 3 3 2
97. 6 3 3
98. 6 1 4
99. 4 2 2
100. 2 3 2
101. 4 3 2
102. 3 4 2
103. 3 3 2
104. 5 5 3
105. 2 6 3
106. 6 4 2
107. 4 3 5
108. 6 3 4
109. 2 2 4
110. 6 2 3
111. 5 3 5
112. 6 3 5
113. 5 4 5
114. 6 4 7
115. 6 6 3
116. 6 3 4
117. 6 3 4
118. 3 2 3
119. 6 1 5
120. 6 2 4
121. 2 6 6
122. 6 2 5
123. 2 2 3
124. 4 4 5
125. 6 4 5
126. 4 2 6
127. 2 5 4
128. 3 2 5
129. 5 3 5
130. 6 3 3
131. 5 5 3
132. 4 5 3
133. 6 4 5
134. 6 2 3
135. 4 2 3
136. 6 3 4













































1. They take as their model of such a variable, IQ. It is interesting that these
authors indicate their interest in a substantially hereditarian view of IQ. In
itself this is neither here nor there, however since it occurs persistently in a
book devoted to a review of the birth order literature, it is surprising, since
it suggests a perspective on birth order, a variable unrelated to genetic
considerations, predisposed to undervalue the effect of that variable. This is
reflected in the general conclusions of the book which, while not rejecting
birth order effects entirely, are cautious to the point of being unhelpful. To
do these authors justice, they seem to be reacting to sweeping
generalizations about birth order effects (eg general conclusion p242), and
in response to such generalizations, caution is indeed appropriate. But the
origin of the generalizations, is, according to Ernst and Angst, dynamic or
depth psychology and psychiatry. Yet by no stretch of the imagination can
most of the studies they review be thought of as involved with such
approaches. In their conclusion they come across as wanting to play down
birth order effects in order to draw attention to heritability:
Our survey thus allows us the conclusion that birth
order influences on personality and IQ have been widely
overrated. This result is in agreement with modern research
on the heritability of certain personality variables.
Even if one accepts this conclusion, the implied opposition between birth
order effects and the effects of heritability is misleading. There is no
necessary opposition here, unless one insists that either genes or
environment account for 100% of the variance. This comment thus adds
nothing to the argument, yet it is italicized by the authors in a concluding
section of their book, and is thus clearly considered by them to be
important. It thus reveals the interests of the authors, and, as I've
suggested, perhaps this explains the generally negative approach to birth
order in the book. Consider in contrast Adams (1972), who in the conclusion
to his review article says:
The promise of birth order research, while thus far
seldom fulfilled, can still be glimpsed alongside the difficulties
of the foregoing discussion.
While Ernst and Angst imply: "there's something there, but don't bother
with it, what you should really be looking at is heritability", Adams implies:
"it may be confusing, but there's something there, so consider it further".
The former view is patronizing, the latter, interesting.
2. All statistics used in this thesis are non-parametric. The rationale for
their use is based on Siegel (1956). The standard significance level of p<.05
is used throughout.
3. In defence of Wittgenstein, note that in the quotation that introduces
Chapter 3, he takes the view that we are still playing the same language
game as was Plato.
4. In the light of the comment in Chapter 3 about the joint cultural
domination of on the one hand science, and on the other hand, men, one
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should note the bias in the very title of the collection. In this context it is
interesting to note that the only contribution which seriously questions this
title, that of Beloff, also makes considerable reference to art. The purpose of
Beloffs paper is not to provide a model of the person as artist, but rather
to make use of art as an index of changing views of men and women. Such
a use of art is to be welcomed but it differs from my interest here.
5. For psychologists, the study of thinking has at its centre the notion of
"truth versus falsity". Psychologists assume that human cognition must
operate with methods similar to those used to investigate it. There are right
answers and wrong answers. Right problem solutions and wrong problem
solutions. Right deductions and wrong deductions. Right classifications and
wrong classifications. Right hypotheses and wrong hypotheses. Right
inferences and wrong inferences. Right attributions and wrong attributions.
The idea of an "answer" which has meaning in virtue of its ambiguity gets
little consideration. The dominant idea is that every question has a true
answer. Furthermore it has only one true answer. Some psychologists have
attempted to get away from this restriction: notable here are Getzels and
Jackson (1963) and Hudson (1966) who made use of open ended tests to
investigate "divergent thinking", which was described by Guilford (1959) as:
"a type of thinking in which considerable searching about is done and a
number of answers will do". Equally notable is the lack of support that this
approach has received from the community of psychologists. This is at first
sight odd, since this work srikes a chord with many of us, and, to take
Hudson as an example, his books, in particular "Contrary imaginations",
"Frames of mind" and "Human beings" are in wide circulation. However this
lack of support is less odd when we realize that it is being proposed that
we work in opposition to the scientistic spirit of the age, in opposition to
the dominant reality. But one should also be aware of the persistence of the
non-dominant reality. This work does strike a chord with us, even if we
subsequently ignore it. Guilford comments on the unexpected strength of
interest in his early work on creativity, then qualifies this by pointing out
that this interest was most strongly manifested outside psychology. Perhaps
this is a useful way to characterize ideas that bear on the non-dominant
reality: strong interest is shown in such ideas, but this interest is
inadequately supported.
The "reality" which underpins our study of thinking continues an
epistemological tradition which can be traced back to Plato's discussion of
knowledge and truth in the Theaetetus. Knowledge is here conceived of as
unambiguous, precisely explicable.
As Copleston (1946) says
(for Plato) the object of true knowledge must be stable
and abiding, fixed, capable of being grasped in clear and
scientific definition....
In contrast, and I quote Copleston again:
In the tenth book of the Republic, Plato says that artists
are at the third remove from truth. For example, there is the
specific form of man, the ideal type that all individuals of the
species strive to realize, and there are particular men who are
copies or imperfect realizations of the specific types. The
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artist now comes and paints a man, the painted man being an
imitation of an imitation.
Thus the idea of truth as essentially science-like sets in very early in the
history of western theory of knowledge. Art is considered a mere imitation
of something that is somehow more real, and thus it is not thought worthy
of the same level of epistemological consideration. This approach
progresses via Descartes view of knowledge as "clear and distinct" to the
rigourous use of symbolic logic in the present century as exemplified by
thinkers such as Bertrand Russell.
This respectable lineage reflects the usefulness of this approach. The
difficulty with this approach is that because of its extensive area of
applicabilty, its limits are not perceived as limits to a way of thinking, but
are rather perceived as limits to what can be thought. Any mode of thinking
falling outside these limits risks being assumed not to be thinking atall. But
by default, not by consideration. H.G Wells has put this nicely:
The man trained solely in science falls easily into a
superstitious attitude; he is overdone with classification. He
believes in the possibility of exact knowledge everywhere.
What is not exact he declares is not knowledge.
For example, though we may disagree with Plato that art is an imitation of
an imitation, painting can still be neatly relegated to the epistemological
shadows as a product of "the unconscious mind".
6. Andre Lhote(1953), the cubist painter, in an essay entitled "Intelligence in
painting" has criticised these assumptions:
... today the opening gambit of any self respecting art
critic - or rather, the critic who follows the fashion - is
characterised by a fulsome eulogy of intuition, the
subconscious and the 'world within'. Intelligence, on the other
hand, is subjected to attacks all the more violent in that the
part played by instinct is exaggerated, and the fear of being
'literary' is so great even among successful painters that
those who owe most to the exercise of that faculty,
energetically deny it. Everything one owes to the critical
sense, the taste for unexpected syntheses, knowledge of
inexhausable wells of tradition, all the technical devices
skillfully exploited, in a word intelligence, must be attributed
to the unconscious if one want to be taken seriously.
One might argue that Lhote's opinions are biased by his background in early
twentieth century painting, and that as fashions in art change, so does the
idea of the intelligence or otherwise of the painter. I would suggest,
however, that even when art is at its most consciously intellectual, as it
was in the early seventies with the growth of minimal and conceptual art
(eg the work of Sol LeWitt and Carl Andre), it still tends to be considered a
mysterious outpouring of the what Lhote calls "the world within", and the
fact that these works do not seem to immediately fit in with this notion,
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simply opens them up to another line of criticism. At least in these cases
the artists are unlikely to "energetically deny" intelligence, however many
other people seem happy to do that for them (witness the furore over the
aquisition of an Andre by the Tate Gallery). One is forced to consider that
perhaps the best survival strategy for an artist today is to deny thought and
emphasize "instinct", that is to say, ignore Lhote's message even if it is
true.
7. One might object that surely I mean "mathematics enables us to conceive
of physical reality". This certainly seems reasonable, however the further
that physics progresses, the more reasonable the alternative view becomes.
One might call this the "god is a mathematician" view. This would be close
to Heisenberg's view.
An interesting example of this is cited by Dirac (1963). He recounts that
Schrodinger created a mathematically elegant equation to describe the
quantum mechanical nature of the electron. However the predictions of the
equation were not borne out by experimental data, so he was forced to
conclude that "God was not a mathematician" after all. The equation which
did fit the data was less elegant. However when experimental physicists
realized that the spin on the electron had to be taken into account during
observation Schrodinger's original equation was seen to work, and God's
mathematical credibility was restored.
Dirac comments:
I think there is a moral to this story, namely that it is
more important to have beauty in one's equations than to
have them fit experiment.
It thus may not be too far fetched to suggest that something like
mathematical reality does indeed enable physical reality, in much the same
way as physical reality enables biological reality and biological reality
enables psychological reality and psychological reality enables mathematical
reality. Support for this point of view comes from one of the most recent
cosmological theories. This is the theory of the "inflationary universe"
described by Guth and Steinhardt (1984). These authors conclude their
paper with the words:
It is tempting to go one step further and speculate that
the entire universe evolved from literally nothing.
By "nothing" is meant: "a state devoid of space, time and matter".The only
things that "exist" are physical laws, but these are not physical laws in the
usual sense, since they relate to nothing except one another. They are
mathematical axioms, not ways to describe physical events. Perhaps then
the idea that pure mathematics underlies physics is a good one.
Mathematics can be seen here as much more than a descriptive tool. One is
put in mind of Koestler's (1959) stimulating discussion on the nature of
thought and matter in which he refers to Eddington's comment that "the
stuff of the world is mind stuff", and to Jeans' suggestion that "the universe
begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine."
Such considerations certainly help to keep Piaget's circle closed.
8. It is useful to list the main terms I made use of while developing the
183
model. The list that resulted in the final label of "concept of analysis",
includes "propositional", " objective", "communicable without remainder" and
"concept of agency". The list that resulted in the final label of "concept of
ambiguity" includes "appositional", "subjective", "uniquely experienced",
"concept of communion" and "concept of ineffability". The list that
culminated in "concept of resemblance" includes "real", "pragmatic",
"operations with percepts", "representational" and "concept of content". The
list that culminated in "concept of form" includes "ideal", "purely
operational" and "presentational". The list that resulted in "concept of
development" includes "temporal", "intentional", "teleological", "sequential"
and "concept of timespace". The list that resulted in "concept of space"
includes "spatial", "patterned" and "symmetrical".
It was a considerable length of time from the inception of the model to the
point at which I realized that the complementary pairs could be referred to
as "definitional", "relational" and "directional", despite the fact that I had
always recognized the lack of such categorization as a problem. This time
lapse can only be understood if one realizes that although the structure of
the model was evident from the beginning, the labelling of the concepts
was only obvious in the most approximate way. While the space was clear,
the words were not. It was thus not until I had sorted out appropriate
words from the large set of words which bordered on the appropriate that I
was able to give these labels to the complementary pairs.
9. These subjects are in the same relationship as those of Piaget's circle of
the sciences, but it would be misleading to suppose that this surface
derives directly from Piaget's work. For a considerable period during the
development of the model I considered biology and social science to be
subsumable by a new classification which I called "chreodic science",
making use of Waddington's word to describe a necessary path of
development. This classification has the merit that it can bring all sciences
of developing systems, that is to say, roughly speaking, embryology to
economics, under one heading. However it eventually became clear that this
did too much violence to areas of classical biology such as plant and
animal anatomy to be an appropriate way of re-classifying biology. However
there is something to be said for renaming social science "chreodic
science" or "developmental science", but on balance I decided not to do this
at present, because new names create problems of communication. These
outweighed the conceptual advantages of the new name.
10. Myth as precursor to science: broadly speaking myths are the realm of
magical events. A magical event is a non-scientifically analysable change or
connection. This emphasis on magical change is clear in the title of perhaps
the most popular repository of myth, Ovid's "Metamorphoses". The view that
magical thought is a primitive, misconceived version of scientific thought
has been put strongly by Sir James Frazer in 'The Golden Bough". It is still
part of our scientistic world view, and thus bears further discussion. He
comments, for example: "... magic is a spurious system of natural law as
well as a fallacious guide to conduct; it is a false science as well as an
abortive art". His examples of this spurious system of natural law include:
"... rites observed in the morning to help the sun to rise, and in the spring
to wake the dreaming earth from her winter sleep ..." But difficulties are
evident here. These rites are performed in the morning and in the spring.
They are harmonious with, rather than causative of, phenomena.
Wittgenstein(1979) has made this point strongly with reference to Frazer's
text:
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I read, among many similar examples, of a rain king in
Africa to whom the people appeal for rain when the rainy
season comes. But surely this means that they do not
actually think he can make rain, otherwise they would do it in
the dry periods in which the land is "a parched and arid
desert". For if we do assume that it was stupidity that once
led the people to institute this office of Rain King, still they
obviously knew from experience that the rains begin in March,
or it would have been the Rain King's duty to perform in
other periods of the year. Or again: towards morning, when
the sun is about to rise, people celebrate rites of the coming
of day, but not at night, for then they simply burn lamps.
A remarkably similar attitude to that of Frazer with respect to mythology is
found with respect to literature in Cattell (1965). He considers it to be
imperfect methodology for the study of personality. (This is analogous to
considering children's drawings as reflecting imperfect methodologies for
problem solving - see Chapter 4. They are considered merely as steps on
the road to the discursive symbolism of propositional thinking.) Cattell talks
about literary (and clinical) approaches to personality as though they
inevitably, in the fullness of cultural evolution, would result in his own
approach. To Cattell they are only of interest when seen in this historical
context. The implication that these approaches are simply primitive attempts
to be scientifically objective is an odd position to assume, yet this type of
thinking seems to be common among modern scientists. This parallels
closely Frazer's attitude to magic discussed above.
Frazer distinguishes magic from religion but he assumes that this also is a
primitive attempt to be scientific: "In short, religion, regarded as an
explanation of nature is displaced by science." He goes on to make clear
that he regards science as a better, rather than simply different, explanation.
(Golden Bough, abridged edition, p712). Popper (1976, p59) lets slip similar
views:
Our theories, begining with primitive myths and evolving
into theories of science, are indeed man-made, as Kant said.
We do try to impose them on the world, and we can always
stick to them dogmatically if we so wish, even if they are
false (as are not only most religious myths, it seems, but also
Newton's theory, which is the one Kant had in mind).
Note the implication that "most religious myths" (one is intrigued to know
why he doesn't say "all") are the same sorts of things as "Newton's theory".
The assumption that both Cattell and Frazer (and Popper) seem to make is
that different sorts of explanation must be better or worse than each other.
That is to say it must be appropriate to compare them on some common
set of criteria. Thus a different sort of explanation is in fact conceived of as
a different level of the same sort of explanation. The thought that these
ways of thinking might be providing essentially different sorts of
explanation, different sorts of meaning, does not seem to be considered.
It is clear that such an approach allows one to inadvertently remove certain
problems by defining them as misconceived methodologies rather than as
part of one's subject matter. Since for Cattell literature is an imperfect
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methodology of personality which aspires to the condition of his own
potentially perfect methodology he does not get as far as asking serious
questions about it as a way of thinking.
It is not my intention to criticise Cattell's approach per se. The point is that
a view of literature or religion as a pre-scientific method of explanation (a
more primitive method, a less good method), rather than of a different type
of explanation is a pervasive view in western culture but for the most part
implicit. When it is stated, eg by Cattell in the early pages of 'The scientific
analysis of personality", it is stated almost as a piece of convential wisdom;
it is taken for granted as a starting point. It is precisely this starting point
which I want to re-examine, because it is the starting point uncritically
taken by most of us.
I was interested to discover in Cattell's 1938 book "Psychology and
religion", an explicit endorsement of Frazer's view of religion. This is useful
to my argument since it provides a definite link between the two thinkers.
In addition, while I have used Cattell as an exponent of the view of
literature as primitive science, and Frazer as an exponent of the view of
myth and religion as primitive science, this book shows that Cattell's view
of literature is consonant with his view of religion and also with that of
Frazer. Cattell further makes clear that he thinks of literature and religion in
the same way by using the poet as an example of a person with: "a naive
tendency to project (his) own modes of experience on the outer world", a
tendency which in the same passage, he also ascribes to religion. (Cattell
1938, pp 17—18)).
11. Levi-Strauss's (1978) analysis of music as consisting of phonemes and
sentences, but unlike language and myth having no words, is in accord with
the my notion of music at the "development" end of its edge on the model.
However I also consider music from a "space" point of view. Levi-Strauss is
himself aware of the relatively non-developmental nature of music and
myth when compared with literature:
.... exactly as in a musical score it is impossible to
understand a myth as a continuous sequence. This is why we
should be aware that if we try to read a myth as we read a
novel or a newspaper article .... we don't understand the myth,
because we have to apprehend it as a totality ...
This gives an opportunity for an analysis of the ambiguity surface of the
model in terms of ideas derived from Levi-Strauss.
The relationship of music and myth to literature (the most obviously
language related point on this surface on the model) is in accord with the
relationship that Levi-Strauss suggests for language myth and music.
He claims that myth and music develop language in different ways. For him
the prime components of language are words, sentences and phonemes,
while both music and myth are composed of only two of these
components; myth is composed of words and sentences, music is
composed of phonemes and sentences. This is an intriguing analysis that
definitely seems to get something right. For example it helps to make sense
of the immense importance of sound, in itself, in literature, which brings it
close to music, but also of the immense importance of resemblance which
brings it closer to myth. C S Lewis has elegantly described what a myth is.
It is something which retains its force of meaning even if you only tell it in
a minimal form i.e. with literary values minimized:
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There is, then, a particular kind of story which has a
value in itself - a value independent of its embodyment in
any particular work. The story of Orpheus strikes and strikes
deep, of itself; the fact that Virgil and others have told it in
good poetry is irrelevant.
Considering the ambiguity surface further, with reference to Levi-Strauss
seems likely to bear fruit.
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PROLOGUE
A fuller discussion of these ideas will appear in the October edition ot Edinburgh
Review, but it is entirely appropriate that they should also be submitted for discussion
here. The more so since it was precisely my recognition of the need for linkages
between activities such as, on the one hand, architecture and design, and on the other,
philosophy and literature which led me to carry out this work.
PLANNING A LIBRARY
Suppose you were faced with the task ot designing a general library, so that the inter¬
relationships of the areas of thought covered by that library were reflected in the
structure of the building itself. The design would only be satisfactory if it enabled people
to progress from one subject area directly to any other closely related subject area. It
would not be satisfactory if people could not go directly from, for example, social science
to, on the one hand, history, and to biology on the other. Similarly it would not be
satisfactory if people could not go easily from music to painting or to literature.
The question is this, what shape would such a library be? The answer is: the same
shape as a coherent model of ways of thinking. I will propose in this paper a three
dimensional model of ways of thinking, and on the basis of this such a library could in
fact be built. I hope it will be
Schopenhauer helps to put such a library in perspective:
As the biggest library if it is in disorder is not as useful as a small but well-
arranged one, so you may accumulate a vast amount of knowledge but it will be
of far less value to you than a much smaller amount if you have not thought it over
for yourself: because only through ordering what you know by comparing every
truth with every other truth can you take complete possession of your knowledge
The proposed model or library is a way of comparing every truth with every other truth.
In examining the diagrams and descriptions below keep this coherently related library
in mind. Imagine a journey round such a library. Bear in mind that the library will have a
highly efficient stair, escalator and lift system connecting nearby areas to each other.
Thus in your journey ignore gravity, which would otherwise bias the structure of the
library by making it more easy to travel horizontally than vertically.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
My initial insight was that a three dimensional model had an explanatory power in
some way appropriate to the problem of relating the arts and sciences. What are these
'dimensions'?
a.
I approached this problem by giving working labels to the sudaces of Jhd cube. I
eventually became more aware of the precise organization of the model. I was then able
to give more precise labels to the sudaces. But in a real sense these labels are
provisional. They are 'to meet necessity'. The model does not originate in them.
They represent a coherent group of approaches to meaning. One can call them
elements of thinking. They are characterized by the following concepts: analysis,
ambiguity, development, space, resemblance and form.
Analysis is closely involved in what we call the sciences. Each work depends on being
interpreted in only one way. Typical analytical activities are biology, social science,
mathematics and physical science. Ambiguity is very much involved in ad. Each work
has many possible appropriate interpretations. Typical activities concerned with
ambiguity are music, plastic ads, mythology and literature. Development is to do with
what one might call a timespace, or following Waddington, a chreod, rather than a
spacetime. The irreversible order of events is of paramount impodance. Novels, studies
of development, chess and biographies do not make sense backwards. Activities
typifying this element of thought are social science, history, literature and games. Space
is to do with potential reversibility and the implications of such multidirectionality. Even
time is thought of in this radically spatial way in physics, for example the 'backward time'
of Feynman diagrams. Typical activities are physical science, design, plastic ads and
depiction. Resemblance is to do with not so much what shape something is, but what it
is like, that is to say with a relation external to the thing. Activities which depend heavily
on this concept are history, biology, depiction and mythology. In contrast, form is solely
to do with internal relations. The relations within such a formal work count for more than
what it is like. This element of thinking is typified by the activities of design, music,
games and mathematics.
These concepts can be seen as three sets of complementarities or polarities. These
are the dimensions of the model. These polarities might be called categories of
meaning These three categories are:
(1) Definitional: one or many interpretations (analysis vs ambiguity)
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(2) Directional: irreversible or reversible (development vs space)
(3) Relational: internal or external (form vs resemblance)
The convention adopted here is that the development/space polarity is represented
vertically, the analysis/ambiguity polarity is represented from left to right, and the







This structure makes sense of a substantial body of human ways of thinking. These
are most accurately described by the concepts which characterise them (eg "thinking
about development and ambiguity") however each way of thinking is also typified by an
identifiable approach to knowledge, an identifiable product. Thus thinking about
development and ambiguity is typified by the production of literature. Similarly, thinking
about form and analysis is typified by the production of mathematics.
THE MODEL
The complete model is shown in Figure 2:
To clarify the relationships between activities further, the diagrams in Figure 3 show
each surface of the model separately. The diagrams show the following surfaces: top
right: ANALYSIS; top left: AMBIGUITY; mid right: RESEMBLANCE; mid left: FORM;
bottom right: SPACE; bottom left: DEVELOPMENT.
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Figure 2
MAKING SENSE OF CONTROVERSIES
Note that the model can contribute to making sense of controversies about the nature
ol certain activities. For example history relates as strongly to literature as it does to
social science. It thus makes sense that there are controversies between historians of
literary and sociological orientations. History also relates as strongly to biology as it
does to myth. In these terms one can make sense of the controversy between
Darwinian claims about the early history of the world and those of creationists.
Similarly it makes sense that social science should be concerned both with problems
of formal logic and games, as in cognitive science, but also be concerned with issues
impinging directly on history, as in sociology, and on biology as for example in ethology
or neuropsychology. The other activities on the model can be considered in a similar
way, for example design relates as strongly to physical science and mathematics as it
does to music and plastic arts.
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REPRESENTATIVE THINKERS
It is belpful to include here another diagram of the model on which have been placed
names of representative thinkers:
Turing* * * * * GAMES * * * * * * Chopin
4
SOCTAL SCIENCES + LITERATURE
Marx* ♦ + * * * *111 STORY *
MATHS *
BIOLOGY
Pythagoras ♦ DESIGN ♦ + * ♦ ♦ Mondr
4 4
PHYSICAL SCIENCES











For the sake ot clarity these names are only placed on the corners of the model. This
is a distortion. Taking for example the 'Marx' corner: ideally Marx should appear
between history and social science, Darwin should appear between history and biology,
and a geneticist such as Waddington should appear between social science and
biology.
I would not want to take this naming of the cube too far because it encourages yet
further distortions. Most thinkers avoid neat positioning. For example the corner named
'Mondrian' only represents Mondrian at his most well known neoplastic stage of
development. In his earlier work he was much more concerned with resemblance,
closer to the point named 'Gainsborough' above. Nevertheless as an exercise in
gaining familiarity with the model such naming is worthwhile.
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THE MODEL AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL
In the light of the above comment about Mondrian, it is clear that one can see the
model as a tool for the analysis of the development and scope of ways of thinking in a
particular individual. For example, Leonardo was engineer, plastic artist and anatomist,
and these activities can be seen as substantially covering the 'space' (lower) surface of
the model. On the other hand Michaelangelo was best known as poet and plastic artist:
with reference to these achievements the 'ambiguity' (right-hand) surface seems more
appropriate.
SUMMARY OF AREAS TYPIFYING WAYS OF THINKING
Biology is centred on ideas about single definition (analysis) and external relations
(resemblance).
Physical science is centred on ideas about single definition (analysis) and multiple
direction (space).
Mathematics is centred on ideas about single definition (analysis) and internal
relations (form).
Social science is centred on ideas about single definition (analysis) and single
direction (development).
History is centred on ideas about single direction (development) and external
relations (resemblance).
Mythology is centred on ideas about multiple definition (ambiguity) and external
relations (resemblance).
Depiction is centred on ideas about external relations (resemblance) and multiple
direction (space).
Plastic art is centred on ideas about multiple definition (ambiguity) and multiple
direction (space).
Design is centred on ideas about internal relations (form) and multiple direction
(space).
Music is centred on ideas about mutliple definition (ambiguity) and internal relations
(form).
111
A Basis for Library Design
Literature is centred on ideas about multiple definition (ambiguity) and single
direction (development)
Games are centred on ideas about single direction (development) and internal
relations (form)
THE THINKER NOT THE THING
It is worth stressing the primary importance of the interpreter. Beloff( 1984) has noted
that, among other things, the same photograph can have both scientific and artistic
aspects. This is an important point to consider with reference to the model. What you get
out of an artifact depends on the way you think about it. A portrait by David Hockney can
be thought of as a work of art. It can also be thought of as a way of identifying the sitter. It
is not that the portrait is both an artwork and a means of identification; rather what the
portrait is depends on how you use it, on how you think about it. However certain
artifacts are tailored to certain ways of thinking, that is to say they are produced by a
certain way of thinking and are best understood by that way of thinking. A simple linear
composition by Mondrian is best considered in an ambiguous, formal, spatial way. But
clearly it could be thought of as a stylized resemblance of scaffolding. The things which
are not tailored to any way of thinking are those of the natural world. As Blake said:
"Nature has no Outline, but Imagination has". This is, perhaps, a key to understanding
the model. It is a model of what we can imagine.
LIBRARY, SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY
In a library constructed on these principles one would find each area coherently
connected to its neighbours. For example one can go from music to literature to history
to psychology to biology to physics to maths to design. Each area leads into its
neighbours. Since most activities have accompanying texts, the library is the most
obvious architectural use of the model, however one could extend this idea into that of a
general resource centre. Here one could play games as well as read about them, write,
design, make use of laboratories or have a base for studies, listen to and perform music,
paint, make or go to films. This extension is useful because it begins to make clear the
possibilities inherent in the model with respect to the development of a property
integrated theory of education. One can regard this resource centre as a model for a
school or university.
MEDITATION AND PATRICK GEDDES
There is, however, one element missing from the library. This is an area devoted to
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understanding the context tor thought, rather than its products, tn the centre of the
library one could devote an area to the contemplation ot context. The appropriate
activity here would be meditation. It is interesting to note that Patrick Geddes had just
such an area in his Edinburgh teaching institution, the Outlook Tower. Boardman( 1978)
remarks that Geddes thought that it should be an Inlook Tower as well, and that this
'meditation cell' was the beginning of this.
CONCLUSION
I hope that architectural thinkers will find something stimulating in these ideas, with
respect to both the possibilities for library design, and to the nature of the links between
their own and other ways of thinking.
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INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND TO THE MODEL
Some years ago I studied painting at art school. During this time I became
increasingly interested in the nature of art. Painting seemed to be a way of
understanding one's position as a human being in and of the universe, or just
simply understanding the universe. In this respect it seemed to be very like
science.
I was attracteci to Arthur Koestler's discussion of the aesthetic aspects ot science
in The Sleepwalkers (1959) and for similar reasons I was interested in the fictional
game which according to Hermann Hesse involved all types of intellectual
activity. In its most advanced form each move is a cue for contemplation of the
relationships between different intellectual activities. While tracing Hesse as an
antecedent to my own thought 1 re-read his description of the history of this game,
which gives context to general approaches to ways of thinking:
How far back the historian wishes to place the origins and antecedents of the
Glass Bead Game is, ultimately, a matter of his personal choice. For like every
great idea it has no real beginning; rather it has always been, at least the idea of
it. We find it foreshadowed, as a dim anticipation and hope, in a good many
earlier ages. There are hints of it in Pythagoras, for example, and then among
Hellenistic Gnostic circles in the late period of classical civilization. We find it
equally among the ancient Chinese, then again at the several pinnacles of Arabic-
Moorish culture; and the path of its prehistory leads on through Scholasticism and
Humanism to the academies of mathematicians of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries and on to the Romantic philosophies and the runes of
Novalis's hallucinatory visions. This same eternal idea, which for us has been
embodied in the Glass Bead Game, has underlain every movement of Mind
towards the ideal goal of a universitas litterarum, every Platonic academy, every
league of an intellectual elite, every rapprochement between the exact and the
more liberal disciplines, every effort towards reconciliation between science and
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art or science and religion. Men like Abelard, Leibniz, and Hegel unquestionably
were familiar with the dream of capturing the universe of the intellect in
concentric systems, and pairing the living beauty of thought and art with the
magical expressiveness of the exact sciences.
(Das Glasperlenspicl, 1943; trans. R. & C. Winston as The Glass llead Game)
Hesse is writing in the person of a cloistered academic at this point, and indeed
the whole book is very much the view from the ivory tower. But the very
popularity of the book is an indication of the everyday importance of the ideas.
It was with this background and these interests that I started to study
psychology. I was not intentionally studying the relationships between ways of
thinking such as art and science however the possibility of such relationships was
always at the back of my mind. Occasionally it was manifested as a couple of
dimensions with different arts and sciences scribbled into the quadrants, or as an
extension or modification of the 'circle of the sciences' which Piaget refers to in
Psychology and Epistemology.
Another thinker I found helpful at an early stage was C. H. Waddington. His
interest in the relationship between art and science emerges first in The Scientific
Attitude (1941), and receives proper consideration in Behind Appearance (1969). The
latter is subtitled 'a study of the relations between natural science and painting in
this century'. In it he considers both natural science and non-figurative painting
to be complementary investigations of what lies 'behind appearance'. He regards
these two areas as linked by identifiable features and claims that there is a
'dialogue between painting and science about the nature of the external world'.
He concludes:
We have been led, by a consideration of one apparent discontinuity in human
experience, that between painting and natural science, to recognize that there is
a continuity between them after all, and that this continuity extends out into
wider fields . . . the conclusion we have come to is that man is an Argus with
innumerable eyes, all yielding their overlapping insights to his one being, that
struggles to accept them in all their variety and richness.
I wanted to see this variety and richness within one coherent framework.
THE MODEL OF WAYS OF THINKING
Things began to fall into place when I started trying to map the disciplines I was
interested in onto a three-dimensional surface, namely a cube. This shape is a
good tool for thought: it helps to keep thinking straight because it has edges and
corners (but a sphere can be used as an alternative).
There are substantial difficulties in communicating an unfamiliar model, but
suppose you were faced with the task of designing a general library, so that the
inter-relationships of the areas of thought covered by that library were reflected in
the structure of the building itself. The design would only be satisfactory if it
enabled people to progress from one subject area directly to any other closely
related subject area. It would not be satisfactory if people could not go directly
from, for example, social science to, on the one hand, history, and to biology on
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the other. Similarly it would not be satisfactory if people could not go easily from
music to painting or to literature.
The question is this: what shape would such a library be? the answer is: the
same shape as a coherent model of ways of thinking. It is interesting to reflect that
since the model to be proposed is three-dimensional, such a library could in fact
be built. 1 hope it will be.
Schopenhauer helps to put such a library in perspective:
As the biggest library if it is in disorder is not as useful as a small but well-
arranged one, so you may accumulate a vast amount of knowledge but it will be
of far less value to you than a much smaller amount if you have not thought it over
for yourself; because only through ordering what you know by comparing every
truth with every other truth can you take complete possession of your
knowledge. ... - '
The proposed model or library is a way of comparing every truth with every other
truth.
In examining the diagrams and descriptions below keep this 'coherently related
library' analogy in mind. Imagining a journey round such a library may be of
particular help. The library will have a highly efficient stair, escalator and lift
system connecting nearby areas to each other. Thus in your journey ignore
gravity, which would otherwise bias the structure of the library by making it more
easy to travel horizontally than vertically.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
I've said that the initial insight was that a three-dimensional model had an
explanatory power in some way appropriate to the problem of relating the arts
and sciences. What are these 'dimensions'?
1 approached this problem by giving working labels to
the surfaces of the cube. I eventually became more aware of
the precise organisation of the model. I was then able to
give more precise labels to the surfaces. But in a real sense
these labels were provisional. They are 'to meet necessity'.
My thought about the model does not originate in them.
They represent a coherent group of approaches to
meaning. One can call them elements of thinking. They are
characterised by the following concepts: analysis,
ambiguity, development, space, resemblance and form.
Analysis is closely involved in what we call sciences.
Each work depends on being interpreted in only one way.
Typical analytical activities are biology, social science,
mathematics and physical science. Ambiguity is very much
involved in art; each work has many possible appropriate
interpretations. Typical activities concerned with
ambiguity are music, plastic arts (e.g. sculpture, painting),
mythology and literature. Development is to do with what
one might call a timespace, or following VVaddington, a
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chreod, rather than a spacetime. The irreversible order of
events is of paramount importance. Novels, studies of
development, chess, and biographies do not make sense
backwards. Activities typifying this element of thought are
social sciences, history, literature and games. Space is to do
with potential reversibility and the implications of such
multi-directionality. Even time is thought of in this
radically spatial way in physics, for example the 'backward
time' of Feynman diagrams. Typical activities are plastic
art, physical science, design and depiction. Resemblance is
to do with not so much what something is, but what it is
like, that is to say it is to do with a relation external to the
thing. Activities which depend heavily on this concept are
history, biology, depiction and mythology. In contrast.
Form is to do with internal relations. The relations within
such a formal work count for more than what it is like. This
element of thinking is typified by the activities of design,
music, games and mathematics.
These concepts can be seen as three sets of
complementaries or polarities. These are the dimensions of
















int rnal or external
rm or resemblance
This structure makes sense of a substantial body of human ways of thinking.
These are most accurately described by the concepts which characterise them (e.g.
thinking about development and ambiguity'), however, each way of thinking is
also typified by an identifiable approach to knowledge, an identifiable product.
Thus thinking about development and ambiguity is typified by the production of
literature. Similarly, thinking about form and analysis is typified by the
production of mathematics. Thinking about resemblance and space is typified by
depiction, for example anything from a scientific anatomy drawing to a portrait by
Diane Arbus.
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The convention adopted here is that the development/space polarity is
represented vertically, the analysis/ambiguity polarity is represented from left to
right, and the resemblance/form polarity is represented from front to back.
THE MODEL
The complete model is shown below:
Note that the model can contribute to making sense of controversies about the
nature of certain activities. Eor example, history relates as strongly to literature as
'f does to social science. It thus makes sense that there are controversies between
historians of literary and sociological orientations. In The Nature of History (1970),
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Arthur Marwick makes this controversy plain while discussing Trevelyan:
Returning again to the question of whether history is art or science, Trevelyan
concluded, rather as Thierry had done before him, and as contemporaries like
Stuart Hughes have agreed since, in this fashion: 'Let us call it both or call it
neither, for it has an element of both.'
Macaulay versus Marx, so to speak. This controversy is illustrated by Robert
Graves in / Claudius by an imaginary argument between the Roman historians
Livy and Pollio. The former mythologizes history, the latter scientizes it.
History relates as strongly to biology as it does to myth. In these terms one can
make sense of the controversy between Darwinian claims about the early history
of the world and those of creationists.
The creational view is mythological, with reference to the model, in the same
sense as the evolutionist view is biological. They both make sense of questions
which bear on history, but they do not attempt to answer the same question. A
problem arises when proponents of one view think that it answers questions
posed by the other. As, for example, when a creation myth is thought to answer
a scientific question, or when a scientific theory is thought to have shown that a
myth is stuff and nonsense. These are simply errors of classification. An
interesting example is given by D. J. Kelves: 'To Gabon's mind, the scientific
doctrine of evolution destroyed the religious doctrine of the fall from grace.'
('Annals of Eugenics I', New Yorker, 8 October 1984.)
Similarly it makes sense that social science should be concerned both with
problems of formal logic and games, as in cognitive science, but also be concerned
with issues impinging directly on history, as in sociology, and on biology as for
example in ethology or neuropsychology. The other activities on the model can be
considered in a similar way. For example, design relates as strongly to physical
science as to plastic art, and literature relates as strongly to myth as to music.
REPRESENTATIVE THINKERS
It is helpful to include here another diagram of the model on which have been
placed names of representative thinkers, see next page.
I would not want to take this naming of the cube too far because it encourages
distortion. Most thinkers avoid neat positioning. For example the corner named
'Mondrian' only represents Mondrian at his most well-known neoplastic stage of
development. In his earlier work he was much more concerned with resemblance,
closer to the point named 'Gainsborough' here . Nevertheless as an exercise in
gaining familiarity with the model such naming is worthwhile.
THE MODEL AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL
In the light of the above comment about Mondrian, it is clear that one can see the
model as a tool for the analysis of the development and scope of ways of thinking
in a particular individual. For example, Leonardo was engineer, plastic artist and
anatomist, and these activities can be seen as substantially covering the 'space
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(lower) surface of the model. On the other hand Michaelangelo was best known
as poet and plastic artist: with reference to these achievements the 'ambiguity'
(right-hand) surface is more appropriate. Similarly the 'form' (back) surface, with
Turing Chopin
Linnaeus Gainsborough
lts characteristic activities of maths, games, musicand design strikes one as a good
starting point for any consideration ofWittgenstein. These are clearly preliminary
Analyses, but they demonstrate the potential use of the model with respect to
biographical understanding. Its use with reference to biases inherent within
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particular societies (and how they change) is similar. That ; lo say its use with
respect to the analysis of dominant socially defined notions of reality.
SUMMARY OF AREAS TYPIFYING WAYS OF THINKING
Biology is centred on ideas about single definition (analysis) and external
relations (resemblance).
Physical science: single definition (analysis) and multiple direction (space).
Mathematics: single definition (analysis) and internal relations (form).
Social science: single definition (analysis) and single direction (development).
History: single direction (development) and external relations (resemblance).
Mythology: multiple definition (ambiguity) and external relations
(resemblance).
Depiction: external relations (resemblance) and multiple direction (space).
Plastic art: multiple definition (ambiguity) and multiple direction (space).
Design: internal relations (form) and multiple direction (space).
Music: multiple definition (ambiguity) and internal relations (form).
Literature: multiple definition (ambiguity) and single direction (development).
Games: single direction (development) and internal relations (form).
One might raise objections here. For example: surely there is a great deal of
external relation to music, such as that of Mahler? True enough: the point with
respect to the model is that music can, with a high degree of meaning, be
concerned with internal relations (form) and multiple definition (ambiguity), e.g.
Bach's art of fugue, while other activities are less likely to be so concerned.
Similarly, biology can, with a high degree of meaning, be concerned with external
relations (resemblance) and single definition (analysis), e.g. taxonomy. Other
activities are less likely to be so concerned.
Ways of thinking are thus, one might say, epicentres for particular subject
areas. They are helpful in sorting out one from another, but they do not bind the
thinker. The provide an epistemological home.
THE THINKER NOT THE THING
It is worth stressing the primary importance of the interpreter. In her recent book,
Camera Culture, Halla Beloff has noted that, among other things, the same
photograph can have both scientific and artistic aspects. This is an important
point to consider with reference to the model. What you get out of an artifact
depends on the way you think about it.
A portrait by Rembrandt can be thought of as a work of art. It can also be
thought of as a way of identifying the sitter. It is not that the portrait is both an
artwork and a means of identification; rather what the portrait is depends on how
you use it, on how you think about it. However, certain artifacts are tailored to
certain ways of thinking, that is to say they are produced by a certain way of
thinking and are best understood by that way of thinking. A simple linear
composition by Mondrian is best considered in an ambiguous, formal, spatial
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way. But clearly it could be thought of as a stylized resemblance of scaffolding.
The things which are not tailored to any way of thinking as those of the natural
world. As Blake said: 'Nature has no Outline, but Imagination has'. This is,
perhaps, a key to understanding the model. It is a model of ivhal zoo con imagine.
UNIMAGINABLES
But what happens when we can't imagine something, yet still feel that it's there?
How can we feel it's there if we can't imagine it? We can do this if we regard it as
a context. That is to say something which gives sense to our thought but by virtue
of this cannot be made sense of by our thought.
Such ideas seem strange however they reflect the way we use similarly strange
words such as God. 'God in whom we live and breathe and have our being', sums
the idea up quite well. What is God if not a way of identifying the context for
j thought? Wittgenstein takes this view when he says in his Notebooks (1914-1916)
' that God is the world. The unimaginable context.
This notion of God is mystical not mythical. These notions are entirely distinct,
: although a myth may lead to God just as may a work of theoretical physics. A
, mythological god is a type of thought, not a context for thought. A mythical god
can be the figure of fun or tragedy. A mystical God is not a figure. '1 am that I am'
i is a way of indicating this, as is 'In the beginning was the word, and the word was
j with God and the word was God'. A context, not a jovial personage.
LIBRARY, SCHOOL AND ENCYCLOPAEDIA
I
! To return to the library analogy: in the light of the model one can now imagine
moving round the library and finding each area coherently connected to its
j neighbours. For example one can go from music to literature to history to
psychology to biology to physics to maths to design. Each area leads into its
i neighbours. Since most activities have accompanying texts, the library is a good
j analogy for the model, however one could expand the analogy by extending the
j notion of the library into that of a general resource centre. Here one could play
games as well as read about them, write, make use of laboratories or have a base
for studies, listen to and perform music, paint, etc. Extending the notion of library
is useful because it begins to make clear the possibilities inherent in the model
with respect to the development of a properly integrated theory of education. One
can regard this resource centre as a model for a school or university.
This organisational system has an interesting bearing on the meaning of
encyclopaedia'. This word is defined by Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary as
The circle of human knowledge'. The model can be regarded as a series of circles
of knowledge; a programme for a complete encyclopaedia.
There is, however, one element missing from the library. This is an area
devoted to the consideration of unimaginables. These could be characterised by
j the act of the Zen master who hits his pupil. He knows what he is not talking
| fbout. Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus: 'It is not how things are in the world that




problem cannot be so treated. It is neither interpretable nor uninterpretable. To
approach it on the level of interpretation is not appropriate. In the centre of the
library one could devote an area to the contemplation of these things which
indicate context. The appropriate activity here would be meditation or prayer.
It is interesting to note that Patrick Geddes had just such an area in his
Edinburgh teaching institution, the Outlook Tower. Philip Boardman in The
Worlds of Patrick Geddes (1978) remarks that he thought that it should be an Inlook
Tower as well, and that the 'meditation cell' was the beginning of this.
The significance of the model is reflected in a statement made in 1919 by John
Burnet, the educationalist and classical scholar:
The most important side of any department of knowledge is the side on which
it comes into touch with every other department. To insist on this is the true
function of humanism.
The model can be of use to those who, with Burnet, see an awareness of
connections between activities as essential to an education true to the potential of
the mind.
